[DNSOP] Incremental zone hash - XHASH

[Mark Andrews <[e-mail]>]

Rather than having a full zone hash this can be done as a chain
of hashes (XHASH).

The XHASH would include all records at a signed name (where a signed
name is NOT an NSEC3 name) up until the next signed name (where a
signed name is NOT a NSEC3 name) in DNSSEC order similar to ZONEMD.
If there is a NSEC3 record and its RRSIGs in this range it is included
in the hash computation.  Where a NSEC3 record matches the name of a
record that exists in the zone it is hashed with that name. The record
type appears at both top and bottom of zone similar to NS.

The chain is only deemed to be complete if there is a hash record at
the zone apex. This allows for incremental construction and destruction
of the XHASH chain similar to the way the presence of NSEC at the zone
apex indicates that chain is complete.

If there are records that are not at or under the zone apex they are included
in the final XHASH of the zone sorting from the zone apex to the end of the
namespace then from the start of the namespace to the zone apex. Such records
at not normally visible to queries other than AXFR/IXFR.  AXFR/IXFR permit such
records. 

XHASH would allow for UPDATE to incrementally adjust the chain without
having to hash the entire zone at once.

XHASH would allow for a slave server to verify a zone is still complete
after a IXFR by just checking the areas of the zone impacted by the IXFR.

e.g.

	example.com SOA
	example.com NS ns.example.com
	example.com DNSKEY …
	example.com NSEC a.example.com NS SOA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY XHASH
	example.com XHASH …

	a.example.com NS ns.a.example.com
	a.example.com NSEC b.example.com NS RRSIG NSEC XHASH
	a.example.com XHASH …
	ns.a.example.com A …

	b.example.com NS ns.b.example.com
	b.example.com NSEC ns.example.com NS RRSIG NSEC XHASH
	b.example.com XHASH …
	ns.b.example.com A …

	ns.example.com A …
	ns.example.com AAAA …
	ns.example.com NSEC example.com A AAAA RRSIG NSEC XHASH
	ns.example.com XHASH …

Each of the groupings shows which records plus RRSIGs that are
included in the XHASH calculation.

To prevent removal/introduction of RRSIGs of XHASH records a DNSKEY
flag bit is be needed to indicate which RRSIG(XHASH) should/should not
be present once the chain is complete.  The same applies to RRSIG(ZONEMD).

Verification of a AXFR would be slightly slower than with ZONEMD as there
are more RRSIG records to be processed,
	

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: [phone]              INTERNET: [e-mail]