Re: [Anima] Sheng/Robert/*: Re: Result//Re: WGLC for draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm-06, ends Feb. 15th, 2023

[Toerless Eckert <[e-mail]>]

This is the second and final set of review feedbacks for draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm-06,
sorry for the long time it took.

I am continuing after where i stopped in the first review.

[major]

I am worried about the non-support for the mechanisms of CSRattr in this spec and
would like to see that functionality for this gets added. In BRSKI, support for
CSRattr, and hence the inclusion of Registrar determined attributes into the CSR
of the pledge is mandatory to support, and just because pledges are in PRM does
not seem to be a good enough reason for me to suspect that we could be successful
in the same breaths of flexible secure domain deployments without similar support.

I would like to request/propose to solve this issue through two complementary
options: 

a) CSR attr in PER trigger

Do: The PER trigger messages agent-signed data should be extended to include an optional
field that can be filled with a Content-Transfer-Encoding of "base64" [RFC2045] encoded
CsrAttr structure according to RFC7030 and clarified by I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs.
Unfortunately, i think the inclusion of this data may make it prudent to also sign
the PER trigger then in the same fashion as the PVR trigger is signed. So maybe
this means to define the following into section 6.1.3:

   # The PER in General JWS Serialization syntax
   {
     "payload": "BASE64URL(ietf-pledge-enrolment-request:prm")",
     "signatures": [
       {
         "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
         "signature": "base64encodedvalue=="
       }
     ]
   }

   # Decoded Payload "ietf-pledge-enrolment-request:prm" Representation
     in JSON syntax
   "ietf-pledge-enrolment-request:prm": {
      "enroll-type" : "enroll-generic-cert",
      "csr-attributes": "base64encodedvalue==",
   }

   # Decoded "JWS Protected Header" Representation in JSON syntax
   {
       "alg": "ES256",
       "x5c": [
         "base64encodedvalue==",
         "base64encodedvalue=="
       ],
       "typ": "per-trigger-jws+json"
   }

Write: The optional "cs-attributes" field of the PER trigger message
is intended to include those CSR attributes according to [EST] as clarified
by I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs, that can be known by the registrar-agent
before authenticating the pledge. This can includes attributes which are
common across the domain such as, such as allowed type(s) and length(s)
of the public key of the pledge. Attributes depending on the pledge or its
identity can be included as well, as long as the registrar-agent can be
made to know them. Mechanisms for how the registrar-agent can learn these
attributes are out-of-scope in this document but expected to use the same
or derived mechanisms to those by which the registrar-agent may learn the
list of pledges serial-number to attempt to enroll.

And in 6.1.4 write:

Thes "csr-attributes" of the PER trigger MUST be handled by the pledge in
forming the PER CSR ("p10-csr") according to [EST], Section 4.5.2 and
clarified by I-D.ietf-lamps.rfc7030-csrattrs.

b) Overriding and extending CSR attributes

The following text should go in an appropriate section, not clear which one:

When using BRSKI-PRM, additional protocol roundtrips between pledge, registrar-agent
and registrar beyond the two specified in this document are prohibitive because
BRSKI-PRM is optimized for the case where the registrar agent needs to physically
move between connectivity to the pledge and connectivity to the registar.

In BRSKI, pledge specific CSR attributes can be determined after successful mutual
authentication between pledge and registar - including the existance/creation of a voucher
for the pledge through the MASA. For example, in [RFC8994], the registrar 
(or a backend server that is consulted by the registar) can determine the exact details
of the AcpNodeName attribute after authentication of the pledge and applying policy
against the type (derived from the serial-number) and location of the pledge.
This AcpNodeName incurs allocation of an IPv6 address for the pledge which if
done before acceptance of the pledge into the domain (in conjunction with issuance of
a a voucher) could at best be tentative and might need to be undone later, and at worsti
it could be a new undesirable attack vector.

If CSR attributes such as these are needed to be included in the pledges LDevID
when using BRSKI-PRM, then the registrar SHOULD add/override the attributes provided
by the pledge in its PER and use a protocol such as full Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
towards the CA, which provides mechanisms to override CSR Attributes. See also [BRSKI], Section 5.9.2.

---
overlooked fixes in first part:

1280	   IDevID, proof of identity is provided.  Here, a JOSE object is being
1281	   created in which the body utilizes the YANG module ietf-ztp-types
1282	   with the grouping for csr-grouping for the CSR as defined in
1283	   [I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr].

1343	   The body of the pledge enrollment-request SHOULD contain a P10
1344	   parameter (for PKCS#10) as defined for ietf-ztp-types:p10-csr in
1345	   [I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr]:
1347	   *  P10: contains the base64-encoded PKCS#10 of the pledge.

1343	   The body of the pledge enrollment-request SHOULD contain a P10
1344	   parameter (for PKCS#10) as defined for ietf-ztp-types:p10-csr in
1345	   [I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr]:
1347	   *  P10: contains the base64-encoded PKCS#10 of the pledge.

[major]

I find the text sections referring to I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr confusing and
i fear it is misleading:

The use of "ietf-ztp-types" in the PER JSON format, and the text saying this
is from I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr makes it sound as if one could or
should be allowed to also form a PER JSON using any of the other 
options defined in the I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr YANG module. But its not
clear whether that is actually intended. It is also not clear how would
format the JSON, because the netconf draft does not specify any JSON, and
as far as i can tell, there is no well defined mapping from YANG to JSON
that would ensure that two independent implementations trying to do this
would be interoperable - or am i wrong ? Aka: If two implementation 
(pledge, registrar/-agent) tried to use "cmp-csr" instead of "p10-csr".

I also fear that by claiming to inherit/refer to the netconf drafts specification,
we do incur more formal spec requirements (i may easily be wrong).

In any case, i think this document would be a lot easier if formal must/YANG
references to the netconf draft would be removed, and this draft would just
specify what is in the "p10-csr" JSON element standalone. Which i think
it already does mostly. One can still add a sentence that this definition
is in "the spirit" of what is also defined in the netconf draft (with reference).

Aka: The introduction and use of "ietf-ztp-types" on line 1364 does not
seem to be related to any registry, so it seems we do not need to do any
reference work to any registry or any netconf draft section, aka: this is
all about removing unnecessary text about the netconf text to make what
the draft specifies standaline, even if it is cloning ideas from the network
draft (like that string name).

Aka: no spec changes needed here.

I would like to see the text avoid rhe abbreviation P10 though, and just
refer to PKCS#10 and "p10-csr" to avoid introducing redundant terms/abbreviations.

[major - or not?]

I find the use or non-use of the media-types confusing. For example, there
is no "typ" field in the PER JWS header, and the media-types that this
draft does suggest/use feel like being all over the place.

I think PRM messages would be less confusing if they all used JWS
(i am making a point below to also do this for the PER trigger), and
all had media-types that would allow to identify each message,
and where all consistent. something like application/brski-<message-type>-jose+json
where message-type could be pvrt (pledge voucher request trigger),
pvr (pledge-voucher-request), rpvr (registrar pledge-voucher-request) - and
so on, for all of them. 

Yes, i can not make a real strong functional argument for this except
maybe that at some point there would be a benefit that all these messages
would much better self-identify if they'd be on disk even without HTTP
header.

---
Following are inline comments/discusses.
---

1842	   The Content-Type header of PER is: application/jose+json.

As top posted [major] discusses, i would suggest something like
"application/prm+jose+json"

1844	   This is a deviation from the Content-Type header values used in
1845	   [RFC7030] and results in additional processing at the domain
1846	   registrar (as EST server).

1846	   Note, the registrar is already aware that
1847	   the bootstrapping is performed in a pledge-responder-mode due to the
1848	   use of the LDevID(RegAgt) certificate for TLS and the provided PVR as
1849	   JSON-in-JWS object.

As mentioned in before, i would like to remove the reliance on the certificate used
to authenticate the pledge, because it is unnecessary. Like in EST and BRSKI,
the purpose of a request should always only be deduced from operation path and
if necessary by media-type. So pls. remove.

1851	   *  If the registrar receives a PER with Content-Type header:
1852	      application/jose+json, it MUST verify the wrapping signature using
                         ^prm+
1853	      the certificate indicated in the JOSE header.

Please specify which cert is used (pledge or agent).

1855	   *  The registrar verifies that the pledge's certificate (here
1856	      IDevID), carried in "x5c" header field, is accepted to join the
1857	      domain

s/is accepted/is authorized/

1857	      after successful validation of the PVR.

I would suggest to remove this. This is confusing, because it can be interpreted
to imply that the PVR/voucher have some impact on whether or not the domain
authorizes the pledge. Which it logically does not have (that would just be
an internal implementation optimization on the registrar, and would be an
additionals security issue).


1859	   *  If both succeed, the registrar utilizes the PKCS#10 request

s/both succeed/this succeeds/

1860	      contained in the JWS object body as "P10" parameter of "ietf-sztp-
                                                                    ^ the

s/"P10"/the "p10-csr"/ 

1861	      csr:csr" for further processing of the enrollment request with the
1862	      corresponding domain CA.  It creates a registrar-enrollment-
1863	      request (RER) by utilizing the protocol expected by the domain CA.

1864	      The domain registrar may either directly forward the provided
1865	      PKCS#10 request to the CA or provide additional information about
1866	      attributes to be included by the CA into the requested LDevID
1867	      certificate.  The approach of sending this information to the CA
1868	      depends on the utilized certificate management protocol between
1869	      the RA and the CA and is out of scope for this document.

This text from 1864-1869 would be good to replace with the proposed text
for "Overriding and extending CSR attributes" i wrote earlier, except that
it is probably better to have here just a forward pointer and write this
in a later section about registrar behavior.

1871	   The registrar-agent SHALL send the PER to the registrar by HTTP POST
1872	   to the endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/requestenroll"

1874	   The registrar SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 OK in the success case
1875	   or fail with HTTP 4xx/5xx status codes as defined by the HTTP
1876	   standard.

replace "HTTP standard" with appropriate RFC reference.

1878	   A successful interaction with the domain CA will result in a pledge
1879	   LDevID certificate, which is then forwarded by the registrar to the

s/forwarded/returned/

1880	   registrar-agent using the Content-Type header: application/
1881	   pkcs7-mime.
                     ^ in response to the PER.

[major]

If retrieval of the CA certs is optional, then care must be taken that
the pkcs7-mime pledge certificate can be authenticated against the pinned
domain certificate from the voucher alone. This may not be the case,
for example if the pinned-domain cert is just the registrar cert.

This would be good to write down, unless:

In general, i would prefer if the cert repsonse is also signed
via JWS+JSON with the registrar-cert. This would also better mimic
BRSKI where the pledge does trust the cert because of the voucher
authenticated TLS connection. This wold make delivery of CA-certs completely
optional to get successfully an initial cert.

[major]

This step involves actual authorization of the pledge to be
enrolled (remember the voucher is really just to make the pledge trust the
domain and some initial invitation, but not a finalized invite for the
certificate - for example the actual issuance of a certificate could incur
additional checks, such as whether the device was encountered in the
correct location in the network designated for it.

Long story short: This enrolment / reply may take some time. I think in BRSKI, we have
some text about HTTP "come back later" or similar replies instead of "fail".
It would be helpfull if we would also be able to make BRSKI-PRM work in a way where the registrar-agent
would be able to repeat requests and specify whatever is easy to say about
these "wait" or "come back later" HTTP replies (ENOTIME to find this text right now
in BRSKI).

1883	6.2.7.  Request Wrapped-CA-certificate(s) (Registrar-Agent to Registrar)
                                   ^
pick upper or lower, but make it consistent troughout the document.

1885	   As the pledge will verify it own certificate LDevID certificate when
                                       ^s

1886	   received, it also needs the corresponding CA certificates.  This is

Confusing - this makes it sound as if the corresponding CA certificates are
required so the pledge can verify the LDevID. But this is not really necessary.
The pledge simply trusts the LDevID in BRSKI/EST because it is received over
the TLS connection that was authenticated by the voucher. The CA certificates
are only needed so the pledge can authenticate peers. One can create use-cases
where the pledge for example only needs to originate signed messages but not
authenticate peers, and in which it would therefore not need to receive CA
certificates.

1886	   This is
1887	   done in EST [RFC7030] using the "/.well-known/est/cacerts" endpoint,
1888	   which provides the CA certificates over a TLS protected connection.
1889	   BRSKI-PRM requires a signature wrapped CA certificate object, to
1890	   avoid that the pledge can be provided with arbitrary CA certificates
1891	   in an authorized way.  The registrar signed CA certificate object
1892	   will allow the pledge to verify the authorization to install the
1893	   received CA certificate(s).  As the CA certificate(s) are provided to
1894	   the pledge after the voucher, the pledge has the required information
1895	   (the domain certificate) to verify the wrapped CA certificate object.

Note: it may be useful to create the reference to RFC7030 so it will read [EST],
that way one avoids duplication like "EST [RFC7030]". Same for other commonly
used words in the draft, like [HTTP].

Suggest to replace 1885 - 1895 with:

In [EST], CA certificate(s) returned by the registrar to the pledge via
the /cacerts operation path are authenticated via the TLS connection to
the pledge which is authenticated by the pledge through the voucheer.
In BRSKI-PRM, this is achieved by the registar-agent retrieving the
CA certificates from the registrar wrapped with a registrar signature.

1897	   To support registrar-agents requesting a signature wrapped CA
1898	   certificate(s) object, a new endpoint for BRSKI-PRM is defined on the
1899	   registrar: "/.well-known/brski/wrappedcacerts"

1901	   The registrar-agent SHALL requests the EST CA trust anchor database
1902	   information (in form of CA certificates) by HTTP GET.

This section so far has no context. Suggest to write that the registrar-agent
will request the wrapped CA certificates after the certificate request/reply with
the registrar. And i guess we can say "successful" (aka: only when registrar
has given registrar-agent a cert for the pledge).

[major - but weird]
there is a weird set of use cases i can imagine, where the pledge might not (yet)
receive a certificate, but just the trust-anchors. I don't think we ever fully
considered this in BRSKI explicitly (but it could work there), but in BRSKI-PRM
it may be more useful, because the trust-anchors may suffice for a pledge to do all or part of its job,
such as listenening and trusting other messages from the domain. And avoid
having to rely/cache the voucher if/when it is instructed to take a certificate
from the domain later.

but if you don't immediately see value in it, then ignore this thought.

1904	   The Content-Type header of the response SHALL be: application/
1905	   jose+json.

1907	   This is a deviation from the Content-Type header values used in EST
1908	   [RFC7030] and results in additional processing at the domain
                    ^ Section 4.1.3
1909	   registrar (as EST server).  The additional processing is to sign the
1910	   CA certificate(s) information using the registrar EE credentials.
... and encode it as JSON+JWS.

Also: why does this need to say "EE credentials" ? And is this not also wrong ?

Aka: Lets assume the voucher had just one (root) CA certificate, but the registrar
itself is enrolled via an intermediate CA. In this case the signature would not
only be the EE certicate of the registrar, but would also need to include the
intermediate CA certificate - otherwise the pledge could not authenticate the
CA certs.

