Re: [abfab] [Sam Hartman] comments on draft-ietf-abfab-arch

Sam Hartman <hartmans@painless-security.com> Mon, 23 September 2013 12:33 UTC

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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@painless-security.com>
To: David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@kent.ac.uk>
References: <tsl61ug7n72.fsf@mit.edu> <052301ceb814$54e4caa0$feae5fe0$@augustcellars.com> <523FE430.4040106@kent.ac.uk>
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2013 08:33:36 -0400
In-Reply-To: <523FE430.4040106@kent.ac.uk> (David Chadwick's message of "Mon, 23 Sep 2013 07:48:16 +0100")
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Cc: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, 'Sam Hartman' <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>, abfab@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [abfab] [Sam Hartman] comments on draft-ietf-abfab-arch
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>>>>> "David" == David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@kent.ac.uk> writes:

    David> Section 1.  i) Data Minimization and User Participation:
    David> "There is currently no direct client participation in this
    David> decision." (i.e. release of identity attributes). We should
    David> say at this juncture that this is a major deficiency in
    David> existing federated systems, since the user does not have full
    David> consent or control over which of his identity attributes are
    David> released. This should be fixed in Abfab

I do not support this change.

There are some cases where this is a major deficiency, but it's not
entirely clear whether fixing this at the ABFAB layer is the right
approach.

I'd argue that trying to fix the concent problem in a general manner at
the federation layer may have done more harm over the years than the
privacy problem that is trying to be addressed.


    David> iii) I dont buy into your whiteboard example of single entity
    David> authentication, because a hacked whiteboard could trick the
    David> user into opening the wrong file, which could be disasterous
    David> during an important business meeting. SO mutual
    David> authentication is needed here as well. If you want an example
    David> where mutual authentication is not important, its one where
    David> either the information being accessed is of very little value
    David> to the accessor so that it does not matter if it is erroneous
    David> information or not, or one where it does not matter who the
    David> accessor is i.e. its public information.

Most of the tools I'm familiar with for screen sharing etc would not
allow the white board to pick the presentation/file.
I'd support adding a comment that you don't want to run UI on the white
board, but no I think I completely disagree with your proposed
constraints on when this is useful.

--Sam