[dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG
"Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> Fri, 15 November 2013 05:55 UTC
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Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2013 21:55:28 -0800
From: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Subject: [dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG
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Hello, and welcome to the dsfjdssdfsd list! At the last IETF the question was asked, "what can we do to harden the Internet?" Given the recent news about Dual_EC_DBRG and the dopant attack against hardware RNGs one of the things that can be done is to have an open specification of a secure RNG. This would allow developers to have an alternative to relying solely on /dev/[u]random, a hardware RNG, an RNG specified by a large government-affiliated group to mix the uncorrelated sources of entropy they gather, or an RNG designed in an ad hoc manner by someone who thinks he knows what he's doing but probably doesn't. One of the things that would be nice to get out of this list is a specification on a strong RNG, in the form of a BCP or Informational RFC. This doesn't necessarily mean lets "roll our own" but perhaps there is best practice that can be specified. So, is there a model that defines what a "robust RNG" would look like? Is there a suitable candidate that exists already for such a thing? regards, Dan.
- [dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG Dan Harkins
- Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG Eric Burger
- Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG Donald Eastlake
- Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
- Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG Michael Hammer
- Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG Dan Harkins
- Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG Russ Housley
- Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG Russ Housley
- Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] specifying an RNG Dan Harkins