Something like "The registrar certificate information included in the JWS header
needs to suffice to be authenticated against the pinned certificate in the voucher for the
pledge to authenticate the message. For example, it is not sufficient to include the
registrars EE certificate if it was signed by an intermediate CA but the voucher
has only the root certificate of the domain pinned. In this case, the JWS certificate
information also needs to contain the intermediate certificate."

1911	   This results in a signed CA certificate(s) object (JSON-in-JWS), the
1912	   CA certificates are provided as base64 encoded "x5b" in the JWS
1913	   payload.

1915	   # The CA certificates data with additional registrar signature in
1916	     General JWS Serialization syntax
1917	   {
1918	     "payload": "BASE64URL(certs)",
1919	     "signatures": [
1920	       {
1921	         "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",

Curious: Why do you use some "nice" textual string here instead of what looks
like a formal registered name in the other JWS+JSON headers. I would actually
prefer to reuse exactly this string "JWS Protected Header" in all JWS+JSON
messages in this document given how i think we never want to demultiplex/decide
anything  based on this field, but only based on the media-type, ... or do we ??

(that would eliminate confusion what the impact of those "looks like registered name" here is...).

1922	         "signature": "base64encodedvalue=="
1923	       }
1924	     ]
1925	   }

1927	   # Decoded payload "certs" representation in JSON syntax
1928	   {
1929	     "x5b": [
1930	       "base64encodedvalue==",
1931	       "base64encodedvalue=="
1932	     ]
1933	   }

[major]

There is no "x5b" in RFC7515 and you have no explanation what the meaning of
those two base64 encoded values is. Could/should this not simply be "cert-pkcs7-mime"
with just one base64 encoded value (the pkcs7-mime base64 encoded CA certificate chain ?)

In any case - needs to be explained, and unless there is a good reason to use a
non-descriptive "x5b" term, i'd prefer a more prescriptive name.

1935	   # Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation in JSON syntax
1936	   {
1937	     "alg": "ES256",
1938	     "x5c": [
1939	       "base64encodedvalue==",
1940	       "base64encodedvalue=="
1941	     ]
1942	   }

1944	          Figure 13: Representation of CA certificate(s) data with
1945	                       additional registrar signature

1947	6.3.  Response Object Supply by Registrar-Agent to Pledge
                         
Response Objects supplied by the Registrar-Agent to the Pledge

1949	   It is assumed that the registrar-agent already obtained the
1950	   bootstrapping response objects from the domain registrar and can
1951	   supply them to the pledge:

1953	   *  voucher-response - Voucher (from MASA via Registrar)

1955	   *  wrapped-CA-certificate(s)-response - CA certificates
                                                                 ^(s)

1957	   *  enrollment-response - LDevID(Pledge) certificate (from CA via
1958	      Registrar)

1960	   The registrar-agent will re-connect to the pledge.  To contact the

To deliver these response object, the registrar-agent will ...

1961	   pledge, it may either discover the pledge as described in
1962	   Section 5.4.2 or use stored information from the first contact with
1963	   the pledge.

1965	   Preconditions in addition to Section 6.2:

1967	   *  Registrar-agent: possesses voucher and LDevID certificate and

s/possesses/has obtained/

(we have this special meaning for posesession such as for proof of possession,
 so i'd avoid it unless it's used in the context of something where you
 can create proof of possession).

1968	      optionally CA certificates.

Its nice that you reconfirm "optionally" here, but from the text leading here,
i have seen no description as to who or how determines whether or not
the CA certificates will be made available to the plegde. Any explanation
would be nice (whereever it fits best).

1970	   +--------+                        +-----------+
1971	   | Pledge |                        | Registrar-|
1972	   |        |                        | Agent     |
1973	   |        |                        | (RegAgt)  |
1974	   +--------+                        +-----------+
1975	       |                          [voucher and enrollment]
1976	       |                          [responses available]
1977	       |                                   |
1978	       |<------- supply voucher -----------|
1979	       |                                   |
1980	       |--------- voucher status --------->| - store
1981	       |                                   |   pledge voucher status
1982	       |<----- supply CA certificates  ----|
1983	       |                                   |
1984	       |<--- supply enrollment response ---|
1985	       |                                   |
1986	       |--------- enroll status ---------->| - store
1987	       |                                   |   pledge enroll status
1988	       |<--- supply CAcerts (optional) ----|
1989	       |                                   |

1991	        Figure 14: Responses and status handling between pledge and
1992	                              registrar-agent


Nice picture, but now i am confused what "supply CA certificates" is
versus "supply CAcerts (optional)" (cold read: this concern is written
without knowing whats written further down. But also the tree bullet
points above in this section didn't distinguish between
"CA certificates" and "CAcerts (optional)".

1994	   The content of the response objects is defined by the voucher
1995	   [RFC8366] and the certificate [RFC5280].

I think this sentence is misleading here given how we know from prior text
in this document, that the format is much more specific, such as JWS+JSON
voucher and pkcs#7-mime certificate.

If this is meant as a more general excurse into how one could potentially
use all type of encodings in variations of a PRM which are not specified
in this document, then thats text for an appendix or something much further below,
but not here. Aka: delete sentence or make references specific to the actual
formats specified in this spec.

1997	   The registrar-agent provides the information via distinct pledge
1998	   endpoints as following.

2000	6.3.1.  Pledge: Voucher Response Processing

2002	   The registrar-agent SHALL send the voucher-response to the pledge by
2003	   HTTP POST to the endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/sv".

2005	   The registrar-agent voucher-response Content-Type header is
2006	   application/voucher-jws+json and contains the voucher as provided by
2007	   the MASA.  An example is given in Figure 11 for a MASA signed voucher
2008	   and in Figure 12 for the voucher with the additional signature of the
2009	   registrar.

The figure numbers 11/12 don't seem to be correct.

2011	   A nonceless voucher may be accepted as in [RFC8995] and may be
2012	   allowed by a manufacture's pledge implementation.

Can a pledge that knows the voucher will be nonceless not include the
nonce in the JWS+JSON PVR message ? In that case it would be good to
mention thi earlier in the document where you specify the none message
element (e.g.: add (optional)).

2014	   To perform the validation of multiple signatures on the voucher

s/multiple/the different/ ??

2015	   object, the pledge SHALL perform the signature verification in the
2016	   following order:

2018	   1.  Verify MASA signature as described in section 5.6.1 in [RFC8995]

... against pre-installed vendor trust anchors.

2020	   2.  Install trust anchor contained in the voucher ("pinned-domain-
2021	       cert") provisionally

2023	   3.  Verify registrar signature as described in section 5.6.1 in
2024	       [RFC8995], but take the registrar certificate instead of the MASA
2025	       certificate for the verification

2027	   4.  Validate the registrar certificate received in the agent-
2028	       provided-proximity-registrar-cert in the pledge-voucher-request
2029	       trigger request (in the field "agent-provided-proximity-
2030	       registrar-cert").

[major]

I think this is in the wrong order or miswritten. Step 3 can not verify a signature
from a certificate that was not verified in before, and i do not see that the
registrar certificate mentioned in step 3 was verified in before. Or is this
assumed to be the pinned-domain-cert mentioned in step 2, and the text just
uses different words to make it impossible to match up terms ?

But be that as it may: i really don't know what steps 3 and 4 are good for.
I think they are not needed, but later when pledge-certificate and CA-certs
are received will those objects need to be authenticated against the
signature of the registrar, and that requires to first authenticate the
registrar certificate against the pinned-domain-cert from step 3.

If 3 and 4 can go, that also means that step 2 is not provisional, but
would per permanent, unless the pinned domain cert is later superceeded by
the CA certs.

2032	   If all steps stated above have been performed successfully, the
2033	   pledge SHALL terminate the "PROVISIONAL accept" state for the domain
2034	   trust anchor and the registrar EE certificate.

2036	   If an error occurs during the verification and validation of the
2037	   voucher, this SHALL be reported in the reason field of the pledge
2038	   voucher status.

2040	6.3.2.  Pledge: Voucher Status Telemetry

2042	   After voucher verification and validation the pledge MUST reply with
2043	   a status telemetry message as defined in section 5.7 of [RFC8995].
2044	   The pledge generates the voucher-status and provides it as signed
2045	   JSON-in-JWS object in response to the registrar-agent.

2047	   The response has the Content-Type application/jose+json and is signed
2048	   using the IDevID of the pledge as shown in Figure 15.  As the reason
2049	   field is optional (see [RFC8995]), it MAY be omitted in case of
2050	   success.

2052	   # The "pledge-voucher-status" telemetry in general JWS
2053	     serialization syntax
2054	   {
2055	     "payload": "BASE64URL(pledge-voucher-status)",
2056	     "signatures": [
2057	       {
2058	         "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
2059	         "signature": "base64encodedvalue=="
2060	       }
2061	     ]
2062	   }

2064	   # Decoded payload "pledge-voucher-status" representation in JSON
2065	     syntax
2066	   {
2067	     "version": 1,
2068	     "status": true,
2069	     "reason": "Voucher successfully processed",
2070	     "reason-context": {
2071	       "additional": "JSON"
2072	     }
2073	   }

2075	   # Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation in JSON syntax
2076	   {
2077	     "alg": "ES256",
2078	     "x5c": [
2079	       "base64encodedvalue==",
2080	       "base64encodedvalue=="
2081	     ]
2082	   }

2084	        Figure 15: Representation of pledge voucher status telemetry

A second picture with an excerpt of a useful error message would be great.
( aka: only showing the dedodec payload.) 

"failed to authenticate MASA certificate because it starts in the future (1/1/2023). Current date: 1/1/1970"
(typical local clock failure on pledges ;-))

[major]

What happens if there is an interruption in the process, and the registrar-agent
does not get to record on disk the successful enrolment ? how does it restart ?
It could attempt to re-send the same voucher, but then it should also get
again success status instead of some errror it can't interpret "you already
gave me the voucher 5 minutes ago".

Aka: would be good to ensure that the sending of voucher and status can repeated
an result in the same positive status.

2086	6.3.3.  Pledge: Wrapped-CA-Certificate(s) Processing

2088	   The registrar-agent SHALL provide the set of CA certificates
2089	   requested from the registrar to the pledge by HTTP POST to the
2090	   endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/cc".

2092	   As the CA certificate provisioning is crucial from a security
2093	   perspective, this provisioning SHALL only be done, if the voucher-
2094	   response has been successfully processed by pledge.

Well.... i don't think this is good text. The registrar-agent can always
try to provide CA certificates if it wants to enroll the pledge. Its the
pledge that would reject this if the voucher was not previously successfully
accepted by the pledge. Aka: there is no harm in the registrar-agent trying,
but if you accept the consideration from my major after line 2084, then one
could write that the registrar-agent SHOULD only send  the CA-certificates
(like the following pledge certificate) after having received a successful
voucher telemetry from the pledge.

2096	   The supply CA certificates message has the Content-Type application/
                                                               
s/supply//
s/the/a/

2097	   jose+json and is signed using the credential of the registrar pledge
2098	   as shown in Figure 13.

"registrar pledge" ?

2100	   The CA certificates are provided as base64 encoded "x5b".  The pledge
2101	   SHALL install the received CA certificates as trust anchor after
2102	   successful verification of the registrar's signature.

[major]

This i think is where to elaborate on the 5 verification steps:
- first authenticat registrar certificate against the pinned-domain-cert
- then authenticate the message signature.

2104	   The following 4xx client error codes SHOULD be used by the pledge:

2106	   *  403 Forbidden: if the validation of the wrapping signature or
2107	      another security check fails.

2109	   *  415 Unsupported Media Type: if the Content-Type of the request is
2110	      in an unknown or unsupported format.

2112	   *  400 Bad Request: if the pledge detects errors in the encoding of
2113	      the payload.

2115	6.3.4.  Pledge: Enrollment Response Processing

2117	   The registrar-agent SHALL send the enroll-response to the pledge by
2118	   HTTP POST to the endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/se".

2120	   The registrar-agent enroll-response Content-Type header, when using
2121	   EST [RFC7030] as enrollment protocol between the registrar-agent and
2122	   the infrastructure is: application/pkcs7-mime.  Note: It only
2123	   contains the LDevID certificate for the pledge, not the certificate
2124	   chain.

I think it is factually wrong that a pkcs7-mime does not contain a certificate chain.
AFAIK it can contain perfectly well not only the signing certificate but also
a chain of intermediate certificate in case those need to be supplied by the
owner of the certificate later knowing that the distributed trust-anchors are not
the signing certificates.

[major]

See my above comment about this only being sufficient if there was CA certificates
given to the pledge or the pinned-domain-cert of the voucher containing the
certificate chain sufficient to authenticate the pledges certificate later.
So if you do not want to wrap the certificate respnse into a registrar
signature, then i think those conditions need to be described here.

2126	   Upon reception, the pledge SHALL verify the received LDevID
2127	   certificate.  The pledge SHALL generate the enroll status and provide
2128	   it in the response to the registrar-agent.  If the verification of
2129	   the LDevID certificate succeeds, the status SHALL be set to true,
2130	   otherwise to FALSE.

In JSON i guess it's "true" and "false", so lets not invent additional ways to write the
same (TRUE, FALSE).

2132	6.3.5.  Pledge: Enrollment Status Telemetry

2134	   The pledge MUST reply with a status telemetry message as defined in
2135	   section 5.9.4 of [RFC8995].  As for the other objects, the enroll-
2136	   status is signed and results in a JSON-in-JWS object.  If the pledge
2137	   verified the received LDevID certificate successfully it SHALL sign
2138	   the response using its new LDevID credentials as shown in Figure 16.
2139	   In the failure case, the pledge SHALL use the available IDevID
2140	   credentials.  As the reason field is optional, it MAY be omitted in
2141	   case of success.

2143	   The response has the Content-Type application/jose+json.

2145	   # The "pledge-enroll-status" telemetry in General JWS Serialization
2146	     syntax
2147	   {
2148	     "payload": "BASE64URL(pledge-enroll-status)",
2149	     "signatures": [
2150	       {
2151	         "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
2152	         "signature": "base64encodedvalue=="
2153	       }
2154	     ]
2155	   }

2157	   # Decoded payload "pledge-enroll-status" representation in
2158	     JSON syntax
2159	   {
2160	     "version": 1,
2161	     "status": true,
2162	     "reason": "Enrollment response successfully processed",
2163	     "reason-context": {
2164	       "additional": "JSON"
2165	     }
2166	   }

2168	   # Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation in JSON syntax
2169	   {
2170	     "alg": "ES256",
2171	     "x5c": [
2172	       "base64encodedvalue==",
2173	       "base64encodedvalue=="
2174	     ]
2175	   }

2177	        Figure 16: Representation of pledge enroll status telemetry

negative example (only payload) would again be a fine addition.

2179	   Once the registrar-agent has collected the information, it can
2180	   connect to the registrar to provide it with the status responses.

