Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] DNSSEC Strict Mode

Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net> Thu, 25 February 2021 00:10 UTC

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From: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>
To: Ulrich Wisser <ulrich=40wisser.se@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Ben Schwartz <bemasc=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>, Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
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Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 16:10:36 -0800
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] DNSSEC Strict Mode
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Ulrich Wisser <ulrich=40wisser.se@dmarc.ietf.org> writes:

> Not only am I in favor of the RFC6840 lax validation, it is in fact
> necessary for secure DNSSEC operation.

I almost wrote up an ID specifically to say validation should always
be lax but be much more clear about it than the current specs.

I kind of like Ben's proposal, *if* it was married with a clear set of
text saying without it validators should take any acceptable validation
path (and not "all or nothing").

Only operators understand their situations with respect to "should I be
more robust or more secure?"  You can't have both, and right now I know
operators that refuse to roll their algorithm because the complexity is
too high (hence my other draft).  So they stick with an insecure
algorithm instead.  Is that better?  Wouldn't it be better for people
that just want security but robustness to give them an option that
provides that without the ultra-security required by others? 
-- 
Wes Hardaker
USC/ISI