Re: [dmarc-ietf] WGLC editorial review of draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-30

Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it> Sun, 31 March 2024 10:41 UTC

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Original-Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] WGLC editorial review of draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-30
Author: Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] WGLC editorial review of draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-30
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On Sat 30/Mar/2024 21:05:17 +0100 Seth Blank wrote:
> This is a real operational problem, so I wanted to expand guidance. The note 
> about best practice may or may not be appropriate here, but I think it works. 
> There are multiple M3AAWG documents which cover this use case, and we can also 
> link them if valuable.
>
> [...]
>
> Since DMARC only relies on an SPF pass, all failures are treated equally. 
> Therefore, it is considered best practice when using SPF in a DMARC context 
> for domains that send email to end records with a soft fail ("~" / "~all").

The last phrase is overly strict.  To /consider using/ soft fail ("~") or 
neutral ("?") should be enough.  For example, I use an SPF record terminating 
like so:

    ?exists:%{ir}.list.dnswl.org -all

It can be criticized for imposing DNS usage, but it works too.  One could also 
use ~include:vast.whitelist.example before -all; it would work as well.

Using ~all is akin to use p=none.  Be armed but only load blanks.  Its being 
best practice bears witness to the weakness of domain based authentication. 
Currently we are in the mid of a swamp, but if we hope to ever get out we can 
start by softening these kind of requirements.


Best
Ale
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