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Re: [Acme] Why "HTTP verification"

Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> Wed, 03 December 2014 16:02 UTC

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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
Date: Wed, 03 Dec 2014 16:01:37 +0000
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To: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [Acme] Why "HTTP verification"
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On Tue Dec 02 2014 at 7:15:54 PM Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:05 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
> wrote:
> > Greetings again. A few people have asked for HTTP-based verification for
> the certificate request, but I'm not sure that is needed. Are there
> environments where someone who will be able to stand up a server with a
> CA-issued cert on HTTPS-over-443 could not stand up such a service with a
> temporary self-issued cert? If not, what is the value of checking if the
> person can control the content on port 80?
>
> The primary case where I see a problem is when the site already has a
> trusted certificate and wants to use ACME to get a new certificate.
> They are unlikely to want to replace their working certificate with a
> self-signed certificate.


Why would you need to replace it? You use SNI on some new domain...


> So the proof would need to happen at the
> HTTP layer, not the TLS layer.
>
> Thanks,
> Peter
>
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