Re: Proposed Proposed Statement on e-mail encryption at the IETF

"Joe Abley" <jabley@hopcount.ca> Tue, 02 June 2015 18:11 UTC

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From: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: Proposed Proposed Statement on e-mail encryption at the IETF
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 19:08:15 +0100
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References: <DD88F4E4-6BBA-4610-BB49-3158A26DF55B@hopcount.ca> <2DA10E34-02DA-4245-9031-8C0F2749461D@vpnc.org>
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On 2 Jun 2015, at 18:15, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> On Jun 2, 2015, at 6:44 AM, Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca> wrote:
>> If the argument that we should use HTTPS everywhere (which I do not 
>> disagree with) is reasonable, it feels like an argument about sending 
>> encrypted e-mail whenever possible ought to be similarly reasonable. 
>> Given that so much of the work of the IETF happens over e-mail, a 
>> focus on HTTP seems a bit weird.
>
> This is a terrible idea. If the IETF mailer thinks it knows my PGP 
> encryption key, and I don't because I have lost it or invalidated it, 
> then I cannot read the mail from the IETF mailer and will thus lose 
> valuable information.

Right. So let's not do that.

> Maybe we can develop some interface that allows a user to specify 
> their encryption key and remove it at will, but I've never seen such 
> an interface before and suspect that its design will have all sorts of 
> pointy edge cases.

I can think of lots of interfaces that let users specify settings for a 
particular service. Mailman is surely one of them. Again, I'm not 
talking about encrypting public list traffic, but it seems like a fair 
bet that anybody who wants to exchange non-public-list traffic with the 
IETF has a mailman account already.

And before anybody jumps on that particular idea, it's just an example. 
I may be the only one, but I'm actually not trying to design a solution 
here, just suggesting that e-mail not be overlooked as we look for ways 
to s/mouth/money/ when it comes to privacy.

> Proposal: if you actually want this, develop an interface for telling 
> the server your key first. Get buy-in from others active in the IETF, 
> if possible. If you can pull this off, it will benefit much more than 
> the IETF.

I don't think anybody wants *me* to develop anything :-)

But agreed, if the IETF was able to show that its work conducted by 
e-mail could incorporate cryptography in such a way that it was a 
benefit to all concerned rather than a headache, I think that would be 
great.


Joe