Re: [AVTCORE] Re-send:Comments on draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06.txt
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 11 September 2014 20:30 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 13:30:05 -0700
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To: Roni Even <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>
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Cc: "avt@ietf.org" <avt@ietf.org>, IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Re-send:Comments on draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06.txt
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Hi Roni, It seems to me that allocating code points in a Proposed Standard document is an endorsement. I realize that this seemed to many like a sensible procedure in 2010, but I would suggest that attitudes towards cipher proliferation have changed and we should assess this draft in light of that. Best, -Ekr On Sun, Sep 7, 2014 at 7:29 AM, Roni Even <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Eric, > This document does not endorse the use of ARIA for SRTP, the usage is > based on what the implementers will implement and the IETF have no control > over it and does not endorse any usage here . The document registers the > IANA code points based on RFC4568 and RFC 5226. According to RFC5226 you > can use a non IETF document (specification required ) for the SRTP > Protection Profile registration but need a standard track RFC for the Security > Descriptions.Doing this work at the IETF allowed for a review of the > usage of ARIA in SRTP instead of asking the authors to go directly to IANA > which will lead them back to the requirement for standard track RFC. To > the best of my knowledge RFC 4568 and RFC 5226 do not say which security > descriptions and which protection profile can be registers just what is > required to registers ones. (this is not ARIA that is being standardize).I > do not voice here my opinion about if it should be done. Just pointing out > that this work was done based on the current procedures. If we have other > procedures we can work accordingly in the future. BTW: this approach was > discussed in 2010 with Robert Sparks (RAI AD advisor to AVT WG) and Sean > Turner (security AD at the time) when the work on ARIA started at the IETF) > based on the ARIA authors question to the ADs (not on the mailing list). > The work also included ARIA as informational RFC and the support for ARIA > in TLS and CMS. The the conclusion was that because if the IANA > registration requirements there should be a standard track RFC for the SRTP > code points registration and it should be an AVT document (individual draft > initially)Roni Even. > > > > > > *From:* Eric Rescorla [mailto:ekr@rtfm.com] > *Sent:* 07 September, 2014 3:42 PM > *To:* Roni Even > *Cc:* avt@ietf.org; IESG > *Subject:* Re: [AVTCORE] Re-send:Comments on > draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06.txt > > > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 11:07 PM, Roni Even <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi Eric, > > This document registers the IANA codepoints for Security Descriptions, > DTLS-SRTP, and MIKEY. The registration procedure requires standard track > document. ARIA itself in RFC5794 is informational. > > > > I'm not sure that that changes the situation. The question is whether the > > IETF should be endorsing the use of ARIA for SRTP, right? > > > > > > > > The WG agreed to have a milestone for this work. > > > > Understood. However, I don't think that precludes deciding otherwise > > at this point. > > > > -Ekr > > > > > > *From:* avt [mailto:avt-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric Rescorla > *Sent:* 07 September, 2014 1:47 AM > *To:* avt@ietf.org; IESG > *Subject:* [AVTCORE] Re-send:Comments on > draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06.txt > > > > [Now with a right address] > > > > I just took a look at draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06.txt and I'm trying > to figure > > out why it's being advanced, especially as Standards Track. I have two > > concerns: > > > > 1. The arguments for specifying ARIA at all seem to be fairly weak. I > > went back to the mail archives and found my question about this from > > 2012, where I asked why we needed ARIA given that we have already > > standardized one KISA algorithm (SEED). > > > > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/current/msg15603.htm > > > > The answer, apparently, is that the Korean government wants it: > > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/current/msg15632.html > > > > Both SEED and ARIA were established as KS(Korean Standard) by the > > Ministry of Knowledge Economy of Korea. But SEED and ARIA have > > different application areas each other. While SEED is mainly used > > for for electronic commerce and financial service, ARIA is for > > government use and public purpose. As the governmental area is > > growing recently, we need to standardize SRTP-ARIA even though > > SRTP-SEED is already defined in RFC 5669. > > > > Substantively, standardizing a cipher just because a national government > > wants to use it doesn't seem like a really great idea. > > > > I just went back through the mailing list and was unable to find any > > messages that argued for standardizing ARIA other than those that > > appear to be by the authors. Procedurally, this doesn't really seem > > like the level of support that we should be looking for, especially > > for a standards track document. > > > > > > 2. If we are to specify ARIA, we shouldn't be specifying the combinatoric > > explosion of all the key lengths and cipher modes. Rather, we should > > specify GCM with one authentication tag and one or two key sizes. > > In response to my comments above, the authors argued that they were > > looking for parity with AES, but this isn't a good reason, since AES is > > the algorithm we are actually encouraging people to use (and even there > > it would be better to have fewer modes). In TLS we are trying to move > > away from non-AEAD ciphers and SRTP should probably do the same. > > > > -Ekr > > >
- [AVTCORE] Re-send:Comments on draft-ietf-avtcore-… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [AVTCORE] Re-send:Comments on draft-ietf-avtc… Roni Even
- Re: [AVTCORE] Re-send:Comments on draft-ietf-avtc… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [AVTCORE] Re-send:Comments on draft-ietf-avtc… Barry Leiba
- Re: [AVTCORE] Re-send:Comments on draft-ietf-avtc… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [AVTCORE] Re-send:Comments on draft-ietf-avtc… Roni Even
- Re: [AVTCORE] Re-send:Comments on draft-ietf-avtc… Eric Rescorla