Sector Review: draft-ietf-ospf-te-metric-extensions-09

Olafur Gudmundsson <> Sat, 03 January 2015 16:44 UTC

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Subject: Sector Review: draft-ietf-ospf-te-metric-extensions-09
Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2015 11:44:10 -0500
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the 
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the 
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat 
these comments just like any other last call comments. 

This document is Ready with nits. 

The document contains no issues from a security perspective as it is only creating LSA’s for new types of route selection metrics,
time instead of network hops. 

The Nit that I have is the document in introduction says time is important and the ability to select faster path has high
economical gain. 
The base time measurement unit in the new LSA’s is MICRO seconds, there is no justification in the document that 
says 1 micro second is granular enough for links of the near future (over 100 Gbits+).