Re: [dmarc-ietf] WGLC contentious topics (I'm in the rough and I know it) in draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-30

"Murray S. Kucherawy" <superuser@gmail.com> Mon, 01 April 2024 14:53 UTC

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From: "Murray S. Kucherawy" <superuser@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 01 Apr 2024 07:52:47 -0700
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] WGLC contentious topics (I'm in the rough and I know it) in draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-30
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On Sun, Mar 31, 2024 at 6:37 PM Seth Blank <seth=
40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> "It is therefore critical that domains that host users who might post
> messages to mailing lists SHOULD NOT publish p=reject."
>
> [...]
>
> More accurate language that alleviates the concern would be "It is
> therefore critical that domains that host users who wish for their messages
> to be modified and spoofed by downstream intermediaries, such as alumni
> forwarders or mailing lists, SHOULD NOT publish p=reject. Such spoofed
> messages may still be rejected, regardless of a domain owner's published
> DMARC policy."
>

I must be missing something as this to me reads as a difference without a
distinction.  That's probably because I assume that the set of mailing
lists that modify messages is a very large subset of all mailing lists, but
they are a priori indistinguishable.

Put another way: As a domain owner with users that may or may not choose to
participate in mailing lists, I don't know what I would do with the added
text.  It seems to be telling me to get to know the configurations of the
lists to which my users might want to subscribe.  If I have only a handful
of users, that's possibly manageable.  If I'm Gmail-sized, not so much.

When it comes to the Charter, the document is supposed to articulate how to
> address indirect mail flow, and this would be the place. Therefore, I
> believe it is also worthwhile in this section to reference both ARC, as
> well as other mechanisms that such breaking intermediaries that create new
> messages (and therefore spoof the sender) could undertake, such as From
> rewriting to properly claim ownership of the message, or not making changes
> to the message that invalidate DKIM.
>

If ARC is intended to be part or all of the answer to how the list problem
is solved, and evidence exists that it does mitigate the damage, then I
think that's a strong argument for saying so in the document.  Do we have
such interoperability experience, especially with respect to lists?

-MSK, p11g