Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-usage-04.txt

Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm> Thu, 02 November 2017 15:06 UTC

Return-Path: <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
X-Original-To: dcrup@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dcrup@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B94513FA9F for <dcrup@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 2 Nov 2017 08:06:36 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.719
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.719 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=-0.01, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=-0.01, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=fastmail.fm header.b=3HjeZYBg; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=messagingengine.com header.b=LIUTLZwW
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id zk6x0b0JRqah for <dcrup@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 2 Nov 2017 08:06:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from out4-smtp.messagingengine.com (out4-smtp.messagingengine.com [66.111.4.28]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0696D13F92E for <dcrup@ietf.org>; Thu, 2 Nov 2017 08:06:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from compute7.internal (compute7.nyi.internal [10.202.2.47]) by mailout.nyi.internal (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E0D620C76; Thu, 2 Nov 2017 11:06:34 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from web5 ([10.202.2.215]) by compute7.internal (MEProxy); Thu, 02 Nov 2017 11:06:34 -0400
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=fastmail.fm; h= cc:content-transfer-encoding:content-type:date:from:in-reply-to :message-id:mime-version:references:subject:to:x-me-sender :x-me-sender:x-sasl-enc; s=fm1; bh=KbOIthYQAdCMGc9U078KPk39N3CvU PrFZe5uRHDgi6g=; b=3HjeZYBgJHVeSVosxsnrZY67F1wbNVL75C/8GgKaW0lo6 vKKi31ztki1JDof8x8WfL8QteDfnzJOL+9k2onm+/17mS10xlA3BbuyD1UXi8Icf YMZWnICvKAT+i7KyN2hI3jsXB6WT/iqgQLrHrI5QVIAEqdjP+JDTeFWiS4KMhNvR /ap5wHFBtwEqITAXtEExBr5g7xytKa8seP1vD/nsoCinqEt+56sH4Mf78T4vBFzt Jf3rck+kwUwXj90JaCSQ71GwGZ02UUPcNAj6rUJktdziQ98a1Oar1vuo1rGKSTz/ ydSGm0grS50frcww2uU/x6lTZW0HPFxeDEftMu2kQ==
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d= messagingengine.com; h=cc:content-transfer-encoding:content-type :date:from:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references :subject:to:x-me-sender:x-me-sender:x-sasl-enc; s=fm1; bh=KbOIth YQAdCMGc9U078KPk39N3CvUPrFZe5uRHDgi6g=; b=LIUTLZwW1zlj+qAE7FB+j2 YGlT6QpZ8F2W8tZbPT+a37kr5ul6K1C2S00kSSo5ZllJ0pV8V5DJMCBAyqjpOun/ uqurhdSLx4wU8EYdjerzbAF3JWsaNBc1yyAvO22pynp19v/bstrjLwpQVWkk4GOn I7XG34eYBrwvBEFB0ALADvm5AWqp8gD2yzzJnvyb7UXQYPwpcgBx7M0As5CUM965 a7PU9nI4A+GDWF399bFpqFHuSunMpuko5zV3gzTEHO3sZTS4pM8+fCMGiFsAk++p FivSMu06hqsWsJJ7M/+kUlBhiFBvBE778x/vYLG32w9MUpnCA2Zo3tDYDMobkbQg ==
X-ME-Sender: <xms:ejT7WXNJxemmo_hvCx1ZBhXgoexBskIPPWApxYW2RHG0mTcbVYfcwQ>
Received: by mailuser.nyi.internal (Postfix, from userid 99) id 4B1469E301; Thu, 2 Nov 2017 11:06:34 -0400 (EDT)
Message-Id: <1509635194.3915266.1159421104.02964C44@webmail.messagingengine.com>
From: Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
To: "Murray S. Kucherawy" <superuser@gmail.com>
Cc: dcrup@ietf.org
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_----------=_150963519439152662"
X-Mailer: MessagingEngine.com Webmail Interface - ajax-66b6e65c
References: <1504117534.496823.1090155768.0E7DA2E2@webmail.messagingengine.com> <CAL0qLwbz3AsKdvZXPfopBO7MY+f3mcY0Ae_yStAWkRJnqGGGEQ@mail.gmail.com> <1504117985.498428.1090164600.651D13E7@webmail.messagingengine.com> <CAL0qLwYuBK55=+ANGLoPk0EazHjsgUcWcgWgo7ptA4QUqD+4aA@mail.gmail.com> <1504177085.2153024.1090910512.3EA32E07@webmail.messagingengine.com> <CAL0qLwYM_k7gUDWX8=ZNoROj=zFtQuW9pTqvRLtvwSHDEDTNGQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2017 15:06:34 +0000
In-Reply-To: <CAL0qLwYM_k7gUDWX8=ZNoROj=zFtQuW9pTqvRLtvwSHDEDTNGQ@mail.gmail.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dcrup/6vwrwbiNcPaEf4AlPhKwQqqG3Vc>
Subject: Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-usage-04.txt
X-BeenThere: dcrup@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: DKIM Crypto Update <dcrup.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dcrup>, <mailto:dcrup-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dcrup/>
List-Post: <mailto:dcrup@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dcrup-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dcrup>, <mailto:dcrup-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2017 15:06:36 -0000

On Wed, Nov 1, 2017, at 10:45 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> Circling back on this, which is the remaining point:
> 
> On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 3:58 AM, Alexey Melnikov
> <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm> wrote:>> 
>> On Thu, Aug 31, 2017, at 01:11 AM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
>>> On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 11:33 AM, Alexey Melnikov
>>> <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm> wrote:>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Wed, Aug 30, 2017, at 07:29 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
>>>>> The first line in Section 4 already says this updates 3.3 of
>>>>> RFC6376.  You think we need to be more specific?>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> As I mentioned: I think sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 are still
>>>> relevant. If this document is replacing 3.3 and its subsections,
>>>> some of this is lost.>>>> 
>>>> If you really intended to replace 3.3 and its subsections, it would
>>>> be worth adding "and its subsections" to the draft.>>> 
>>> The draft says "updates", but you're saying "replaces".  I don't see
>>> those as the same thing.  What this document says is to my mind
>>> treated as an overlay, not a replacement; read RFC6376, then read
>>> this for current advice, then act.>> 
>> I assume you are replacing the whole sections. If this is not what
>> you are doing, the document is even less clear and need to be
>> clarified.>> 
>> 
>>> If it's better to say this updates a specific subsection, then
>>> that's also reasonable.  I just thought what we have is sufficient.>> 
>> 
>> Yes, please be specific. I couldn't be certain which sections are
>> still in force and which were updated.> 
> I propose this, replacing our document's current Section 4:
> 
> 4. Update to DKIM Signing and Verification Algorithms
> 
> 
> 
>    Section 4.1 updates the text in [RFC6376] Section 3.3.
> 
> 
> 
>    Section 4.2 updates the first paragraph in [RFC6376] Section 3.3.3.
>
I want some specific text about what happens to sections:

3.3.1.  The rsa-sha1 Signing Algorithm
3.3.2.  The rsa-sha256 Signing Algorithm
3.3.4.  Other Algorithms

e.g. "Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 are not affected" or similar. (Or
     the correct disposition of these sections if what I suggested is
     not correct.
> 
> 
> 4.1. DKIM Signing and Verification Algorithms  DKIM supports multiple
>      digital signature algorithms.  Two algorithms are defined by this
>      specification at this time: rsa-sha1 and rsa- sha256.  Signers
>      MUST sign using rsa-sha256.  Verifiers MUST be able to verify
>      using rsa-sha256.  rsa-sha1 MUST NOT be used for signing or
>      verifying.  DKIM signatures signed with historic algorithms
>      (currently rsa-sha1) or with insufficient key sizes (currently
>      rsa-sha256 with less than 1024 bits) have permanently failed
>      evaluation as discussed in  [RFC6376] Section 3.9[1].  4.2. Key
>      Sizes  Selecting appropriate key sizes is a trade-off between
>      cost, performance, and risk.  Since short RSA keys more easily
>      succumb to off-line attacks, Signers MUST use RSA keys of at
>      least 1024 bits for all keys.  Signers SHOULD use RSA keys of at
>      least 2048 bits. Verifiers MUST be able to validate signatures
>      with keys ranging from 1024 bits to 4096 bits, and they MAY be
>      able to validate signatures with larger keys.  Verifier policies
>      can use the length of the signing key as one metric for
>      determining whether a signature is acceptable.  Verifiers MUST
>      NOT consider signatures using RSA keys of less than 1024 bits as
>      valid signatures.
>
> Alexey, would this suffice? -MSK

Links:

  1. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6376#section-3.9