RE: Last Call: <draft-turner-md5-seccon-update-07.txt> (Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms) to Informational RFC

The logic doesn't make sense in this position.  "Crypto modules can't use MD5, thus no protocols at all should use MD5."

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From: ietf-bounces@ietf.org [ietf-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Francis Dupont [Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr]
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2010 9:55 AM
To: L.Wood@surrey.ac.uk
Cc: wes@mti-systems.com; iesg@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-turner-md5-seccon-update-07.txt> (Updated        Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the      HMAC-MD5 Algorithms) to Informational RFC

I have a concern about no security usages of MD5 for practical reasons:
in some environments, including US Gov, crypto implementations (e.g.,
FIPS 140-2 HSMs) are required to not support MD5 so you can have to
choose between a compliant application and a conformant crypto,
for instance for DNS TSIG...

So IMHO it is still a good idea to avoid MD5 in any uses, even when
it is still far to have been proved insecure or for an use which is
not about security.

This could be caught by the "DEPRECATED" keyword in the registry
but this registry doesn't seem to have usage entries?!

To conclude I am fine with the implicit conclusion of the I-D to
not use MD5 or HMAC-MD5 in new protocols.

Thanks

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

PS: I am the gen-art reviewer for this document too.
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