2182	6.3.6.  Telemetry Voucher Status and Enroll Status Handling (Registrar-
2183	        Agent to Domain Registrar)

2185	   The following description requires that the registrar-agent has
2186	   collected the status information from the pledge.  It SHALL provide
2187	   the status information to the registrar for further processing.


2189	   Preconditions in addition to Section 6.2:

2191	   *  Registrar-agent: possesses voucher status and enroll status from
2192	      pledge.

2194	   +-----------+        +-----------+   +--------+   +---------+
2195	   | Registrar |        | Domain    |   | Domain |   | Vendor  |
2196	   | Agent     |        | Registrar |   | CA     |   | Service |
2197	   | RegAgt)   |        |  (JRC)    |   |        |   | (MASA)  |
2198	   +-----------+        +-----------+   +--------+   +---------+
2199	       |                      |              |   Internet |
2200	   [voucher + enroll ]        |              |            |
2201	   [status info available]    |              |            |
2202	       |                      |              |            |
2203	       |<------- mTLS ------->|              |            |
2204	       |                      |              |            |
2205	       |--- Voucher Status -->|              |            |
2206	       |                      |--- req-device audit log-->|
2207	       |                      |<---- device audit log ----|
2208	       |              [verify audit log ]
2209	       |                      |              |            |
2210	       |--- Enroll Status --->|              |            |
2211	       |                      |              |            |

2213	                  Figure 17: Bootstrapping status handling

2215	   The registrar-agent MUST provide the collected pledge voucher status
2216	   to the registrar.  This status indicates if the pledge could process
2217	   the voucher successfully or not.

2219	   If the TLS connection to the registrar was closed, the registrar-

closed after...(insert maybe section).

2220	   agent establishes a TLS connection with the registrar as stated in

establishes a new TLS connection
              ^^^
2221	   Section 6.2.

2223	   The registrar-agent sends the pledge voucher status without
2224	   modification to the registrar with an HTTP-over-TLS POST using the
2225	   registrar endpoint "/.well-known/brski/voucher_status".  The Content-
2226	   Type header is kept as application/jose+json as described in
2227	   Figure 14 and depicted in the example in Figure 15.

[major]

So, in the first part of the review i was trying to suggest positive spin text
around all the complexity of introducing registar-agent authentication in
some messages, such as being able to track on the registrar and the backend
behind it, who (which registstrar-agent) was assisting he enrollment and
hence also likely co-checks for the pledge.

But when you simply pass through the telementry without including an
identity of the registar-agent, then this benefit goes out the door, and
we could rather remove all other registrar-agent signatures from the spec
because they serve no purpose other than to track somewhere who was
sending messages back and forth between pledge and registrar.

Aka: either have a scheme where all the steps taken can be traced back to
a registrar-agent (aka: put the plege-responses into a registrar-agent
signed container), or get rid of all the then unnecessary registrar-agent
signatures...


2229	   The registrar SHALL verify the signature of the pledge voucher status
2230	   and validate that it belongs to an accepted device in his domain

s/an/the/ ??

2231	   based on the contained "serial-number" in the IDevID certificate
2232	   referenced in the header of the voucher status.

2234	   According to [RFC8995] section 5.7, the registrar SHOULD respond with
2235	   an HTTP 200 OK in the success case or fail with HTTP 4xx/5xx status
2236	   codes as defined by the HTTP standard.  The registrar-agent may use
2237	   the response to signal success / failure to the service technician
2238	   operating the registrar agent.  Within the server logs the server
2239	   SHOULD capture this telemetry information.

2241	   The registrar SHOULD proceed with collecting and logging status
2242	   information by requesting the MASA audit-log from the MASA service as
2243	   described in section 5.8 of [RFC8995].

2245	   The registrar-agent MUST provide the pledge's enroll status to the
2246	   registrar.  The status indicates the pledge could process the enroll-
2247	   response (certificate) and holds the corresponding private key.

2249	   The registrar-agent sends the pledge enroll status without
2250	   modification to the registrar with an HTTP-over-TLS POST using the
2251	   registrar endpoint "/.well-known/brski/enrollstatus".  The Content-
2252	   Type header is kept as application/jose+json as described in
2253	   Figure 14 and depicted in the example in Figure 16.

2255	   The registrar MUST verify the signature of the pledge enroll status.
2256	   Also, the registrar SHALL validate that the pledge is an accepted

s/an/the/

2257	   device in his domain based on the contained product-serial-number in
2258	   the LDevID certificate referenced in the header of the enroll status.
2259	   The registrar SHOULD log this event.  In case the pledge enroll
2260	   status indicates a failure, the pledge was unable to verify the
2261	   received LDevID certificate and therefore signed the enroll status
2262	   with its IDevID credential.  Note that the verification of a
2263	   signature of the status information is an addition to the described
2264	   handling in section 5.9.4 of [RFC8995].

... and is replacing the pledges IDevID TLS authentication in [RFC8995].

2266	   According to [RFC8995] section 5.9.4, the registrar SHOULD respond
2267	   with an HTTP 200 OK in the success case or fail with HTTP 4xx/5xx
2268	   status codes as defined by the HTTP standard.  Based on the failure

2268	   status codes as defined by the HTTP standard.  Based on the failure
2269	   case the registrar MAY decide that for security reasons the pledge is
2270	   not allowed to reside in the domain.  In this case the registrar MUST
2271	   revoke the certificate.  The registrar-agent may use the response to
2272	   signal success / failure to the service technician operating the
2273	   registrar agent.  Within the server log the registrar SHOULD capture
2274	   this telemetry information.

[major]

This part (2268-2274) seems to be new compared to rfc8995. If there is a reference
to this revocation after enrolment in rfc8995, please add. Otherwise it would
be great to add an example. For example, if the pledge failed to install the
certificate because of clock messup, this does not mean that the registrar
MUST revoke the certificate. it could as well end up for the technician
having to replace NVram battery on the pledge or the like and re-send the
voucher/certificate to the pledge.

Aka: i fail to come up with an idea for the decision for the pledge not being
allowed to reside in the domain after the registrar did previously happily
provde a cert to the registrar-agent for the pledge.


2276	6.4.  Request Pledge-Status by Registrar-Agent from Pledge

2278	   The following assumes that a registrar-agent may need to query the
2279	   status of a pledge.  This information may be useful to solve errors,
2280	   when the pledge was not able to connect to the target domain during
2281	   the bootstrapping.  The pledge MAY provide a dedicated endpoint to
2282	   accept status-requests.

2284	   Preconditions:

2286	   *  Registrar-agent: possesses LDevID (RegAgt), list of serial numbers
2287	      of pledges to be queried and a list of corresponding manufacturer
2288	      trust anchors to be able to verify signatures performed with the
2289	      IDevID credential.

2291	   *  Pledge: may already possess domain credentials and LDevID(Pledge),
2292	      or may not possess one or both of these.

2294	   +--------+                     +-----------+
2295	   | Pledge |                     | Registrar-|
2296	   |        |                     | Agent     |
2297	   |        |                     | (RegAgt)  |
2298	   +--------+                     +-----------+
2299	       |                                |
2300	       |<--- pledge-status request -----|
2301	       |                                |
2302	       |---- pledge-status response --->|
2303	       |                                |

2305	    Figure 18: Pledge-status handling between registrar-agent and pledge

2307	6.4.1.  Pledge-Status - Trigger (Registrar-Agent to Pledge)

I don't think "trigger" is a good name here. It made sense when the
reply are "requests", but in this case it should be called (IMHO) a Pledge Status Request,
because it's answered by a response.

2309	   The registrar-agent requests the pledge-status via HTTP POST on the
2310	   defined pledge endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/ps"

2312	   The registrar-agent Content-Type header for the pledge-status request
2313	   is: application/jose+json.  It contains information on the requested
2314	   status-type, the time and date the request is created, and the
2315	   product serial-number of the pledge contacted as shown in Figure 19.
2316	   The pledge-status request is signed by registrar-agent using the
2317	   LDevID(RegAgt) credential.

2319	   The following Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610]
2320	   explains the structure of the format for the pledge-status request.
2321	   It is defined following the status telemetry definitions in BRSKI
2322	   [RFC8995].  Consequently, format and semantics of pledge-status
2323	   requests below are for version 1.  The version field is included to
2324	   permit significant changes to the pledge-status request and response
2325	   in the future.  A pledge or a registrar-agent that receives a pledge-
2326	   status request with a version larger than it knows about SHOULD log
2327	   the contents and alert a human.

Seems like a lot of replicated text from RFC8995. See if you can cut it down
to just reference and whatever is new here.

2329	   <CODE BEGINS>
2330	     status-request = {
2331	         "version": uint,
2332	         "created-on": tdate ttime,
2333	         "serial-number": text,
2334	         "status-type": text
2335	     }
2336	   <CODE ENDS>

2338	                 Figure 19: CDDL for pledge-status request

Its a bit weird using formal CDDL here when the whole document so far
was inventing a lot of JSON/JWS+JSON messages without an equivalent CDDL
specification. I don't want to ask for additional formalistic spec stuff
in CDDL here, just wanted to note the inconsistency.

2340	   The status-type defined for BRSKI-PRM is "bootstrap".  This indicates
2341	   the pledge to provide current status information regarding the
2342	   bootstrapping status (voucher processing and enrollment of the pledge
2343	   into the new domain).  As the pledge-status request is defined
2344	   generic, it may be used by other specifications to request further
2345	   status information, e.g., for onboarding to get further information
2346	   about enrollment of application specific LDevIDs or other parameters.
2347	   This is out of scope for this specification.

2349	   Figure 20 below shows an example for querying pledge-status using
2350	   status-type bootstrap.

2352	   # The registrar-agent request of "pledge-status" in general JWS
2353	     serialization syntax
2354	   {
2355	     "payload": "BASE64URL(status-request)",
2356	     "signatures": [
2357	       {
2358	         "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
2359	         "signature": "base64encodedvalue=="
2360	       }
2361	     ]
2362	   }

2364	   # Decoded payload "status-request" representation in JSON syntax
2365	   {
2366	     "version": 1,
2367	     "created-on": "2022-08-12T02:37:39.235Z",
2368	     "serial-number": "pledge-callee4711",
2369	     "status-type": "bootstrap"
2370	   }

2372	   # Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation in JSON syntax
2373	   {
2374	     "alg": "ES256",
2375	     "x5c": [
2376	       "base64encodedvalue==",
2377	       "base64encodedvalue=="
2378	     ]
2379	   }

2381	       Figure 20: Example of registrar-agent request of pledge-status
2382	                        using status-type bootstrap

2384	6.4.2.  Pledge-Status - Response (Pledge - Registrar-Agent)

2386	   If the pledge receives the pledge-status request with status-type
2387	   "bootstrap" it SHALL react with a status response message based on
2388	   the telemetry information described in section Section 6.3.

2390	   The pledge-status response Content-Type header is application/
2391	   jose+json.

2393	   The following CDDL explains the structure of the format for the
2394	   status response, which is :

2396	   <CODE BEGINS>
2397	     status-response = {
2398	       "version": uint,
2399	       "status":
2400	         "factory-default" /
2401	         "voucher-success" /
2402	         "voucher-error" /
2403	         "enroll-success" /
2404	         "enroll-error" /
2405	         "connect-success" /
2406	         "connect-error",
2407	       ?"reason" : text,
2408	       ?"reason-context" : { $$arbitrary-map }
2409	     }
2410	   <CODE ENDS>

2412	                 Figure 21: CDDL for pledge-status response

2414	   Different cases for pledge bootstrapping status may occur, which
2415	   SHOULD be reflected using the status enumeration.  This document
2416	   specifies the status values in the context of the bootstrapping
2417	   process and credential application.  Other documents may enhance the
2418	   above enumeration to reflect further status information.

2420	   The pledge-status response message is signed with IDevID or LDevID,
2421	   depending on bootstrapping state of the pledge.

I think earlier in the text in this section you said only LDevID.

There is also the question as to whether or not th pledge wants to divulge
the status to anybody. I remember that even as much as 5 years ago we had
to limit LLDP information from network devices to prohibit unauthenticated
status visibility. So it might make sense to say that pledge SHOULD
by default only answer to nodes that they can authenticate (such as registrar
agents), once the pledge is enrolled with CA certificates and matching
domain certificate.
n
2423	   *  "factory-default": Pledge has not been bootstrapped.  Additional
2424	      information may be provided in the reason or reason-context.  The
2425	      pledge signs the response message using its IDevID(Pledge).

2427	   *  "voucher-success": Pledge processed the voucher exchange
2428	      successfully.  Additional information may be provided in the
2429	      reason or reason-context.  The pledge signs the response message
2430	      using its IDevID(Pledge).

2432	   *  "voucher-error": Pledge voucher processing terminated with error.
2433	      Additional information may be provided in the reason or reason-
2434	      context.  The pledge signs the response message using its
2435	      IDevID(Pledge).

2437	   *  "enroll-success": Pledge has processed the enrollment exchange
2438	      successfully.  Additional information may be provided in the
2439	      reason or reason-context.  The pledge signs the response message
2440	      using its LDevID(Pledge).

2442	   *  "enroll-error": Pledge enrollment response processing terminated
2443	      with error.  Additional information may be provided in the reason
2444	      or reason-context.  The pledge signs the response message using
2445	      its IDevID(Pledge).

2447	   The reason and the reason-context SHOULD contain the telemetry
2448	   information as described in section Section 6.3.

2450	   As the pledge is assumed to utilize the bootstrapped credential

s/the bootstrapped credential/its LDevID(Pledge)/

2451	   information in communication with other peers, additional status
2452	   information is provided for the connectivity to other peers, which
2453	   may be helpful in analyzing potential error cases.

2455	   *  "connect-success": Pledge could successfully establish a
2456	      connection to another peer.  Additional information may be
2457	      provided in the reason or reason-context.  The pledge signs the
2458	      response message using its LDevID(Pledge).

2460	   *  "connect-error": Pledge connection establishment terminated with
2461	      error.  Additional information may be provided in the reason or
2462	      reason-context.  The pledge signs the response message using its
2463	      LDevID(Pledge).

2465	   The pledge-status responses are cumulative in the sense that connect-
2466	   success implies enroll-success, which in turn implies voucher-
2467	   success.

2469	   Figure 22 provides an example for the bootstrapping-status
2470	   information.

2472	   # The pledge "status-response" in General JWS Serialization syntax
2473	   {
2474	     "payload": "BASE64URL(status-response)",
2475	     "signatures": [
2476	       {
2477	         "protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
2478	         "signature": "base64encodedvalue=="
2479	       }
2480	     ]
2481	   }

2483	   # Decoded payload "status-response" representation in JSON syntax
2484	   {
2485	     "version": 1,
2486	     "status": "enroll-success",
2487	     "reason-context": {
2488	       "additional" : "JSON"

s/JSON/example text/ ??

2489	     }
2490	   }

2492	   # Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation in JSON syntax
2493	   {
2494	     "alg": "ES256",
2495	     "x5c": [
2496	       "base64encodedvalue==",
2497	       "base64encodedvalue=="
2498	     ],
2499	     "typ": "jose+json
2500	   }

2502	                Figure 22: Example of pledge-status response

2504	   In case "factory-default" the pledge does not possess the domain
2505	   certificate resp. the domain trust-anchor.  It will not be able to
2506	   verify the signature of the registrar-agent in the bootstrapping-
2507	   status request.

and.... just provide the status reply without authentication ?!

new paraagraph.

2507	   In cases "vouchered" and "enrolled" the pledge
2508	   already possesses the domain certificate (has domain trust-anchor)
2509	   and can therefore validate the signature of the registrar-agent.  If
2510	   validation of the JWS signature fails, the pledge SHOULD respond with
2511	   the HTTP 403 Forbidden status code.

Ok. great. this is what i was suggesting earlier.

new paragraph.

2511	   The HTTP 406 Not Acceptable
2512	   status code SHOULD be used, if the Accept header in the request
2513	   indicates an unknown or unsupported format.  The HTTP 415 Unsupported
2514	   Media Type status code SHOULD be used, if the Content-Type of the
2515	   request is an unknown or unsupported format.  The HTTP 400 Bad
2516	   Request status code SHOULD be used, if the Accept/Content-Type
2517	   headers are correct but nevertheless the status-request cannot be
2518	   correctly parsed.

2520	7.  Artifacts

not reviewing now, because i think this moves to rfc8366bis, right ?

2522	7.1.  Voucher Request Artifact

2524	   The following enhancement extends the voucher-request as defined in
2525	   [RFC8995] to include additional fields necessary for handling
2526	   bootstrapping in the pledge-responder-mode.

2528	7.1.1.  Tree Diagram

2530	   The following tree diagram is mostly a duplicate of the contents of
2531	   [RFC8995], with the addition of the fields agent-signed-data,
2532	   registrar-proximity-certificate, and agent-signing certificate.  The
2533	   tree diagram is described in [RFC8340].  Each node in the diagram is
2534	   fully described by the YANG module in Section Section 7.1.2.

2536	   module: ietf-voucher-request-prm

2538	    grouping voucher-request-prm-grouping
2539	     +-- voucher
2540	        +-- created-on?                               yang:date-and-time
2541	        +-- expires-on?                               yang:date-and-time
2542	        +-- assertion?                                enumeration
2543	        +-- serial-number                             string
2544	        +-- idevid-issuer?                            binary
2545	        +-- pinned-domain-cert?                       binary
2546	        +-- domain-cert-revocation-checks?            boolean
2547	        +-- nonce?                                    binary
2548	        +-- last-renewal-date?                        yang:date-and-time
2549	        +-- prior-signed-voucher-request?             binary
2550	        +-- proximity-registrar-cert?                 binary
2551	        +-- agent-signed-data?                        binary
2552	        +-- agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert?  binary
2553	        +-- agent-sign-cert?                          binary

2555	7.1.2.  YANG Module

2557	   The following YANG module extends the [RFC8995] Voucher Request to
2558	   include a signed artifact from the registrar-agent (agent-signed-
2559	   data) as well as the registrar-proximity-certificate and the agent-
2560	   signing certificate.

2562	   <CODE BEGINS> file "[e-mail]"
2563	   module ietf-voucher-request-prm {
2564	     yang-version 1.1;

2566	     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher-request-prm";
2567	     prefix vrprm;
2568	     import ietf-restconf {
2569	       prefix rc;
2570	       description
2571	         "This import statement is only present to access
2572	          the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
2573	       reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
2574	     }

2576	     import ietf-voucher-request {
2577	       prefix vcr;
2578	       description
2579	         "This module defines the format for a voucher request,
2580	             which is produced by a pledge as part of the RFC8995
2581	             onboarding process.";
2582	       reference
2583	         "RFC 8995: Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure";
2584	     }

2586	     organization
2587	      "IETF ANIMA Working Group";

2589	     contact
2590	      "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
2591	       WG List:  <mailto:[e-mail]>
2592	       Author:   Steffen Fries
2593	                 <mailto:[e-mail]>
2594	       Author:   Eliot Lear
2595	                 <mailto: [e-mail]>
2596	       Author:   Thomas Werner
2597	                 <mailto: [e-mail]>
2598	       Author:   Michael Richardson
2599	                 <mailto: [e-mail]>";

2601	     description
2602	      "This module defines the format for a voucher-request form the
2603	       pledge in responder mode. It bases on the voucher-request
2604	       defined in RFC 8995, which is a superset of the voucher itself.
2605	       It provides content to the MASA for consideration
2606	       during a voucher-request.

2608	       The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
2609	       NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
2610	       'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
2611	       described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
2612	       they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2614	       Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
2615	       authors of the code. All rights reserved.

2617	       Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
2618	       without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
2619	       to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
2620	       set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
2621	       Relating to IETF Documents
2622	       (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

2624	       This version of this YANG module is part of RFC xxxx; see the
2625	       RFC itself for full legal notices.";

2627	     revision 2022-07-05 {
2628	       description
2629	        "Initial version";
2630	       reference
2631	        "RFC XXXX: BRSKI for Pledge in Responder Mode";
2632	     }

2634	     // Top-level statement
2635	     rc:yang-data voucher-request-prm-artifact {
2636	       // YANG data template for a voucher-request.
2637	       uses voucher-request-prm-grouping;
2638	     }
2639	     // Grouping defined for future usage
2640	     grouping voucher-request-prm-grouping {
2641	       description
2642	         "Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
2643	       uses vcr:voucher-request-grouping {

2645	         augment voucher {
2646	           description "Base the voucher-request-prm upon the
2647	             regular one";

2649	           leaf agent-signed-data {
2650	             type binary;
2651	             description
2652	               "The agent-signed-data field contains a JOSE [RFC7515]
2653	                object provided by the Registrar-Agent to the Pledge.

2655	                This artifact is signed by the Registrar-Agent
2656	                and contains a copy of the pledge's serial-number.";
2657	           }

2659	           leaf agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert {
2660	             type binary;
2661	             description
2662	               "An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by
2663	                RFC 5280, Section 4, encoded using the ASN.1
2664	                distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
2665	                in ITU X.690.
2666	                The first certificate in the registrar TLS server
2667	                certificate_list sequence (the end-entity TLS
2668	                certificate; see RFC 8446) presented by the
2669	                registrar to the registrar-agent and provided to
2670	                the pledge.
2671	                This MUST be populated in a pledge's voucher-request
2672	                when an agent-proximity assertion is requested.";
2673	             reference
2674	               "ITU X.690: Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding
2675	                rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
2676	                Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
2677	                Encoding Rules (DER)
2678	                RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
2679	                Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
2680	                Profile
2681	                RFC 8446: The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
2682	                Protocol Version 1.3";
2683	           }

2685	           leaf-list agent-sign-cert{
2686	             type binary;
2687	             min-elements 1;
2688	             description
2689	               "An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by
2690	                RFC 5280, Section 4, encoded using the ASN.1
2691	                distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
2692	                in ITU X.690.
2693	                This certificate can be used by the pledge,
2694	                the registrar, and the MASA to verify the signature
2695	                of agent-signed-data. It is an optional component
2696	                for the pledge-voucher request.
2697	                This MUST be populated in a registrar's
2698	                voucher-request when an agent-proximity assertion
2699	                is requested.
2700	                It is defined as list to enable inclusion of further
2701	                certificates along the certificate chain if different
2702	                issuing CAs have been used for the registrar-agent
2703	                and the registrar.";
2704	             reference
2705	               "ITU X.690: Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding
2706	                rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
2707	                Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
2708	                Encoding Rules (DER)
2709	                RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
2710	                Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
2711	                Profile";

2713	           }
2714	         }
2715	       }
2716	     }
2717	   }
2718	   <CODE ENDS>

2720	   Examples for the PVR are provided in Section 6.2.

2722	8.  IANA Considerations

2724	   This document requires the following IANA actions.

2726	8.1.  BRSKI .well-known Registry

2728	   IANA is requested to enhance the Registry entitled: "BRSKI Well-Known
2729	   URIs" with the following endpoints:

2731	  URI                        Description                       Reference
2732	  tv                         create pledge-voucher-request     [THISRFC]
2733	  te                         create pledge-enrollment-request  [THISRFC]
2734	  sv                         supply voucher response           [THISRFC]
2735	  se                         supply enrollment response        [THISRFC]
2736	  cc                         supply CA certificates to pledge  [THISRFC]
2737	  ps                         query pledge status               [THISRFC]
2738	  requestenroll              supply PER to registrar           [THISRFC]
2739	  wrappedcacerts             request wrapped CA certificates   [THISRFC]

2741	9.  Privacy Considerations

2743	   In general, the privacy considerations of [RFC8995] apply for BRSKI-
2744	   PRM also.  Further privacy aspects need to be considered for:

2746	   *  the introduction of the additional component registrar-agent

2748	   *  no transport layer security between registrar-agent and pledge

2750	   The credential used by the registrar-agent to sign the data for the
2751	   pledge should not contain any personal information.  Therefore, it is
2752	   recommended to use an LDevID certificate associated with the
2753	   commissioning device instead of an LDevID certificate associated with
2754	   the service technician operating the device.  This avoids revealing
2755	   potentially included personal information to Registrar and MASA.

Nice. I'd even try to go for SHOULD NOT (not quite clear with this couldn't
be normative, but someone from IESG review should complain if its not ok.).

2757	   The communication between the pledge and the registrar-agent is
2758	   performed over plain HTTP.  Therefore, it is subject to disclosure by
2759	   a Dolev-Yao attacker (an "oppressive observer")[onpath].  Depending
2760	   on the requests and responses, the following information is
2761	   disclosed.

This of course raises the question why we're not using https between pledge
and registrar-agent to prohibit such mitm obervation (beyond other good reasons
to use https that i brought up in my first part of the review).

Remember that the registrar can always authenticate the IDevID of pledges,
so arguably the pledge vendors trust anchors can also be provisionined
onto registrar-agents (not more difficult than the serial numbers that you
assume to be provisionalbe - which i find much more difficult), and the
pledge simply does not even need to do any registrar-agent certificate
verification, but solely because of TLS PFS, this one-side verification
should suffice to prohibit passive observation.

2763	   *  the Pledge product-serial-number is contained in the trigger
2764	      message for the PVR and in all responses from the pledge.  This
2765	      information reveals the identity of the devices being bootstrapped
2766	      and allows deduction of which products an operator is using in
2767	      their environment.  As the communication between the pledge and
2768	      the registrar-agent may be realized over wireless link, this
2769	      information could easily be eavesdropped, if the wireless network
2770	      is unencrypted.  Even if the wireless network is encrypted, if it
2771	      uses a network-wide key, then layer-2 attacks (ARP/ND spoofing)
2772	      could insert an on-path observer into the path.

2774	   *  the Timestamp data could reveal the activation time of the device.

2776	   *  the Status data of the device could reveal information about the
2777	      current state of the device in the domain network.

I'll comment on whether this is complete after we have (hopefully not)
concluded that we cannot/should-not use http.

2779	10.  Security Considerations

2781	   In general, the security considerations of [RFC8995] apply for BRSKI-
2782	   PRM also.  Further security aspects are considered here related to:

2784	   *  the introduction of the additional component registrar-agent

2786	   *  the reversal of the pledge communication direction (push mode,
2787	      compared to BRSKI)

2789	   *  no transport layer security between registrar-agent and pledge

2791	10.1.  Denial of Service (DoS) Attack on Pledge

2793	   Disrupting the pledge behavior by a DoS attack may prevent the
2794	   bootstrapping of the pledge to a new domain.

2796	   A DoS attack with a faked registrar-agent may block the bootstrapping
2797	   of the pledge due to state creation on the pledge (the pledge may
2798	   produce a voucher-request, and refuse to produce another one).  One
2799	   mitigation may be that the pledge does does not limited the number of
2800	   voucher requests it creates until at least one has finished, or a
2801	   single onboarding state may expire after a certain time.

The way i remember, the nonce is really only meant to protect against replay
attack from e.g. a prior owner: Owner generates voucher, then sells box,
new owner takes ownership with new voucher, then sneaky prior owner re-owns
pledge (after some partial reset) with prior voucher and then gains access
to some not-fully reset information about the second owner on the pledge.

The way to protect against this is IMHO to simply not issue new nonce values for
every voucher request thats is triggered, but only to generate a new nonce
after the pledge is presented with a successful voucher for the prior
nonce. and remember the prior nonce value as "do-not-reuse". For example
by having a persistent (e.g.: TPM based) RNG for the nonce. Thats just
one more persistent number to remember.

Maybe write something like that.

2803	10.2.  Misuse of acquired PVR and PER by Registrar-Agent

2805	   A registrar-agent that uses previously requested PVR and PER for
2806	   domain-A, may attempt to onboard the device into domain-B.  This can
2807	   be detected by the domain registrar while PVR processing.  The domain
2808	   registrar needs to verify that the "proximity-registrar-cert" field
2809	   in the PVR matches its own registrar EE certificate.  In addition,
2810	   the domain registrar needs to verify the association of the pledge to
2811	   its domain based on the product-serial-number contained in the PVR
2812	   and in the IDevID certificate of the pledge.  (This is just part of
2813	   the supply chain integration) Moreover, the domain registrar verifies
2814	   if the registrar-agent is authorized to interact with the pledge for
2815	   voucher-requests and enroll-requests, based on the LDevID(RegAgt)
2816	   certificate data contained in the PVR.

2818	   Misbinding of a pledge by a faked domain registrar is countered as
2819	   described in BRSKI security considerations [RFC8995] (section 11.4).

2821	10.3.  Misuse of Registrar-Agent Credentials

2823	   Concerns of misusage of a registrar-agent with a valid
2824	   LDevID(RegAgt), may be addressed by utilizing short-lived
2825	   certificates (e.g., valid for a day) to authenticate the registrar-
2826	   agent against the domain registrar.  The LDevID(RegAgt) certificate
2827	   may be acquired by a prior BRSKI run for the registrar-agent, if an
2828	   IDevID is available on registrar-agent.  Alternatively, the LDevID
2829	   may be acquired by a service technician from the domain PKI system in
2830	   an authenticated way.

These problems would be eliminated with the LDevID of the registrar-agent
would as i suggested in part 1 of my review only be used for tracing on or
behind the registrar which registrar-agent was forwarding messages, but not
making any actual enrolment security decisions based on it. Which i tried to
outline how.

2832	   In addition it is required that the LDevID(RegAgt) certificate is
2833	   valid for the complete bootstrapping phase.  This avoids that a
2834	   registrar-agent could be misused to create arbitrary "agent-signed-
2835	   data" objects to perform an authorized bootstrapping of a rogue
2836	   pledge at a later point in time.  In this misuse "agent-signed-data"
2837	   could be dated after the validity time of the LDevID(RegAgt)
2838	   certificate, due to missing trusted timestamp in the registrar-agents
2839	   signature.  To address this, the registrar SHOULD verify the
2840	   certificate used to create the signature on "agent-signed-data".
2841	   Furthermore the registrar also verifies the LDevID(RegAgt)
2842	   certificate used in the TLS handshake with the registrar-agent.  If
2843	   both certificates are verified successfully, the registrar-agent's
2844	   signature can be considered as valid.

