[btns] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5386 (7829)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Thu, 29 February 2024 00:05 UTC

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Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 16:05:39 -0800
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Subject: [btns] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5386 (7829)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5386,
"Better-Than-Nothing Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7829

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Type: Technical
Reported by: Mccoy stevens <mccoystevens7777@gmail.com>

Section: Global

Original Text
-------------
Null

Corrected Text
--------------
Any peer that uses an IKEv2 AUTH method involving a digital
      signature (made with a private key to a public key cryptosystem)
      may match a BTNS PAD entry, provided that it matches no non-BTNS
      PAD entries.  Suitable AUTH methods as of August 2007 are: RSA
|     Digital Signature (method #1) and DSA Digital Signature (method
      #3); see [RFC4306], Section 3.8.

Notes
-----
H

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--------------------------------------
RFC5386 (draft-ietf-btns-core-07)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Better-Than-Nothing Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec
Publication Date    : November 2008
Author(s)           : N. Williams, M. Richardson
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Better-Than-Nothing Security
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG