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Re: [CFRG] [EXTERNAL] Re: Call for adoption: Hybrid KEM Combiners

Sophie Schmieg <sschmieg@google.com> Wed, 21 February 2024 20:36 UTC

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From: Sophie Schmieg <sschmieg@google.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2024 12:35:57 -0800
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Cc: Sophie Schmieg <sschmieg=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>, "Kousidis, Stavros" <stavros.kousidis@bsi.bund.de>
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Subject: Re: [CFRG] [EXTERNAL] Re: Call for adoption: Hybrid KEM Combiners
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Oh yeah, there is definitely lots of PKCS1 + AES-CBC, but that is so
trivially insecure that the combiner doesn't really have to care about it
to begin with in my opinion, since you can't make the argument that the PQC
algorithm might be less secure.

On Tue, Feb 20, 2024 at 5:09 PM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> Sophie Schmieg <sschmieg=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> writes:
>
> >I'm specifically thinking about S/MIME, which might be one of the more
> >complex situations. At the moment, the most commonly used encryption
> scheme
> >there is using RSA-OAEP to encrypt an AES-CBC or (hopefully mostly these
> >days) AES-GCM key.
>
> What's that claim based on?  Is it a specific operating environment?  I've
> seen essentially zero use of OAEP in S/MIME, it's all PKCS #1 v1.5.
>
> I do still occasionally see RC2/40 used, just as a side-note.
>
> Peter.
>
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-- 

Sophie Schmieg | Information Security Engineer | ISE Crypto |
sschmieg@google.com

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