Same.

2846	10.4.  Misuse of mDNS to obtain list of pledges

2848	   To discover a specific pledge a registrar-agent may request the
2849	   service name in combination with the product-serial-number of a
2850	   specific pledge.  The pledge reacts on this if its product-serial-
2851	   number is part of the request message.

2853	   If the registrar-agent performs DNS-based Service Discovery without a
2854	   specific product-serial-number, all pledges in the domain react if
2855	   the functionality is supported.  This functionality enumerates and
2856	   reveals the information of devices available in the domain.  The
2857	   information about this is provided here as a feature to support the
2858	   commissioning of devices.  A manufacturer may decide to support this
2859	   feature only for devices not possessing a LDevID or to not support
2860	   this feature at all, to avoid an enumeration in an operative domain.

2862	10.5.  YANG Module Security Considerations

2864	   The enhanced voucher-request described in section Section 7.1 is
2865	   bases on [RFC8995], but uses a different encoding based on
2866	   [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].  Therefore similar considerations as
2867	   described in [RFC8995] section 11.7 (Security Considerations) apply.
2868	   The YANG module specified in this document defines the schema for
2869	   data that is subsequently encapsulated by a JOSE signed-data Content-
2870	   type as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].  As such, all of
2871	   the YANG-modeled data is protected against modification.  The use of
2872	   YANG to define data structures via the "yang-data" statement, is
2873	   relatively new and distinct from the traditional use of YANG to
2874	   define an API accessed by network management protocols such as
2875	   NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040].  For this reason these
2876	   guidelines do not follow the template described by [RFC8407] section
2877	   3.7 (Security Considerations Section).

2879	11.  Acknowledgments

2881	   We would like to thank the various reviewers, in particular Brian E.
2882	   Carpenter, Oskar Camenzind, Hendrik Brockhaus, and Ingo Wenda for
2883	   their input and discussion on use cases and call flows.  Further
2884	   review input was provided by Jesser Bouzid, Dominik Tacke, and
2885	   Christian Spindler.  Special thanks to Esko Dijk for the in deep
2886	   review and the improving proposals.  Support in PoC implementations
2887	   and comments resulting from the implementation was provided by Hong
2888	   Rui Li and He Peng Jia.

I'll stop here. Thanks a lot folks. Lot of good work, and a lot more security 
relevant changes to BRSKI than the constrained work IMHO so don't be too annoyed
by the due diligence this requires.

Cheers
    Toerless

2890	12.  References

2892	12.1.  Normative References

2894	   [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher]
2895	              Werner, T. and M. Richardson, "JWS signed Voucher
2896	              Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols", Work in Progress,
2897	              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-jws-voucher-05, 24
2898	              October 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
2899	              anima-jws-voucher-05.txt>.

2901	   [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis]
2902	              Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., Eckert, T. T.,
2903	              and Q. Ma, "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping
2904	              Protocols", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
2905	              anima-rfc8366bis-00, 31 January 2022,
2906	              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-anima-
2907	              rfc8366bis-00.txt>.

2909	   [I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr]
2910	              Watsen, K., Housley, R., and S. Turner, "Conveying a
2911	              Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in a Secure Zero Touch
2912	              Provisioning (SZTP) Bootstrapping Request", Work in
2913	              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-sztp-csr-14,
2914	              2 March 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
2915	              netconf-sztp-csr-14.txt>.

2917	   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
2918	              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
2919	              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
2920	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

2922	   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
2923	              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
2924	              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
2925	              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
2926	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

2928	   [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
2929	              DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
2930	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.

2932	   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
2933	              Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
2934	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.

2936	   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
2937	              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
2938	              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
2939	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

2941	   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
2942	              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2943	              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

2945	   [RFC8040]  Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
2946	              Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
2947	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.

2949	   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2950	              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
2951	              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

2953	   [RFC8366]  Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
2954	              "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
2955	              RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
2956	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.

2958	   [RFC8610]  Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
2959	              Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
2960	              Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
2961	              JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
2962	              June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.

2964	   [RFC8995]  Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
2965	              and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
2966	              Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
2967	              May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995>.

2969	12.2.  Informative References

2971	   [BRSKI-PRM-abstract]
2972	              "Abstract BRSKI-PRM Protocol Overview", April 2022,
2973	              <https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/anima-brski-
2974	              prm/main/pics/brski_prm_overview.png>.

2976	   [I-D.ietf-anima-brski-ae]
2977	              von Oheimb, D., Fries, S., and H. Brockhaus, "BRSKI-AE:
2978	              Alternative Enrollment Protocols in BRSKI", Work in
2979	              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-brski-ae-03, 24
2980	              October 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
2981	              anima-brski-ae-03.txt>.

2983	   [IEEE-802.1AR]
2984	              Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
2985	              802.1AR Secure Device Identifier", IEEE 802.1AR, June
2986	              2018.

2988	   [onpath]   "can an on-path attacker drop traffic?", n.d.,
2989	              <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/saag/
2990	              m1r9uo4xYznOcf85Eyk0Rhut598/>.

2992	   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
2993	              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
2994	              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
2995	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

2997	   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
2998	              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
2999	              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
3000	              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
3001	              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
3002	              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

3004	   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
3005	              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
3006	              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
3007	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

3009	   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
3010	              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
3011	              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
3012	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

3014	   [RFC8340]  Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
3015	              BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
3016	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.

3018	   [RFC8407]  Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
3019	              Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
3020	              DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
3021	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.

3023	   [RFC8792]  Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
3024	              "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
3025	              RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
3026	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.

3028	   [RFC9052]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
3029	              Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
3030	              DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
3031	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.

3033	   [RFC9053]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
3034	              Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053,
3035	              August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9053>.

3037	   [RFC9110]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
3038	              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
3039	              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
3040	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.

3042	   [RFC9238]  Richardson, M., Latour, J., and H. Habibi Gharakheili,
3043	              "Loading Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URLs from QR
3044	              Codes", RFC 9238, DOI 10.17487/RFC9238, May 2022,
3045	              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9238>.

3047	Appendix A.  Examples

3049	   These examples are folded according to [RFC8792] Single Backslash
3050	   rule.

3052	A.1.  Example Pledge Voucher Request - PVR (from Pledge to Registrar-
3053	      agent)

3055	   The following is an example request sent from a Pledge to the
3056	   Registrar-agent, in "General JWS JSON Serialization".
3057	   The message size of this PVR is: 4649 bytes

3059	   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

3061	   {
3062	     "payload":
3063	       "eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXItcmVxdWVzdC1wcm06dm91Y2hlciI6eyJhc3NlcnRpb24\
3064	   iOiJhZ2VudC1wcm94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoiMDEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsIm5\
3065	   vbmNlIjoiTDNJSjZocHRIQ0lRb054YWFiOUhXQT09IiwiY3JlYXRlZC1vbiI6IjIwMjI\
3066	   tMDQtMjZUMDU6MTY6MTcuNzA5WiIsImFnZW50LXByb3ZpZGVkLXByb3hpbWl0eS1yZWd\
3067	   pc3RyYXItY2VydCI6Ik1JSUI0akNDQVlpZ0F3SUJBZ0lHQVhZNzJiYlpNQW9HQ0NxR1N\
3068	   NNDlCQU1DTURVeEV6QVJCZ05WQkFvTUNrMTVRblZ6YVc1bGMzTXhEVEFMQmdOVkJBY01\
3069	   CRk5wZEdVeER6QU5CZ05WQkFNTUJsUmxjM1JEUVRBZUZ3MHlNREV5TURjd05qRTRNVEp\
3070	   hRncwek1ERXlNRGN3TmpFNE1USmFNRDR4RXpBUkJnTlZCQW9NQ2sxNVFuVnphVzVsYzN\
3071	   NeERUQUxCZ05WQkFjTUJGTnBkR1V4R0RBV0JnTlZCQU1NRDBSdmJXRnBibEpsWjJsemR\
3072	   ISmhjakJaTUJNR0J5cUdTTTQ5QWdFR0NDcUdTTTQ5QXdFSEEwSUFCQmsxNksvaTc5b1J\
3073	   rSzVZYmVQZzhVU1I4L3VzMWRQVWlaSE10b2tTZHFLVzVmbldzQmQrcVJMN1dSZmZlV2t\
3074	   5Z2Vib0pmSWxsdXJjaTI1d25oaU9WQ0dqZXpCNU1CMEdBMVVkSlFRV01CUUdDQ3NHQVF\
3075	   VRkJ3TUJCZ2dyQmdFRkJRY0RIREFPQmdOVkhROEJBZjhFQkFNQ0I0QXdTQVlEVlIwUkJ\
3076	   FRXdQNElkY21WbmFYTjBjbUZ5TFhSbGMzUXVjMmxsYldWdWN5MWlkQzV1WlhTQ0huSmx\
3077	   aMmx6ZEhKaGNpMTBaWE4wTmk1emFXVnRaVzV6TFdKMExtNWxkREFLQmdncWhrak9QUVF\
3078	   EQWdOSUFEQkZBaUJ4bGRCaFpxMEV2NUpMMlByV0N0eVM2aERZVzF5Q08vUmF1YnBDN01\
3079	   hSURnSWhBTFNKYmdMbmdoYmJBZzBkY1dGVVZvL2dHTjAvand6SlowU2wyaDR4SVhrMSI\
3080	   sImFnZW50LXNpZ25lZC1kYXRhIjoiZXlKd1lYbHNiMkZrSWpvaVpYbEtjRnBZVW0xTVd\
3081	   GcDJaRmRPYjFwWVNYUmpiVlo0WkZkV2VtUkRNWGRqYlRBMldWZGtiR0p1VVhSak1teHV\
3082	   ZbTFXYTB4WFVtaGtSMFZwVDI1emFWa3pTbXhaV0ZKc1drTXhkbUpwU1RaSmFrbDNUV3B\
3083	   KZEUxRVVYUk5hbHBWVFVSVk5rMUVZelpPUkVWMVRrUlJORmRwU1hOSmJrNXNZMjFzYUd\
3084	   KRE1YVmtWekZwV2xoSmFVOXBTWGROVkVsNlRrUlZNazU2WnpWSmJqRTVJaXdpYzJsbmJ\
3085	   tRjBkWEpsY3lJNlczc2ljSEp2ZEdWamRHVmtJam9pWlhsS2NtRlhVV2xQYVVwWlkwaHd\
3086	   jMVJWZERSaVNFSkNUbXBvYWxaVVZrZFZWVEZaVmxoYWRWTldVVEpWV0dNNVNXbDNhVmx\
3087	   YZUc1SmFtOXBVbFpOZVU1VVdXbG1VU0lzSW5OcFoyNWhkSFZ5WlNJNklrY3pWM2hHU0d\
3088	   WMFdGQTRiR3hTVmkwNWRXSnlURmxxU25aUllUWmZlUzFRYWxGWk5FNWhkMW81Y0ZKaGI\
3089	   yeE9TbTlFTm1SbFpXdHVTVjlGV0daemVWWlRZbmM0VTBONlRWcE1iakJoUVhWb2FVZFp\
3090	   UakJSSW4xZGZRPT0iLCJhZ2VudC1zaWduLWNlcnQiOlsiTUlJQjFEQ0NBWHFnQXdJQkF\
3091	   nSUVZbWQ0T1RBS0JnZ3Foa2pPUFFRREFqQStNUk13RVFZRFZRUUtEQXBOZVVKMWMybHV\
3092	   aWE56TVEwd0N3WURWUVFIREFSVGFYUmxNUmd3RmdZRFZRUUREQTlVWlhOMFVIVnphRTF\
3093	   2WkdWc1EwRXdIaGNOTWpJd05ESTJNRFEwTWpNeldoY05Nekl3TkRJMk1EUTBNak16V2p\
3094	   BOU1STXdFUVlEVlFRS0RBcE5lVUoxYzJsdVpYTnpNUTB3Q3dZRFZRUUhEQVJUYVhSbE1\
3095	   SY3dGUVlEVlFRRERBNVNaV2RwYzNSeVlYSkJaMlZ1ZERCWk1CTUdCeXFHU000OUFnRUd\
3096	   DQ3FHU000OUF3RUhBMElBQkd4bHJOZmozaVJiNy9CUW9kVys1WWlvT3poK2pJdHlxdVJ\
3097	   JTy9XejdZb1czaXdEYzNGeGV3TFZmekNyNU52RDEzWmFGYjdmcmFuK3Q5b3RZNVdMaEo\
3098	   2alp6QmxNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQWZCZ05WSFNNRUdEQVdnQlJ2b1QxdWR\
3099	   lMmY2TEVRaFU3SEhqK3ZKL2Q3SXpBZEJnTlZIUTRFRmdRVVhwemxNS3hscEE2OGNVNUZ\
3100	   RTVhVdm5JVDZRd3dFd1lEVlIwbEJBd3dDZ1lJS3dZQkJRVUhBd0l3Q2dZSUtvWkl6ajB\
3101	   FQXdJRFNBQXdSUUlnYzJ5NnhvT3RvUUJsSnNnbE9MMVZ4SEdvc1R5cEVxUmZ6MFF2NFp\
3102	   FUHY0d0NJUUNWeWIyRjl6VjNuOTUrb2xnZkZKZ1pUV0V6NGRTYUYzaHpSUWIzWnVCMjl\
3103	   RPT0iLCJNSUlCekRDQ0FYR2dBd0lCQWdJRVhYakhwREFLQmdncWhrak9QUVFEQWpBMU1\
3104	   STXdFUVlEVlFRS0RBcE5lVUoxYzJsdVpYTnpNUTB3Q3dZRFZRUUhEQVJUYVhSbE1ROHd\
3105	   EUVlEVlFRRERBWlVaWE4wUTBFd0hoY05NVGt3T1RFeE1UQXdPRE0yV2hjTk1qa3dPVEV\
3106	   4TVRBd09ETTJXakErTVJNd0VRWURWUVFLREFwTmVVSjFjMmx1WlhOek1RMHdDd1lEVlF\
3107	   RSERBUlRhWFJsTVJnd0ZnWURWUVFEREE5VVpYTjBVSFZ6YUUxdlpHVnNRMEV3V1RBVEJ\
3108	   nY3Foa2pPUFFJQkJnZ3Foa2pPUFFNQkJ3TkNBQVRsRzBmd1QzM29leloxdmtIUWJldGV\
3109	   ibWorQm9WK1pGc2pjZlF3MlRPa0pQaE9rT2ZBYnU5YlMxcVppOHlhRVY4b2VyS2wvNlp\
3110	   YYmZ4T21CanJScmNYbzJZd1pEQVNCZ05WSFJNQkFmOEVDREFHQVFIL0FnRUFNQTRHQTF\
3111	   VZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJQ0JEQWZCZ05WSFNNRUdEQVdnQlRvWklNelFkc0Qvai8rZ1gvN2N\
3112	   CSnVjSC9YbWpBZEJnTlZIUTRFRmdRVWI2RTliblh0bitpeEVJVk94eDQvcnlmM2V5TXd\
3113	   DZ1lJS29aSXpqMEVBd0lEU1FBd1JnSWhBUG5CMHcxTkN1cmhNeEp3d2ZqejdnRGlpeGt\
3114	   VWUxQU1o5ZU45a29oTlFVakFpRUF3NFk3bHR4V2lQd0t0MUo5bmp5ZkRObDVNdUVEQml\
3115	   teFIzQ1hvWktHUXJVPSJdfX0",
3116	       "signatures":[{
3117	         "protected":"eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQitUQ0NBYUNnQXdJQkFnSUdBWG5WanNVN\
3118	   U1Bb0dDQ3FHU000OUJBTUNNRDB4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQWtGUk1SVXdFd1lEVlFRS0RBe\
3119	   EthVzVuU21sdVowTnZjbkF4RnpBVkJnTlZCQU1NRGtwcGJtZEthVzVuVkdWemRFTkJNQ\
3120	   0FYRFRJeE1EWXdOREExTkRZeE5Gb1lEems1T1RreE1qTXhNak0xT1RVNVdqQlNNUXN3Q\
3121	   1FZRFZRUUdFd0pCVVRFVk1CTUdBMVVFQ2d3TVNtbHVaMHBwYm1kRGIzSndNUk13RVFZR\
3122	   FZRUUZFd293TVRJek5EVTJOemc1TVJjd0ZRWURWUVFEREE1S2FXNW5TbWx1WjBSbGRtb\
3123	   GpaVEJaTUJNR0J5cUdTTTQ5QWdFR0NDcUdTTTQ5QXdFSEEwSUFCQzc5bGlhUmNCalpjR\
3124	   UVYdzdyVWVhdnRHSkF1SDRwazRJNDJ2YUJNc1UxMWlMRENDTGtWaHRVVjIxbXZhS0N2T\
3125	   XgyWStTTWdROGZmd0wyM3ozVElWQldqZFRCek1Dc0dDQ3NHQVFVRkJ3RWdCQjhXSFcxa\
3126	   GMyRXRkR1Z6ZEM1emFXVnRaVzV6TFdKMExtNWxkRG81TkRRek1COEdBMVVkSXdRWU1CY\
3127	   UFGRlFMak56UFwvU1wva291alF3amc1RTVmdndjWWJNQk1HQTFVZEpRUU1NQW9HQ0NzR\
3128	   0FRVUZCd01DTUE0R0ExVWREd0VCXC93UUVBd0lIZ0RBS0JnZ3Foa2pPUFFRREFnTkhBR\
3129	   EJFQWlCdTN3UkJMc0pNUDVzTTA3MEgrVUZyeU5VNmdLekxPUmNGeVJST2xxcUhpZ0lnW\
3130	   ENtSkxUekVsdkQycG9LNmR4NmwxXC91eW1UbmJRRERmSmxhdHVYMlJvT0U9Il0sImFsZ\
3131	   yI6IkVTMjU2In0",
3132	         "signature":"Y_ohapnmvbwjLuUicOB7NAmbGM7igBfpUlkKUuSNdG-eDI4BQ\

