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Re: [Acme] Why "HTTP verification"

Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com> Wed, 03 December 2014 16:30 UTC

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Date: Wed, 03 Dec 2014 08:30:08 -0800
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From: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
To: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
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Cc: acme@ietf.org, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [Acme] Why "HTTP verification"
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On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 8:01 AM, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:
> On Tue Dec 02 2014 at 7:15:54 PM Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:05 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
>> > Greetings again. A few people have asked for HTTP-based verification for
>> > the certificate request, but I'm not sure that is needed. Are there
>> > environments where someone who will be able to stand up a server with a
>> > CA-issued cert on HTTPS-over-443 could not stand up such a service with a
>> > temporary self-issued cert? If not, what is the value of checking if the
>> > person can control the content on port 80?
>>
>> The primary case where I see a problem is when the site already has a
>> trusted certificate and wants to use ACME to get a new certificate.
>> They are unlikely to want to replace their working certificate with a
>> self-signed certificate.
>
> Why would you need to replace it? You use SNI on some new domain...

Assuming I want to get a new certificate for secure.example.org, which
is current using a certificate from Connotation, a trusted CA.  How
would using SNI on another FQDN help validate control of
secure.example.org?

The ACME proposal suggests that "DV + Proof of Possession of previous
CA-signed key" is the appropriate mechanism for "Existing valid certs,
first use of ACME."  However I don't see a clear definition of DV
outside of DVSNI.

Thanks,
Peter

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