Re: [abfab] [Sam Hartman] comments on draft-ietf-abfab-arch

David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@kent.ac.uk> Mon, 23 September 2013 20:53 UTC

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Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2013 21:52:44 +0100
From: David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@kent.ac.uk>
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To: Sam Hartman <hartmans@painless-security.com>
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Cc: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, 'Sam Hartman' <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>, abfab@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [abfab] [Sam Hartman] comments on draft-ietf-abfab-arch
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Hi Sam

On 23/09/2013 13:33, Sam Hartman wrote:
>>>>>> "David" == David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@kent.ac.uk> writes:
>
>      David> Section 1.  i) Data Minimization and User Participation:
>      David> "There is currently no direct client participation in this
>      David> decision." (i.e. release of identity attributes). We should
>      David> say at this juncture that this is a major deficiency in
>      David> existing federated systems, since the user does not have full
>      David> consent or control over which of his identity attributes are
>      David> released. This should be fixed in Abfab
>
> I do not support this change.

Which change do you not support
a) saying that this is a major deficiency in existing federated systems
b) saying that Abfab should fix this
c) both


>
> There are some cases where this is a major deficiency, but it's not
> entirely clear whether fixing this at the ABFAB layer is the right
> approach.

So it appears that you support a) but not b). So can you simply add a).

>
> I'd argue that trying to fix the concent problem in a general manner at
> the federation layer may have done more harm over the years than the
> privacy problem that is trying to be addressed.

Actually in my previous research we fixed this in a layer above the 
federation layer, which we called the attribute aggregation layer. So I 
agree that it is best to not fix it in the federation layer.

>
>
>      David> iii) I dont buy into your whiteboard example of single entity
>      David> authentication, because a hacked whiteboard could trick the
>      David> user into opening the wrong file, which could be disasterous
>      David> during an important business meeting. SO mutual
>      David> authentication is needed here as well. If you want an example
>      David> where mutual authentication is not important, its one where
>      David> either the information being accessed is of very little value
>      David> to the accessor so that it does not matter if it is erroneous
>      David> information or not, or one where it does not matter who the
>      David> accessor is i.e. its public information.
>
> Most of the tools I'm familiar with for screen sharing etc would not
> allow the white board to pick the presentation/file.

Meaning that the user sends an already chosen file to the whiteboard?
In which case I agree with you.

> I'd support adding a comment that you don't want to run UI on the white
> board, but no I think I completely disagree with your proposed
> constraints on when this is useful.

I would be interested to learn of another generic type of use case where 
you think that mutual authn is not needed

regards

David
>
> --Sam
>