[Ace] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-17: (with COMMENT)

[Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-17: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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* Section 4.  Per “the DTLS connections SHOULD only be kept alive for EST
messages that are relatively close to each other”, I think the text means that
some EST messages are more likely to occur one after another.  It would be
worth being clearer what these would be.

* Section 5.1. Per “These URIs are shorter than the ones in [RFC7030]”, does
Table 1 imply that when using EST-coaps the “longer names” from RFC7030
wouldn’t be valid?

* Section 5.2  Per “The latter ones are deemed to expensive …”, was difficult
to parse as the sentence prior has three things (instead of two).  Is this
sentence referring to the “not specified functions” only?

* Section 5.3, Per “30% smaller payload for DER-encoded ASN.1”, if you can cite
this metric, please do.

* Section 5.8.  Per “In summary, the symmetrically encrypted key is included in
the encryptedKey attribute in a KEKRecipientInfo structure”, if this is done in
a server-side key generation scenario, where is the client getting the key to
decrypt the server computed key material?  Should the DecryptKeyIdentifier/
AsymmetricDecryptKeyIdentifier attributes be populated in the CSR per Sections
4.4.1.1/4.4.1.2 of RFC7030?

* Section 10.1.  Per “When server-side key generation is used, the constrained
device depends on the server to generate the private key randomly, but it still
needs locally generated random numbers for use in security protocols, as
explained in Section 12 of [RFC7925].”, is the “security protocols” referenced
here anything beyond DTLS?

* Section 10.1.  Per “In such occasions, checking the certificate revocation
status or authorizing the client using another method is important for the
server to ensure that the client is to be trusted.”

-- does this text suggest that expired+revoked certificates should not be used?

-- to word-smith:
s/for the server to ensure that the client is to be trusted/for the server to
raise its confidence that the client can be trusted/

* Section 10.1.  Per “More information about recommendations of TLS and DTLS
are included in   [BCP195]”, thanks for referencing BCP195.  Could you please
clarify with normative language if these recommendations SHOULD/MUST be
followed?

* Editorial
- Section 4.  Per “Authenticating and negotiating DTLS keys requires resources
on low- end endpoints and consumes valuable bandwidth”, I’m not sure this
sentence is needed.  Technically, “authenticating and negotiating DTLS keys
requires resources” on any endpoint.

- Section 4.
OLD: Given that after a successful enrollment, it is more likely that a new EST
transaction will take place after a significant amount of time, NEW: Given that
after a successful enrollment, it is more likely that a new EST transaction
will not take place for a significant amount of time,

- Section 5.5. Typo.  s/successfull/successful/

- Section 5.8.  s/Such scenarios could be when it is …/Such scenarios apply
when it is …/

- Section 5.8.  s/ client, or when the resources/client, when the resources/

- Section 5.8. s/Then the private key/The private key/