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[Acme] Why "HTTP verification"

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Tue, 02 December 2014 18:05 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: [Acme] Why "HTTP verification"
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Greetings again. A few people have asked for HTTP-based verification for the certificate request, but I'm not sure that is needed. Are there environments where someone who will be able to stand up a server with a CA-issued cert on HTTPS-over-443 could not stand up such a service with a temporary self-issued cert? If not, what is the value of checking if the person can control the content on port 80?

--Paul Hoffman

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