Re: [Dime] AD review of draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-09

Glen Zorn <gwz@net-zen.net> Tue, 24 May 2011 14:35 UTC

Return-Path: <gwz@net-zen.net>
X-Original-To: dime@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dime@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6A0B9E074C for <dime@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 24 May 2011 07:35:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Y5jOpqdGBmMp for <dime@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 24 May 2011 07:35:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from p3plsmtpa06-09.prod.phx3.secureserver.net (p3plsmtpa06-09.prod.phx3.secureserver.net [173.201.192.110]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 842FFE06AF for <dime@ietf.org>; Tue, 24 May 2011 07:35:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: (qmail 30229 invoked from network); 24 May 2011 14:28:58 -0000
Received: from unknown (124.120.74.224) by p3plsmtpa06-09.prod.phx3.secureserver.net (173.201.192.110) with ESMTP; 24 May 2011 14:28:57 -0000
Message-ID: <4DDBC0A4.4000802@net-zen.net>
Date: Tue, 24 May 2011 21:28:52 +0700
From: Glen Zorn <gwz@net-zen.net>
Organization: Network Zen
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.17) Gecko/20110414 Thunderbird/3.1.10
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Romascanu, Dan (Dan)" <dromasca@avaya.com>
References: <EDC652A26FB23C4EB6384A4584434A04031E5369@307622ANEX5.global.avaya.com>
In-Reply-To: <EDC652A26FB23C4EB6384A4584434A04031E5369@307622ANEX5.global.avaya.com>
X-Enigmail-Version: 1.1.1
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------080107020508070000090906"
Cc: dime@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Dime] AD review of draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-09
X-BeenThere: dime@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Diameter Maintanence and Extentions Working Group <dime.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dime>, <mailto:dime-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dime>
List-Post: <mailto:dime@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dime-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dime>, <mailto:dime-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 24 May 2011 14:35:39 -0000

On 5/16/2011 9:14 PM, Romascanu, Dan (Dan) wrote:

> 
> 
> Hi, 
> 
> I have reviewed draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-09. The document is in
> good shape, I have a small number of issues which seem simple to respond
> and fix if necessary, so I suggest that you do it before submitting the
> document to IETF Last Call. 
> 
> Technical Issues are marked T and Editorial issues are marked E. 
> 
> Technical:
> 
> T1: Is there any special reason for skipping decimal value (4) in the
> enumeration in Section 3.1.1? If there is none I suggest to move RSA-KEM
> from (5) to (4). 

OK.

> 
> T2: Are there any special recommendations for the experts who will be in
> charge in the future with the "Expert Review" policy as per [RFC5226]
> for AVP types? 

Do you mean values for the Key-Type AVP?  No such recommendations would
come from me; we had originally specified the policy as "First Come,
First Served"
(http://www.potaroo.net/ietf/all-ids/draft-wu-dime-local-keytran-03.txt)
on the simple theory that anybody who wanted to register, use & deploy
e.g. rot13 would get what they deserved ;-).  IIRC, one of the dime
Chairs suggested the expert review policy, so maybe they have some
suggestions.

...

> T3. In section  5.2: 
> 
>    'once values have been assigned, they MUST NOT be deleted, replaced,
> modified or deprecated.' 
> 
> It is not clear why we do not allow for values to be deprecated.
> Assuming that a cryptographic delivery method was deprecated, why would
> not marking the AVP as deprecated be allowed, as long as the value
> cannot be deleted, replaced or modified? 

Sure, why not.

> 
> Editorial: 
> 
> E1: Why is RSA-KEM not expanded and explained in Section 2.2. -
> Technical Terms and Acronyms?

Would you like the whole thing expanded or just KEM?

...