Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] More private algorithms for DNSSEC

Nils Wisiol <nils@desec.io> Tue, 22 March 2022 08:56 UTC

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From: Nils Wisiol <nils@desec.io>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>, "Wessels, Duane" <dwessels=40verisign.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: dnsop WG <dnsop@ietf.org>, Matthieu Grillere <matgrillere@gmail.com>, Peter Thomassen <peter@desec.io>
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 09:56:27 +0100
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] More private algorithms for DNSSEC
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There was some internal discussion about using 17 vs 253, with the main
argument for 253 being that this is the intended use case for 253 and
the main argument for 17 being that worry that some resolver
implementations could have special treatment for private algorithm
numbers. As we are interested in how FALCON-512 would behave in the
existing DNSSEC infrastructure, I pushed for using 17. I have to admit
though that I did not do research whether there exists special
treatment for private algorithms.

To settle this, I would like to ask the resolver vendors on this list:
is your treatment of private DNSSEC algorithms (253) any different from
unknown algorithms (such as 17)?

In any event, we shall make our implementation flexible wrt to the used
algorithm number(s). The intent was explicitly not to make any claims
on unused numbers.

Best,
Nils

On Mon, 2022-03-21 at 19:32 +0000, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On Mar 21, 2022, at 11:34 AM, Wessels, Duane <
> dwessels=40verisign.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> > Is it in response to the DNS-OARC talk we saw about implementing
> > PQC Falcon in PowerDNS, and they used the next unused algorithm
> > number rather than a private algorithm?
> 
> Nils could have picked 253 but probably didn't even think of looking
> down to the bottom of the list. He was just following the time-
> honored pattern in the IETF. :-)
> 
> > If the authors of that work are on this list I would be interested
> > to hear from them about that decision. In particular, would just
> > having more private algorithms change their thinking or is
> > something else needed?
> 
> They only needed one. This draft is for experimenters who need many
> at the same time. NIST has said that they are likely to later
> standardize on multiple post-quantum signature algorithms which will
> create larger payloads, and the DNSSEC community will have to decide
> if it wants just one of those, or many. Having a bit of experimental
> space for authoritative and recursive developers would be good, given
> that basically the entire range will be empty for centuries.
> 
> --Paul Hoffman
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