3134	   yuXZ2aw93zZId45R7XxAK-12YKIx6qLjiPjMw"
3135	     }]
3136	   }

3138	              Figure 23: Example Pledge Voucher Request - PVR

3140	A.2.  Example Parboiled Registrar Voucher Request - RVR (from Registrar
3141	      to MASA)

3143	   The term parboiled refers to food which is partially cooked.  In
3144	   [RFC8995], the term refers to a Pledge voucher-request (PVR) which
3145	   has been received by the Registrar, and then has been processed by
3146	   the Registrar ("cooked"), and is now being forwarded to the MASA.

3148	   The following is an example Registrar voucher-request (RVR) sent from
3149	   the Registrar to the MASA, in "General JWS JSON Serialization".  Note
3150	   that the previous PVR can be seen in the payload as "prior-signed-
3151	   voucher-request".  The message size of this RVR is: 13257 bytes

3153	   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

3155	   {
3156	     "payload":
3157	       "eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXItcmVxdWVzdC1wcm06dm91Y2hlciI6eyJhc3NlcnRpb24\
3158	   iOiJhZ2VudC1wcm94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoiY2FmZmUtOTg3NDUiLCJ\
3159	   ub25jZSI6ImM1VEVPb29NTE5hNEN4L1UrVExoQ3c9PSIsInByaW9yLXNpZ25lZC12b3V\
3160	   jaGVyLXJlcXVlc3QiOiJleUp3WVhsc2IyRmtJam9pWlhsS2NGcFlVbTFNV0ZwMlpGZE9\
3161	   iMXBZU1hSamJWWjRaRmRXZW1SRE1YZGpiVEEyWkcwNU1Wa3lhR3hqYVVrMlpYbEthR01\
3162	   6VG14amJsSndZakkwYVU5cFNtaGFNbFoxWkVNeGQyTnRPVFJoVnpGd1pFaHJhVXhEU25\
3163	   wYVdFcHdXVmQzZEdKdVZuUlpiVlo1U1dwdmFWa3lSbTFhYlZWMFQxUm5NMDVFVldsTVE\
3164	   wcDFZakkxYWxwVFNUWkpiVTB4VmtWV1VHSXlPVTVVUlRWb1RrVk9ORXd4VlhKV1JYaHZ\
3165	   VVE5qT1ZCVFNYTkpiVTU1V2xkR01GcFhVWFJpTWpScFQybEplVTFFU1hsTVZFRjVURlJ\
3166	   KZVZaRVFUTlBhazE2VDJwQk5FeHFSVFZPYkc5cFRFTkthRm95Vm5Wa1F6RjNZMjA1TW1\
3167	   GWFVteGFRekYzWTIwNU5HRlhNWEJrU0d0MFkyMVdibUZZVGpCamJVWjVURmRPYkdOdVV\
3168	   XbFBhVXBPVTFWc1JGSkdVa1JSTUVacFZESmtRbVF3YkVOUlYyUktVakJHV1ZkWVRuZFR\
3169	   WMVoyVkZWR2RsSXdUa1JqVldSVVZGUlJOVkZyUms1Uk1ERkhaRE5vUkdWclJrdFJiV1J\
3170	   QVm10S1FsZFdVa0poTUZwVFZGWktTbVF3VmtKWFZWSlhWVlpHVEZKRlJuTlViVlpXVkc\
3171	   1YWFWZEZTbTlaYlRWeVpVVmFWVkZXVWtOYU1EVlhVV3RHZWxSVlVrWk5WRlpXVFRGYWN\
3172	   GbDZTbk5oTWtaWVVtNXNiRlpGVmxGVVZVVjNVakJGZUZaVlZrTmtNMlJJVmtab2MxWkh\
3173	   SbGxWYlhoT1ZXdFdNMUpJWkZwU1JscFNWVlZTUlZGWGFFOWFWbHBQWTBkU1NGWnJVbEp\
3174	   XUlVac1VtNWpkMlZWTVVWU1dHeE9Va1pHTTFSdWNFcE5WVFZGWVVkR1IyUjZRalpVVlZ\
3175	   KR1pWVXhSVlZZWkU5bGEydDRWR3RTYjFsVk1VaFRXR2hFWld0R1MxRnRaRTlXYTBwQ1Y\
3176	   xWlNRbUV3V2xOVVZrcEtaREJXUWxkVlVsZFZWa1pNVWtWR2MxUnRWbFpVYmxwcFYwVkt\
3177	   iMWx0TlhKbFJWcEZVVlpPUTFvd05WZFJhMFo2VkZWTmQwMVVWbFpOTVZwd1dYcEtjMkV\
3178	   4YkZsVGFsWk9WVlJvTTFKR1JscFNSbHBTVlZWb1JWRldjRTlhVmxwUFkwZFNTRlpZYUV\
3179	   oU1JVWllVVzFrVDFaclNrSlVWVEZGVFVSRk1WWlVTbk5OUm5CWFUyMTRZVTF0ZURaYVJ\
3180	   XaExZVWRPY1ZGc2NFNVJhekZJVVc1c2VGSXhUazVPUkd4Q1dqQldTRkV3VG5oU01VNU9\
3181	   Ua1JzUW1Rd1ZrbFJWRUpLVVZWS1NsVklhRmhrVlRGSlVucG9TMVJIV2taVlJVVTFUMWh\
3182	   hZDAxdVZrbFNWVFZxVlROc2JWa3pWVE5VUjJSYVRraEJlRTVGUmtOT01GSk9XbFJGTkU\
3183	   xSVRrWmxSV1J4VkZOME0yTnJOVFJPTURVMVdWaE9lRXQ2Um5CTlJXUlVVVEZKTlU1VVV\
3184	   UTk5SRVp0VWpKV1dGUldSbWxqVjNCWVpXdEtZVlJWU1hkU01FVjRWbGRTUzFWV1JsaFV\
3185	   WVXBTVWpCT1JHTXdaRUpWVmxaSFVXNWtUbEZyU201YU0wcERXakJXUjFGc1JtcFNSV2h\
3186	   GVVZVNVExb3dOVmRUUmtVMFVXdEdiVTlGVmtOUlZURkVVV3BTUW1Rd2RFSlhWVkpYVld\
3187	   wQ1UxRnJUa1prTUdjd1UxZFNhVmRIZURaWlZtaFRZa2RPZEZadE5XaFhSVFIzV1RJeFI\
3188	   yVlZlSFJOVkZaYVRXcHNNRmt3WkVka1YxWlVUbGR3YVUxcVFqTlJNbVJhVTFWMGRsZHJ\
3189	   iRFpoYWtKR1VWaGtTbEpHVGtKUldHUlRWVlZzYjFGV1FqVlBXRnBOVTFkR01WVnJWbEp\
3190	   qYlhnMVlteGtNRlI2VmxOaVZYQXdZVmhTVW1GNlpFOVhSRkpMVlVoV2RWVklRazlVYXp\
3191	   BeFZWUnNRbUZWUm5sa1JVNTBWRVprWVZSVmJFMVdiRTEyVFZWc1JWbFhjR2xqTVU1Sll\
3192	   tNXdkbUpYYjNkV1F6a3paVmhKY21Nd2RFdGpRM1IxVFhwU1VsQlVNR2xNUTBwb1dqSld\
3193	   kV1JETVhwaFYyUjFXbGRSZEZwSFJqQlpVMGsyU1cxV05WTnVaRnBYUjNoNldXcEtSMkV\
3194	   3YkhGaU1teGhWMGQ0VEZrd1duZFhWbFowVFZVeFdGSnVRWGxYYTFwclZESkplR05HYkZ\
3195	   SWFJrcHhXV3hhWVU1R2NFZGFSbVJzWWxaS1JWUldhR3RoYlVwVlVWUktXRlp0VW5KWmE\
3196	   yUkxaRlpXV1ZWdGNFNWlXR2d4VjFjd2VGWXlSWGRsUm1oV1lsZG9jbFZxUWxkalJsRjV\
3197	   UbGh3YUZadGREWlZNakUwVjJ4a1IxTnVUbGhoTURFMFdrY3hTMk5HVGxWWGEzQm9ZVEo\
3198	   zZWxaR1pIZFNiVkpHVFZaV1UxZEdTazlXYTFwM1ZteFNWbFZyY0U5aGVrVXlWVlpTWVZ\
3199	   Sc1NrWlNha1pWVmxaS1ExcEVSbXRqUms1WlZHdHdhV0Y2Vm5wWFZFbDRZekpHU0ZOclV\
3200	   rNVhSbHB5Vm01d1IyTkdaSE5oUlhCb1ZsUnNkMVV5TVhkWGJGbDRZMGhTV0dKRk1UTlV\
3201	   iRlUxVWxac05sRnJPVlpOUnpneFYyMTRSbUZWZUVSVGJuQm9WakpTTVZkV2FGTk5WMDU\
3202	   wVm01d1NtRnVRbWxhV0d4TFpESk9kRTlVUW1GV01EUjNWMnhrVW1GVk9YQlRiWGhzVmx\
3203	   oQ2RsZFhkR3RoYlVaV1QxaENWR0V4Y0ZkYVYzUnlaVVpTZEdKRmNHcE5SM2d3V2tWb1E\
3204	   xbFdSWGRoZWtwVVZqTm9kbFZ0ZEhwbFZsWlpVMnhTYVdKclNrcFdhMVpUVVcxV2MxSnV\
3205	   VbFJpVlZwVlZXdGFjbVZzVFhwalJ6bFhUVlpHTmxkWWNFTmhiRWw1V1ROa1ZVMUdSak5\
3206	   aVm1SaFZXdHNjR1F5YkdwTmJYaDFXVzB4UjAxSFVsbFRiWGhLWVcwNWNGZEVRazlsYXp\
3207	   sV1QxWm9VMkpyY0dGWmJHTTFaV3hOZDA5WVZsSlhSMUpUVjFSR1YyRXhiM2RqUlZaWVV\
3208	   qRndUVmxzVWt0WFZUbFhVMnhXVjFJd05URlVSazE0WXpGUmQwNVdRbWxTZWxaMlZqSjB\
3209	   SazFGT1VaWGJYUlhZa2hCZDFReFVrOWhNbEY0Vld0d1YxWlVWbGRYUkVwaFYyczVWMWR\
3210	   1UWxkaVJHdzFWWHBPVDFaV1JuSmhSa3BRVmpOQ2Vsa3haSHBsVjBsNldUSnNiVlpxUlR\
3211	   WSmFYZHBXVmRrYkdKdVVYUmpNbXh1WW1reGFscFlTakJKYW5CaVNXc3hTbE5WVGt0U1J\
3212	   VNUVVVmRPZUZvd1JqTlRWVXBDV2pCc1JsZEhlSEZSTURGRlVWVjBRMW95WkhoaFIzUnh\
3213	   WREZDVWxWVlVrSmhhMHB6VkZaR2VtUXdUbEpYVlZKWFZWWkdTRkpZWkV0UmJGWlZVbFp\
3214	   PVGxGclJraFJWRVpXVWxWT2JtUXdjRlZYUjNoRldXcEplR1F4YkZoT1ZGWk9WV3hXTTF\
3215	   KWVpGcFNSbHBTVlZWNFJWRllhRTlhVmxwUFRWWnNkVlJ1UW1GU01uaHZXVEkxY21WRlV\
3216	   qWlJWVFZEV2pBMVYxRnJSbXBVVlVweVRWUldWazF0ZDNkWGJGSkdXVlV4UTFvd1pFSk5\
3217	   WbFpHVVZoa00xVnNVbGxpUmxKb1YwWktjMVpWYUZkbGJVWkdUVmhhWVZJeFducFZWRUp\
3218	   HWkRCb2Ixa3dOVTVoYTBZelZGZHdTazVGTVVWWk0zQk9aV3RGZDFZeWFHcFVhekUyVVZ\
3219	   oa1RtRnJhekJVVlZKcVpXc3hObEZVUWxoaGEwcDBWRlpHZW1Rd1RsSlhWVkpYVlZaR1N\
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3322	   Tc0xXUDV4U1FVMFhxelZxOFl2aUYxYlZvekd6eDV6Tmdjc3c9PSJdfX0",
3323	     "signatures":[{
3324	       "protected":"eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQjhEQ0NBWmFnQXdJQkFnSUdBWEJoTUtZSU1\
3325	   Bb0dDQ3FHU000OUJBTUNNRnd4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQWtGUk1SSXdFQVlEVlFRS0RBbE5\
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3350	   6dGdJZ2RwejZiUkYyREZtcGlKb3JCMkd5VmE4YVdkd2xIc0RvRVdZY0k0UEdKYmc9Il0\
3351	   sImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2In0",
3352	       "signature":"67t3n8zyEek4IM2Ko3Y_UvE1hzp794QFNTqG-HzTrBQtE4_4-yS\
3353	   yyFd3kP6YCn35YYJ7yK35d3styo_yoiPfKA"
3354	     }]
3355	   }

3357	             Figure 24: Example Registrar Voucher Request - RVR

3359	A.3.  Example Voucher Response (from MASA to Pledge, via Registrar and
3360	      Registrar-agent)

3362	   The following is an example voucher response from MASA to Pledge via
3363	   Registrar and Registrar-agent, in "General JWS JSON Serialization".
3364	   The message size of this Voucher is: 1916 bytes
3365	   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

3367	   {
3368	     "payload":"eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXI6dm91Y2hlciI6eyJhc3NlcnRpb24iOiJhZ2V\
3369	   udC1wcm94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoiMDEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsIm5vbmNlIjo\
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3372	   3SUJBZ0lHQVcwZUx1SCtNQW9HQ0NxR1NNNDlCQU1DTURVeEV6QVJCZ05WQkFvTUNrMTV\
3373	   RblZ6YVc1bGMzTXhEVEFMQmdOVkJBY01CRk5wZEdVeER6QU5CZ05WQkFNTUJsUmxjM1J\
3374	   EUVRBZUZ3MHhPVEE1TVRFd01qTTNNekphRncweU9UQTVNVEV3TWpNM016SmFNRFV4RXp\
3375	   BUkJnTlZCQW9NQ2sxNVFuVnphVzVsYzNNeERUQUxCZ05WQkFjTUJGTnBkR1V4RHpBTkJ\
3376	   nTlZCQU1NQmxSbGMzUkRRVEJaTUJNR0J5cUdTTTQ5QWdFR0NDcUdTTTQ5QXdFSEEwSUF\
3377	   CT2t2a1RIdThRbFQzRkhKMVVhSTcrV3NIT2IwVVMzU0FMdEc1d3VLUURqaWV4MDYvU2N\
3378	   ZNVBKaWJ2Z0hUQitGL1FUamdlbEhHeTFZS3B3Y05NY3NTeWFqUlRCRE1CSUdBMVVkRXd\
3379	   FQi93UUlNQVlCQWY4Q0FRRXdEZ1lEVlIwUEFRSC9CQVFEQWdJRU1CMEdBMVVkRGdRV0J\
3380	   CVG9aSU16UWRzRC9qLytnWC83Y0JKdWNIL1htakFLQmdncWhrak9QUVFEQWdOSkFEQkd\
3381	   BaUVBdHhRMytJTEdCUEl0U2g0YjlXWGhYTnVocVNQNkgrYi9MQy9mVllEalE2b0NJUUR\
3382	   HMnVSQ0hsVnEzeWhCNThUWE1VYnpIOCtPbGhXVXZPbFJEM1ZFcURkY1F3PT0ifX0",
3383	     "signatures":[{
3384	       "protected":"eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQmt6Q0NBVGlnQXdJQkFnSUdBV0ZCakNrWU1\
3385	   Bb0dDQ3FHU000OUJBTUNNRDB4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQWtGUk1SVXdFd1lEVlFRS0RBeEt\
3386	   hVzVuU21sdVowTnZjbkF4RnpBVkJnTlZCQU1NRGtwcGJtZEthVzVuVkdWemRFTkJNQjR\
3387	   YRFRFNE1ERXlPVEV3TlRJME1Gb1hEVEk0TURFeU9URXdOVEkwTUZvd1R6RUxNQWtHQTF\
3388	   VRUJoTUNRVkV4RlRBVEJnTlZCQW9NREVwcGJtZEthVzVuUTI5eWNERXBNQ2NHQTFVRUF\
3389	   3d2dTbWx1WjBwcGJtZERiM0p3SUZadmRXTm9aWElnVTJsbmJtbHVaeUJMWlhrd1dUQVR\
3390	   CZ2NxaGtqT1BRSUJCZ2dxaGtqT1BRTUJCd05DQUFTQzZiZUxBbWVxMVZ3NmlRclJzOFI\
3391	   wWlcrNGIxR1d5ZG1XczJHQU1GV3diaXRmMm5JWEgzT3FIS1Z1OHMyUnZpQkdOaXZPS0d\
3392	   CSEh0QmRpRkVaWnZiN294SXdFREFPQmdOVkhROEJBZjhFQkFNQ0I0QXdDZ1lJS29aSXp\
3393	   qMEVBd0lEU1FBd1JnSWhBSTRQWWJ4dHNzSFAyVkh4XC90elVvUVwvU3N5ZEwzMERRSU5\
3394	   FdGNOOW1DVFhQQWlFQXZJYjNvK0ZPM0JUbmNMRnNhSlpSQWtkN3pPdXNuXC9cL1pLT2F\
3395	   FS2JzVkRpVT0iXSwiYWxnIjoiRVMyNTYifQ",
3396	       "signature":"0TB5lr-cs1jqka2vNbQm3bBYWfLJd8zdVKIoV53eo2YgSITnKKY\
3397	   TvHMUw0wx9wdyuNVjNoAgLysNIgEvlcltBw"
3398	     }]
3399	   }

3401	               Figure 25: Example Voucher Response from MASA

3403	A.4.  Example Voucher Response, MASA issued Voucher with additional
3404	      Registrar signature (from MASA to Pledge, via Registrar and
3405	      Registrar-agent)

3407	   The following is an example voucher response from MASA to Pledge via
3408	   Registrar and Registrar-agent, in "General JWS JSON Serialization".
3409	   The message size of this Voucher is: 3006 bytes
3410	   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

3412	   {
3413	     "payload":"eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXI6dm91Y2hlciI6eyJhc3NlcnRpb24iOiJhZ2V\
3414	   udC1wcm94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoiMDEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsIm5vbmNlIjo\
3415	   iUUJiSXMxNTJzbkFvVzdSeVFMWENvZz09IiwiY3JlYXRlZC1vbiI6IjIwMjItMDktMjl\
3416	   UMDM6Mzc6MjYuMzgyWiIsInBpbm5lZC1kb21haW4tY2VydCI6Ik1JSUJwRENDQVVtZ0F\
3417	   3SUJBZ0lHQVcwZUx1SCtNQW9HQ0NxR1NNNDlCQU1DTURVeEV6QVJCZ05WQkFvTUNrMTV\
3418	   RblZ6YVc1bGMzTXhEVEFMQmdOVkJBY01CRk5wZEdVeER6QU5CZ05WQkFNTUJsUmxjM1J\
3419	   EUVRBZUZ3MHhPVEE1TVRFd01qTTNNekphRncweU9UQTVNVEV3TWpNM016SmFNRFV4RXp\
3420	   BUkJnTlZCQW9NQ2sxNVFuVnphVzVsYzNNeERUQUxCZ05WQkFjTUJGTnBkR1V4RHpBTkJ\
3421	   nTlZCQU1NQmxSbGMzUkRRVEJaTUJNR0J5cUdTTTQ5QWdFR0NDcUdTTTQ5QXdFSEEwSUF\
3422	   CT2t2a1RIdThRbFQzRkhKMVVhSTcrV3NIT2IwVVMzU0FMdEc1d3VLUURqaWV4MDYvU2N\
3423	   ZNVBKaWJ2Z0hUQitGL1FUamdlbEhHeTFZS3B3Y05NY3NTeWFqUlRCRE1CSUdBMVVkRXd\
3424	   FQi93UUlNQVlCQWY4Q0FRRXdEZ1lEVlIwUEFRSC9CQVFEQWdJRU1CMEdBMVVkRGdRV0J\
3425	   CVG9aSU16UWRzRC9qLytnWC83Y0JKdWNIL1htakFLQmdncWhrak9QUVFEQWdOSkFEQkd\
3426	   BaUVBdHhRMytJTEdCUEl0U2g0YjlXWGhYTnVocVNQNkgrYi9MQy9mVllEalE2b0NJUUR\
3427	   HMnVSQ0hsVnEzeWhCNThUWE1VYnpIOCtPbGhXVXZPbFJEM1ZFcURkY1F3PT0ifX0",
3428	     "signatures":[{
3429	       "protected":"eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQmt6Q0NBVGlnQXdJQkFnSUdBV0ZCakNrWU1\
3430	   Bb0dDQ3FHU000OUJBTUNNRDB4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQWtGUk1SVXdFd1lEVlFRS0RBeEt\
3431	   hVzVuU21sdVowTnZjbkF4RnpBVkJnTlZCQU1NRGtwcGJtZEthVzVuVkdWemRFTkJNQjR\
3432	   YRFRFNE1ERXlPVEV3TlRJME1Gb1hEVEk0TURFeU9URXdOVEkwTUZvd1R6RUxNQWtHQTF\
3433	   VRUJoTUNRVkV4RlRBVEJnTlZCQW9NREVwcGJtZEthVzVuUTI5eWNERXBNQ2NHQTFVRUF\
3434	   3d2dTbWx1WjBwcGJtZERiM0p3SUZadmRXTm9aWElnVTJsbmJtbHVaeUJMWlhrd1dUQVR\
3435	   CZ2NxaGtqT1BRSUJCZ2dxaGtqT1BRTUJCd05DQUFTQzZiZUxBbWVxMVZ3NmlRclJzOFI\
3436	   wWlcrNGIxR1d5ZG1XczJHQU1GV3diaXRmMm5JWEgzT3FIS1Z1OHMyUnZpQkdOaXZPS0d\
3437	   CSEh0QmRpRkVaWnZiN294SXdFREFPQmdOVkhROEJBZjhFQkFNQ0I0QXdDZ1lJS29aSXp\
3438	   qMEVBd0lEU1FBd1JnSWhBSTRQWWJ4dHNzSFAyVkh4XC90elVvUVwvU3N5ZEwzMERRSU5\
3439	   FdGNOOW1DVFhQQWlFQXZJYjNvK0ZPM0JUbmNMRnNhSlpSQWtkN3pPdXNuXC9cL1pLT2F\
3440	   FS2JzVkRpVT0iXSwidHlwIjoidm91Y2hlci1qd3MranNvbiIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2In0\
3441	   ",
3442	       "signature":"ShqW8uFRkuAXIzjAhB4bolMMndcY7GYq3Kbo94yvGtjCaxEX3Hp\
3443	   6QXZUTEJ_kulQ1G7DnaU4igDPdUGtcV9Lkw"},{
3444	       "protected":"eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQjRqQ0NBWWlnQXdJQkFnSUdBWFk3MmJiWk1\
3445	   Bb0dDQ3FHU000OUJBTUNNRFV4RXpBUkJnTlZCQW9NQ2sxNVFuVnphVzVsYzNNeERUQUx\
3446	   CZ05WQkFjTUJGTnBkR1V4RHpBTkJnTlZCQU1NQmxSbGMzUkRRVEFlRncweU1ERXlNRGN\
3447	   3TmpFNE1USmFGdzB6TURFeU1EY3dOakU0TVRKYU1ENHhFekFSQmdOVkJBb01DazE1UW5\
3448	   WemFXNWxjM014RFRBTEJnTlZCQWNNQkZOcGRHVXhHREFXQmdOVkJBTU1EMFJ2YldGcGJ\
3449	   sSmxaMmx6ZEhKaGNqQlpNQk1HQnlxR1NNNDlBZ0VHQ0NxR1NNNDlBd0VIQTBJQUJCazE\
3450	   2S1wvaTc5b1JrSzVZYmVQZzhVU1I4XC91czFkUFVpWkhNdG9rU2RxS1c1Zm5Xc0JkK3F\
3451	   STDdXUmZmZVdreWdlYm9KZklsbHVyY2kyNXduaGlPVkNHamV6QjVNQjBHQTFVZEpRUVd\
3452	   NQlFHQ0NzR0FRVUZCd01CQmdnckJnRUZCUWNESERBT0JnTlZIUThCQWY4RUJBTUNCNEF\
3453	   3U0FZRFZSMFJCRUV3UDRJZGNtVm5hWE4wY21GeUxYUmxjM1F1YzJsbGJXVnVjeTFpZEM\
3454	   1dVpYU0NIbkpsWjJsemRISmhjaTEwWlhOME5pNXphV1Z0Wlc1ekxXSjBMbTVsZERBS0J\
3455	   nZ3Foa2pPUFFRREFnTklBREJGQWlCeGxkQmhacTBFdjVKTDJQcldDdHlTNmhEWVcxeUN\
3456	   PXC9SYXVicEM3TWFJRGdJaEFMU0piZ0xuZ2hiYkFnMGRjV0ZVVm9cL2dHTjBcL2p3ekp\
3457	   aMFNsMmg0eElYazEiXSwidHlwIjoidm91Y2hlci1qd3MranNvbiIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU\
3458	   2In0",
3459	       "signature":"N4oXV48V6umsHMKkhdSSmJYFtVb6agjD32uXpIlGx6qVE7Dh0-b\
3460	   qhRRyjnxp80IV_Fy1RAOXIIzs3Q8CnMgBgg"
3461	     }]
3462	   }

3464	       Figure 26: Example Voucher Response from MASA, with additional
3465	                            Registrar signature

3467	Appendix B.  History of Changes [RFC Editor: please delete]

3469	   Proof of Concept Code available

3471	   From IETF draft 05 -> IETF draft 06:

3473	   *  Update of list of reviewers

3475	   *  Issue #67, shortened the pledge endpoints to prepare for
3476	      constraint deployments

3478	   *  Included table for new endpoints on the registrar in the overview
3479	      of the registrar-agent

3481	   *  addressed review comments from SECDIR early review

3483	   *  addressed review comments from IOTDIR early review

3485	   From IETF draft 04 -> IETF draft 05:

3487	   *  Restructured document to have a distinct section for the object
3488	      flow and handling and shortened introduction, issue #72

3490	   *  Added security considerations for using mDNS without a specific
3491	      product-serial-number, issue #75

3493	   *  Clarified pledge-status responses are cumulative, issue #73

3495	   *  Removed agent-sign-cert from trigger data to save bandwidth and
3496	      remove complexity through options, issue #70

3498	   *  Changed terminology for LDevID(Reg) certificate to registrar EE
3499	      certificate, as it does not need to be an LDevID, issue #66

3501	   *  Added new protected header parameter (created-on) in PER to
3502	      support freshness validation, issue #63

3504	   *  Removed reference to CAB Forum as not needed for BRSKI-PRM
3505	      specifically, issue #65

3507	   *  Enhanced error codes in section 5.5.1, issue #39, #64

3509	   *  Enhanced security considerations and privacy considerations, issue
3510	      #59

3512	   *  Issue #50 addressed by referring to the utilized enrollment
3513	      protocol

3515	   *  Issue #47 MASA verification of LDevID(RegAgt) to the same
3516	      registrar EE certificate domain CA

3518	   *  Reworked terminology of "enrollment object", "certification
3519	      object", "enrollment request object", etc., issue #27

3521	   *  Reworked all message representations to align with encoding

3523	   *  Added explanation of MASA requiring domain CA cert in section
3524	      5.5.1 and section 5.5.2, issue #36

3526	   *  Defined new endpoint for pledge bootstrapping status inquiry,
3527	      issue #35 in section Section 6.4, IANA considerations and section
3528	      Section 5.3

3530	   *  Included examples for several objects in section Appendix A
3531	      including message example sizes, issue #33

3533	   *  PoP for private key to registrar certificate included as
3534	      mandatory, issues #32 and #49

3536	   *  Issue #31, clarified that combined pledge may act as client/server
3537	      for further (re)enrollment

3539	   *  Issue #42, clarified that Registrar needs to verify the status
3540	      responses with and ensure that they match the audit log response
3541	      from the MASA, otherwise it needs drop the pledge and revoke the
3542	      certificate

3544	   *  Issue #43, clarified that the pledge shall use the create time
3545	      from the trigger message if the time has not been synchronized,
3546	      yet.

