[Endymail] What are the problems?

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Sun, 07 September 2014 17:55 UTC

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Date: Sun, 07 Sep 2014 10:55:46 -0700
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: endymail <endymail@ietf.org>
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Subject: [Endymail] What are the problems?
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Dear all,
Let's back up from spam.

If we look at E2E encryption, S/MIME is widely supported and deployed.
It's way more heavyweight than it needs to be. PGP same story, but add
in completely weird crypto. (I don't actually know what S/MIME does
cryptographically: my tolerance for ASN.1 is only so high) Both are
unnecessarily complicated. So why aren't they used more? I can think
of a few issues.

The first issue is UI: nothing much we can do about it here. But if we
reduce the complexity of the protocols by subsetting them, the UI
doesn't need to expose so much, and so conceivably be simpler.

The second issue is multidevice usage. Here we have questions about
transporting keys, removing keys from devices (hard), but the core
protocols will work.

The third issue is webmail: I'm part of the problem here, but I think
browser extensions (ugh) can solve it: I don't think we need new
protocols.

The fourth issue is key discovery. For S/MIME I don't know how this
works. For PGP the keyservers work, but the control ensuring you get
the right key is the WoT, which is very hard to use, and most people
don't do it. In practice the keys get put on websites served over TLS,
or tweeted.

We should really think about the merits of the Public File: it's very
close to what we have with PGP, and would resolve a lot of concerns
about CA subversion.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd