Re: [Dime] Ben Campbell's No Objection on draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-04: (with COMMENT)

["Ben Campbell" <[e-mail]>]

By the way, <[e-mail]> bounces. Is there an updated address?

Ben.

On 1 Jun 2016, at 11:23, Ben Campbell wrote:

> Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-04: No Objection
>
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> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>
>
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req/
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Substantive:
>
> - I am concerned about the de-emphasis of privacy requirements. While
> there's a mention of confidentiality in Requirement 2, other text
> suggests that integrity is more important (implying privacy is less
> important). There are no privacy considerations. Finally, the  {AVP}k
> convention does not distinguish  hinders discussion about how the set of
> confidentiality-protected AVPs and integrity-protected AVPs might not be
> the same. [Note: I almost balloted DISCUSS over this point. I did not,
> because I don't want to force the working group to add requirements it
> doesn't believe in. But I'd like to see some discussion about this.]
>
> - The "middle to *" models may be useful, but they are not end-to-end.
> Given the focus on those models, I find the title of the draft to border
> on disinformation. The description in the introduction about protecting
> AVPs between "non-neighbor" nodes is more accurate.
>
> - I find it odd to find 2119 keywords in the "motivation" sections. I
> suspect that most of those are statements of fact. If some are really
> requirements, they should be presented as such.
>
> - 4: The listed advantages of the middle-middle model (and also
> middle-to-end and end-to-middle) seem to assume that the number of
> "middles" is smaller than the number of "ends". While this may be true,
> especially for clienty ends, it should probably be explicitly stated.
>
> -- "firewalling Diameter proxy" needs a definition or reference.
>
> - Requirement 1: Does this need discussion on deprecating algorithms when
> vulnerabilities become known?
>
> - Requirement 2: Please elaborate on backwards-compatibiltiy with
> existing applications. Is this intended to motivate the models with
> "middles"?
>
> - Requirement 7: This (along with some text in the introduction) implies
> that non-repudiation is a requirement. If so, that should be listed and
> elaborated as a requirement.
>
> Editorial and Nits:
>
>
> - 1, first paragraph: "mechanisms independent of Diameter (e.g., IPsec)
>    is used."
>
> s/is/are
>
> - Requirement 3: The last sentence seems to ask the reader to draw a
> conclusion that wall-clock time can be used for anti-replay protection.
> If that's the intent, please say so explicitly.