Re: Fourth Last Call: draft-housley-tls-authz-extns

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Thu, 15 January 2009 19:54 UTC

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Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 14:54:16 -0500
To: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: Fourth Last Call: draft-housley-tls-authz-extns
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References: <20090114161820.BFA4228C1BB@core3.amsl.com> <20090115013244.GA20394@redoubt.spodhuis.org> <20090115162240.3DEC23A67F1@core3.amsl.com> <87d4eofqaa.fsf@mocca.josefsson.org>
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Simon:

> >>For the people who want this draft published (and perhaps have a pending
> >>implementation), would you please humour me by offering some usage
> >>scenarios, other than debugging or toys, which would meet security
> >>review and which are not covered by the four points which the
> >>patent-holder notes as potentially encumbered?
> >
> > I'll offer one based on attribute certificates (see RFC 3281).  If the
> > attribute certificate policy does not use a critical certificate
> > policy identifier that is within an arc registered to RedPhone
> > Security (e.g. iso.org.dod.internet.private.enterprise.23106), then
> > the most straightforward deployments would not encounter problems with
> > this IPR Statement.  RFC 3281 specifies ways to carry access
> > identities, group memberships, roles, and clearances in attribute
> > certificates.  As long as these are not coupled to signed agreements
> > such as contracts, as is their normal use, then I cannot see problems
> > with this IPR statement.
>
>What's the point of a certificate if you don't ultimately couple it with
>a contract?  Identities, group memberships, roles, and clearances are
>all attributes defined by non-technical, real-world agreements, often
>documented in the form of a contract.

I can think of many that are not tied to contracts, especially in the 
manner described in the paragraph numbered 2 in the IPR 
statement.  The authorization data needs to be used to "locate" the 
agreement.  I've worked with many identification and authorization 
systems, and this is not a traditional aspect of any of them.

Russ 

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