Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-usage-04.txt
Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm> Fri, 03 November 2017 10:11 UTC
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From: Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
To: Scott Kitterman <sklist@kitterman.com>, dcrup@ietf.org
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Date: Fri, 03 Nov 2017 10:10:57 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-usage-04.txt
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This looks good to me. Please post a new version. If you need to do a manual post (due to pre-Singapore draft submission deadline), please request it and I will authorize it. On Thu, Nov 2, 2017, at 07:18 PM, Scott Kitterman wrote: > On Thursday, November 02, 2017 03:06:34 PM Alexey Melnikov wrote: > > On Wed, Nov 1, 2017, at 10:45 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote: > > > Circling back on this, which is the remaining point: > > > > > > On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 3:58 AM, Alexey Melnikov > > > <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm> wrote:>> > > > > > >> On Thu, Aug 31, 2017, at 01:11 AM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote: > > >>> On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 11:33 AM, Alexey Melnikov > > >>> <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm> wrote:>>>> > > >>> > > >>>> On Wed, Aug 30, 2017, at 07:29 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote: > > >>>>> The first line in Section 4 already says this updates 3.3 of > > >>>>> RFC6376. You think we need to be more specific?>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> As I mentioned: I think sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 are still > > >>>> relevant. If this document is replacing 3.3 and its subsections, > > >>>> some of this is lost.>>>> > > >>>> If you really intended to replace 3.3 and its subsections, it would > > >>>> be worth adding "and its subsections" to the draft.>>> > > >>> > > >>> The draft says "updates", but you're saying "replaces". I don't see > > >>> those as the same thing. What this document says is to my mind > > >>> treated as an overlay, not a replacement; read RFC6376, then read > > >>> this for current advice, then act.>> > > >> > > >> I assume you are replacing the whole sections. If this is not what > > >> you are doing, the document is even less clear and need to be > > >> clarified.>> > > >> > > >>> If it's better to say this updates a specific subsection, then > > >>> that's also reasonable. I just thought what we have is sufficient.>> > > >> > > >> Yes, please be specific. I couldn't be certain which sections are > > >> still in force and which were updated.> > > > > > > I propose this, replacing our document's current Section 4: > > > > > > 4. Update to DKIM Signing and Verification Algorithms > > > > > > Section 4.1 updates the text in [RFC6376] Section 3.3. > > > > > > > > > > > > Section 4.2 updates the first paragraph in [RFC6376] Section 3.3.3. > > > > I want some specific text about what happens to sections: > > > > 3.3.1. The rsa-sha1 Signing Algorithm > > 3.3.2. The rsa-sha256 Signing Algorithm > > 3.3.4. Other Algorithms > > > > e.g. "Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 are not affected" or similar. (Or > > the correct disposition of these sections if what I suggested is > > not correct. > > > > > 4.1. DKIM Signing and Verification Algorithms DKIM supports multiple > > > > > > digital signature algorithms. Two algorithms are defined by this > > > specification at this time: rsa-sha1 and rsa- sha256. Signers > > > MUST sign using rsa-sha256. Verifiers MUST be able to verify > > > using rsa-sha256. rsa-sha1 MUST NOT be used for signing or > > > verifying. DKIM signatures signed with historic algorithms > > > (currently rsa-sha1) or with insufficient key sizes (currently > > > rsa-sha256 with less than 1024 bits) have permanently failed > > > evaluation as discussed in [RFC6376] Section 3.9[1]. 4.2. Key > > > Sizes Selecting appropriate key sizes is a trade-off between > > > cost, performance, and risk. Since short RSA keys more easily > > > succumb to off-line attacks, Signers MUST use RSA keys of at > > > least 1024 bits for all keys. Signers SHOULD use RSA keys of at > > > least 2048 bits. Verifiers MUST be able to validate signatures > > > with keys ranging from 1024 bits to 4096 bits, and they MAY be > > > able to validate signatures with larger keys. Verifier policies > > > can use the length of the signing key as one metric for > > > determining whether a signature is acceptable. Verifiers MUST > > > NOT consider signatures using RSA keys of less than 1024 bits as > > > valid signatures. > > > > > > Alexey, would this suffice? -MSK > > > > Links: > > > > 1. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6376#section-3.9 > > I added text about 3.3.1, 2, and 4. See the attached RFC diff. If that > works > for you, I'll submit -06 and (hopefully) we can call it done.
- [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-usage-… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Murray S. Kucherawy
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Hector Santos
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Murray S. Kucherawy
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Martin Thomson
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Murray S. Kucherawy
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Scott Kitterman
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Murray S. Kucherawy
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Scott Kitterman
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Scott Kitterman
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Dcrup] AD review of draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-us… Murray S. Kucherawy