Re: [Add] [Ext] Validity of network administrator role

[Frode Kileng <[e-mail]>]

On 16/08/2019 18:30, Bret Jordan wrote:
> Not every devices supports this.  Please stop using the “endpoints can 
> do everything” argument that been fronted by the “there is nothing 
> wrong camp” for the last 5 years.

How can "your" ISP DNS-filtering solution protect my children when not 
connected that specific network? How can it protect if the end-point 
bypass the network specific DNS using DoT or some "hidden" mechanisms? 
How can a "FQDN matching rule" protect when the malware/"dangerous 
content" is distributed from a previously un-classified source or 
distributed from a source normally considered safe?

Wanting to add competitive advantages compared to other ISPs by offering 
a DNS-based filtering solution is a perfectly good business argument but 
I cannot understand the argument that this is the only or best solution 
for this specific use-case.

Frode


>
> Thanks,
> Bret
> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing 
> that can not be unscrambled is an egg."
>
>> On Aug 16, 2019, at 12:56 AM, Frode Kileng <[e-mail] 
>> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>
>> On 15/08/2019 23:58, Bret Jordan wrote:
>> <snip>
>>> If you say that the parental controls you have signed up for and 
>>> paid money for are no longer going to work, you might get a 
>>> different answer.
>>
>> There are numerous other client-side child-safe products in the 
>> markets that will continue to work perfectly well. Please please stop 
>> using this "save the children" argument that has been fronted by the 
>> "anti-encryption camp" for the last 5 years.
>>
>> frodek
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -- 
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