Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption draft-wouters-sury-dnsop-algorithm-update

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Tue, 28 February 2017 21:55 UTC

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Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 16:55:05 -0500
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption draft-wouters-sury-dnsop-algorithm-update
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On Tue, 28 Feb 2017, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> The recommendations in the document are completely unclear if it is talking 
> about:
>
> - what should be in signer implementations
> - what should be in validator implementations

That is clearly Section 3 in two seperate columns

> - what someone who is starting to sign today SHOULD/MUST use

Obviously pick one of the mandatory-to-implement DNSSEC Signing"
algortihms of Sesction 3. Obviously, picking a MUST over a SHOULD
would be a safer bet.

> - what someone who is already signing SHOULD/MUST use

Try to do the same as above, provided their software is fully testing
and can handle algorithm rollovers.

> I think those four lists are probably different.

The Signer / Validator column is obviously different, as the validator
needs to deal with the long tail versus insecurity, whereas the signer
software can be a little more aggressive in dropping support for weak
things. I don't see why the recommendation of "already signing" and
"newly signing" should be different, other then "ensure you can do an
algorithm rollover".

> Before the document is 
> picked up by the WG, it would be good if it made clear which lists it is for.

I do not think that is needed.

> My personal feeling is that if we do the third, we should say MUST NOT with 
> any SHA1 algorithm because they're going to get nailed in the future by 
> people who refuse to validate it. If we do the fourth, I would say SHOULD NOT 
> use now and SHOULD change within two years (or some moral equivalent of 
> that).

I don't think adding that much more flavours and granularity brings more
clarity. Heck, someone just said that our + and - symbols was already
too much granularity :P

And then we have some software people who say "we will never remove
anything because that can break our users' scripts".....

Paul