Re: [dns-privacy] New draft on encrypting the stub-to-resolver link: draft-hoffman-dns-tls-stub-00.txt

神明達哉 <jinmei@wide.ad.jp> Wed, 20 August 2014 15:44 UTC

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From: 神明達哉 <jinmei@wide.ad.jp>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] New draft on encrypting the stub-to-resolver link: draft-hoffman-dns-tls-stub-00.txt
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At Tue, 19 Aug 2014 11:32:54 -0700,
Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:

> >  Is this "security-oblivious stub" the concept defined in RFC 4033?
> >  If so, I think it's helpful to refer to the RFC explicitly.  And,
> >  even if so, I'm not sure how the "security-oblivious"ness
> >  matters in this context.  Some more explanation might be needed.
>
> This was just a leftover from a pre-draft when I was trying to deal with passing validation responses from resolver as well. It should simply have read "A stub resolver MAY..."

Ah, okay.

> > - Section 2.2
> >
> >   A stub resolver cannot tell whether it is sending queries to a
> >   recursive resolver or to a DNS forwarder.  Therefore, a DNS forwarder
> >   that acts as a TLS server for DNS requests MUST also act as a TLS
> >   client for queries to its upstream recursive resolvers.
> >
> > I wonder this 'MUST' may be too strong
[...]
> Good catch. Proposed replacement to handle the case where the recursive resolver doesn't do TLS:
>
>   A stub resolver cannot tell whether it is sending queries to a
>   recursive resolver or to a DNS forwarder.  Therefore, a DNS forwarder
>   that acts as a TLS server for DNS requests MUST also attempt to act as a TLS
>   client for queries to its upstream recursive resolvers, but MAY
>   use the normal DNS protocol on port 53 if an upstream recursive
>   resolver does set up a TLS session.

This works for me (I realize there's a followup discussion regarding
the possibility of downgrade attacks, on which I don't have a strong
opinion yet).

> > - General: perhaps related to the above points, I wonder what the stub
> >  resolver should do if it finds the recursive server(s) don't support
> >  the TLS extension.  It's probably just another policy matter (it can
> >  simply give up or live with resolution without encryption, etc), but
> >  I think it's worth noting explicitly.
>
> Sure, let's be explicit. Proposed addition to the policy section:
>
> If a recursive resolver does not respond on port 443 or set up a TLS session, the stub resolver MAY use the normal DNS protocol on port 53.

Works for me, too.

--
JINMEI, Tatuya