Re: [DNSOP] Seeking discussion of draft-ietf-dnsop-cookies-01

Evan Hunt <each@isc.org> Thu, 07 May 2015 17:14 UTC

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Date: Thu, 07 May 2015 17:14:21 +0000
From: Evan Hunt <each@isc.org>
To: 神明達哉 <jinmei@wide.ad.jp>
Message-ID: <20150507171421.GA43272@isc.org>
References: <20150501232130.GA13049@isc.org> <CAJE_bqe2FhYgCrOzh4ZRZYOO=YoJC3_QOoMwq1KLPbc30Y==mw@mail.gmail.com> <20150506183324.GA67107@isc.org> <CAJE_bqc0uNC6DTsJLs8oeEka2MEXXPhbgijqAxFn7_awvQ_CPw@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Seeking discussion of draft-ietf-dnsop-cookies-01
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On Thu, May 07, 2015 at 09:11:53AM -0700, 神明達哉 wrote:
> According to Section 7.2.4.1 of draft-ietf-dnsop-cookies-01, the server
> will still return the full size of response, so the attack will still be
> effective.

Subject to rate limiting restraints, yes.  BIND's experimental SIT
implementation exempts clients from rate limiting if they have a valid
cookie, but not otherwise.  The cookie is more of a way for legitimate
client traffic to be privileged, than for attack traffic to be mitigated;
we have other mechanisms in place to handle mitigation.

That said, however, I like the idea of adding the TC=1 response to the
protocol specification as a MAY.

-- 
Evan Hunt -- each@isc.org
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.