3548	   *  Several editorial changes and enhancements to increasing
3549	      readability.

3551	   From IETF draft 03 -> IETF draft 04:

3553	   *  In deep Review by Esko Dijk lead to issues #22-#61, which are bein
3554	      stepwise integrated

3556	   *  Simplified YANG definition by augmenting the voucher request from
3557	      RFC 8995 instead of redefining it.

3559	   *  Added explanation for terminology "endpoint" used in this
3560	      document, issue #16

3562	   *  Added clarification that registrar-agent may collect PVR or PER or
3563	      both in one run, issue #17

3565	   *  Added a statement that nonceless voucher may be accepted, issue
3566	      #18

3568	   *  Simplified structure in section Section 3.1, issue #19

3570	   *  Removed join proxy in Figure 1 and added explanatory text, issue
3571	      #20

3573	   *  Added description of pledge-CAcerts endpoint plus further handling
3574	      of providing a wrapped CA certs response to the pledge in section
3575	      Section 6.3; also added new required registrar endpoint (section
3576	      Section 6.2 and IANA considerations) for the registrar to provide
3577	      a wrapped CA certs response, issue #21

3579	   *  utilized defined abbreviations in the document consistently, issue
3580	      #22

3582	   *  Reworked text on discovery according to issue #23 to clarify scope
3583	      and handling

3585	   *  Added several clarifications based on review comments

3587	   From IETF draft 02 -> IETF draft 03:

3589	   *  Updated examples to state "base64encodedvalue==" for x5c
3590	      occurrences

3592	   *  Include link to SVG graphic as general overview

3594	   *  Restructuring of section 5 to flatten hierarchy

3596	   *  Enhanced requirements and motivation in Section 4

3598	   *  Several editorial improvements based on review comments

3600	   From IETF draft 01 -> IETF draft 02:

3602	   *  Issue #15 included additional signature on voucher from registrar
3603	      in section Section 6.2 and section Section 5.2 The verification of
3604	      multiple signatures is described in section Section 6.3

3606	   *  Included representation for General JWS JSON Serialization for
3607	      examples

3609	   *  Included error responses from pledge if it is not able to create a
3610	      pledge-voucher request or an enrollment request in section
3611	      Section 6.1

3613	   *  Removed open issue regarding handling of multiple CSRs and
3614	      enrollment responses during the bootstrapping as the initial
3615	      target it the provisioning of a generic LDevID certificate.  The
3616	      defined endpoint on the pledge may also be used for management of
3617	      further certificates.

3619	   From IETF draft 00 -> IETF draft 01:

3621	   *  Issue #15 lead to the inclusion of an option for an additional
3622	      signature of the registrar on the voucher received from the MASA
3623	      before forwarding to the registrar-agent to support verification
3624	      of POP of the registrars private key in section Section 6.2 and
3625	      Section 6.3.

3627	   *  Based on issue #11, a new endpoint was defined for the registrar
3628	      to enable delivery of the wrapped enrollment request from the
3629	      pledge (in contrast to plain PKCS#10 in simple enroll).

3631	   *  Decision on issue #8 to not provide an additional signature on the
3632	      enrollment-response object by the registrar.  As the enrollment
3633	      response will only contain the generic LDevID certificate.  This
3634	      credential builds the base for further configuration outside the
3635	      initial enrollment.

3637	   *  Decision on issue #7 to not support multiple CSRs during the
3638	      bootstrapping, as based on the generic LDevID certificate the
3639	      pledge may enroll for further certificates.

3641	   *  Closed open issue #5 regarding verification of ietf-ztp-types
3642	      usage as verified via a proof-of-concept in section
3643	      {#exchanges_uc2_1}.

3645	   *  Housekeeping: Removed already addressed open issues stated in the
3646	      draft directly.

3648	   *  Reworked text in from introduction to section pledge-responder-
3649	      mode

3651	   *  Fixed "serial-number" encoding in PVR/RVR

3653	   *  Added prior-signed-voucher-request in the parameter description of
3654	      the registrar-voucher-request in Section 6.2.

3656	   *  Note added in Section 6.2 if sub-CAs are used, that the
3657	      corresponding information is to be provided to the MASA.

3659	   *  Inclusion of limitation section (pledge sleeps and needs to be
3660	      waked up.  Pledge is awake but registrar-agent is not available)
3661	      (Issue #10).

3663	   *  Assertion-type aligned with voucher in RFC8366bis, deleted related
3664	      open issues.  (Issue #4)

3666	   *  Included table for endpoints in Section 5.3 for better
3667	      readability.

3669	   *  Included registrar authorization check for registrar-agent during
3670	      TLS handshake in section Section 6.2.  Also enhanced figure
3671	      Figure 9 with the authorization step on TLS level.

3673	   *  Enhanced description of registrar authorization check for
3674	      registrar-agent based on the agent-signed-data in section
3675	      Section 6.2.  Also enhanced figure Figure 9 with the authorization
3676	      step on pledge-voucher-request level.

3678	   *  Changed agent-signed-cert to an array to allow for providing
3679	      further certificate information like the issuing CA cert for the
3680	      LDevID(RegAgt) certificate in case the registrar and the
3681	      registrar-agent have different issuing CAs in Figure 9 (issue
3682	      #12).  This also required changes in the YANG module in
3683	      Section 7.1.2

3685	   *  Addressed YANG warning (issue #1)

3687	   *  Inclusion of examples for a trigger to create a pledge-voucher-
3688	      request and an enrollment-request.

3690	   From IETF draft-ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll-03 -> IETF anima-brski-
3691	   prm-00:

3693	   *  Moved UC2 related parts defining the pledge in responder mode from
3694	      draft-ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll-03 to this document This
3695	      required changes and adaptations in several sections to remove the
3696	      description and references to UC1.

3698	   *  Addressed feedback for voucher-request enhancements from YANG
3699	      doctor early review in Section 7.1 as well as in the security
3700	      considerations (formerly named ietf-async-voucher-request).

3702	   *  Renamed ietf-async-voucher-request to IETF-voucher-request-prm to
3703	      to allow better listing of voucher related extensions; aligned
3704	      with constraint voucher (#20)

3706	   *  Utilized ietf-voucher-request-async instead of ietf-voucher-
3707	      request in voucher exchanges to utilize the enhanced voucher-
3708	      request.

3710	   *  Included changes from draft-ietf-netconf-sztp-csr-06 regarding the
3711	      YANG definition of csr-types into the enrollment request exchange.

3713	   From IETF draft 02 -> IETF draft 03:

3715	   *  Housekeeping, deleted open issue regarding YANG voucher-request in
3716	      Section 6.1 as voucher-request was enhanced with additional leaf.

3718	   *  Included open issues in YANG model in Section 5.1 regarding
3719	      assertion value agent-proximity and csr encapsulation using SZTP
3720	      sub module).

3722	   From IETF draft 01 -> IETF draft 02:

3724	   *  Defined call flow and objects for interactions in UC2.  Object
3725	      format based on draft for JOSE signed voucher artifacts and
3726	      aligned the remaining objects with this approach in Section 6 .

3728	   *  Terminology change: issue #2 pledge-agent -> registrar-agent to
3729	      better underline agent relation.

3731	   *  Terminology change: issue #3 PULL/PUSH -> pledge-initiator-mode
3732	      and pledge-responder-mode to better address the pledge operation.

3734	   *  Communication approach between pledge and registrar-agent changed
3735	      by removing TLS-PSK (former section TLS establishment) and
3736	      associated references to other drafts in favor of relying on
3737	      higher layer exchange of signed data objects.  These data objects
3738	      are included also in the pledge-voucher-request and lead to an
3739	      extension of the YANG module for the voucher-request (issue #12).

3741	   *  Details on trust relationship between registrar-agent and
3742	      registrar (issue #4, #5, #9) included in Section 5.1.

3744	   *  Recommendation regarding short-lived certificates for registrar-
3745	      agent authentication towards registrar (issue #7) in the security
3746	      considerations.

3748	   *  Introduction of reference to agent signing certificate using SKID
3749	      in agent signed data (issue #37).

3751	   *  Enhanced objects in exchanges between pledge and registrar-agent
3752	      to allow the registrar to verify agent-proximity to the pledge
3753	      (issue #1) in Section 6.

3755	   *  Details on trust relationship between registrar-agent and pledge
3756	      (issue #5) included in Section 5.1.

3758	   *  Split of use case 2 call flow into sub sections in Section 6.

3760	   From IETF draft 00 -> IETF draft 01:

3762	   *  Update of scope in Section 3.1 to include in which the pledge acts
3763	      as a server.  This is one main motivation for use case 2.

3765	   *  Rework of use case 2 in Section 5.1 to consider the transport
3766	      between the pledge and the pledge-agent.  Addressed is the TLS
3767	      channel establishment between the pledge-agent and the pledge as
3768	      well as the endpoint definition on the pledge.

3770	   *  First description of exchanged object types (needs more work)

3772	   *  Clarification in discovery options for enrollment endpoints at the
3773	      domain registrar based on well-known endpoints do not result in
3774	      additional /.well-known URIs.  Update of the illustrative example.
3775	      Note that the change to /brski for the voucher related endpoints
3776	      has been taken over in the BRSKI main document.

3778	   *  Updated references.

3780	   *  Included Thomas Werner as additional author for the document.

3782	   From individual version 03 -> IETF draft 00:

3784	   *  Inclusion of discovery options of enrollment endpoints at the
3785	      domain registrar based on well-known endpoints in new section as
3786	      replacement of section 5.1.3 in the individual draft.  This is
3787	      intended to support both use cases in the document.  An
3788	      illustrative example is provided.

3790	   *  Missing details provided for the description and call flow in
3791	      pledge-agent use case Section 5.1, e.g. to accommodate
3792	      distribution of CA certificates.

3794	   *  Updated CMP example in to use lightweight CMP instead of CMP, as
3795	      the draft already provides the necessary /.well-known endpoints.

3797	   *  Requirements discussion moved to separate section in Section 4.
3798	      Shortened description of proof of identity binding and mapping to
3799	      existing protocols.

3801	   *  Removal of copied call flows for voucher exchange and registrar
3802	      discovery flow from [RFC8995] in UC1 to avoid doubling or text or
3803	      inconsistencies.

3805	   *  Reworked abstract and introduction to be more crisp regarding the
3806	      targeted solution.  Several structural changes in the document to
3807	      have a better distinction between requirements, use case
3808	      description, and solution description as separate sections.
3809	      History moved to appendix.

3811	   From individual version 02 -> 03:

3813	   *  Update of terminology from self-contained to authenticated self-
3814	      contained object to be consistent in the wording and to underline
3815	      the protection of the object with an existing credential.  Note
3816	      that the naming of this object may be discussed.  An alternative
3817	      name may be attestation object.

3819	   *  Simplification of the architecture approach for the initial use
3820	      case having an offsite PKI.

3822	   *  Introduction of a new use case utilizing authenticated self-
3823	      contain objects to onboard a pledge using a commissioning tool
3824	      containing a pledge-agent.  This requires additional changes in
3825	      the BRSKI call flow sequence and led to changes in the
3826	      introduction, the application example,and also in the related
3827	      BRSKI-PRM call flow.

3829	   From individual version 01 -> 02:

3831	   *  Update of introduction text to clearly relate to the usage of
3832	      IDevID and LDevID.

3834	   *  Update of description of architecture elements and changes to
3835	      BRSKI in Section 5.

3837	   *  Enhanced consideration of existing enrollment protocols in the
3838	      context of mapping the requirements to existing solutions in
3839	      Section 4.

3841	   From individual version 00 -> 01:

3843	   *  Update of examples, specifically for building automation as well
3844	      as two new application use cases in Section 3.1.

3846	   *  Deletion of asynchronous interaction with MASA to not complicate
3847	      the use case.  Note that the voucher exchange can already be
3848	      handled in an asynchronous manner and is therefore not considered
3849	      further.  This resulted in removal of the alternative path the
3850	      MASA in Figure 1 and the associated description in Section 5.

3852	   *  Enhancement of description of architecture elements and changes to
3853	      BRSKI in Section 5.

3855	   *  Consideration of existing enrollment protocols in the context of
3856	      mapping the requirements to existing solutions in Section 4.

3858	   *  New section starting with the mapping to existing enrollment
3859	      protocols by collecting boundary conditions.

3861	Contributors

3863	   Esko Dijk
3864	   IoTconsultancy.nl
3865	   Email: [e-mail]

3867	Authors' Addresses

3869	   Steffen Fries
3870	   Siemens AG
3871	   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
3872	   81739 Munich
3873	   Germany
3874	   Email: [e-mail]
3875	   URI:   https://www.siemens.com/

3877	   Thomas Werner
3878	   Siemens AG
3879	   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
3880	   81739 Munich
3881	   Germany
3882	   Email: [e-mail]
3883	   URI:   https://www.siemens.com/

3885	   Eliot Lear
3886	   Cisco Systems
3887	   Richtistrasse 7
3888	   CH-8304 Wallisellen
3889	   Switzerland
3890	   Phone: [phone]
3891	   Email: [e-mail]

3893	   Michael C. Richardson
3894	   Sandelman Software Works
3895	   Email: [e-mail]
3896	   URI:   http://www.sandelman.ca/