Re: [ippm] WGLC for draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-05

["[e-mail]" <[e-mail]>]

Dhruv,
Thanks for your comments.   Please see inline.  A new version of the draft has also been posted which incorporates these changes.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2/

Nalini Elkins
CEO and Founder
Inside Products, Inc.
https://www.insidethestack.com
PresidentIndustry Network Technology Councilhttps://www.industrynetcouncil.org 

    On Saturday, January 27, 2024 at 01:53:25 AM PST, Dhruv Dhody <[e-mail]> wrote:  
 
 Hi, 
I support this work, but here are a few comments that should be handled before sending the I-D to our AD. 
## Suggestions/Query
> * I am assuming that the procedures specified in RFC 8250 continue to apply. That should be stated explicitly.
Done  
> * Section 3, Is it correct to say the difference between a client and server is that it is the client that initiates the session? Maybe just state that and other properties are for any endpoint node.
Done  
> * Shouldn't there be some backward compatibility text to explain cases like -- what happens when a node does not understand PDMv2 and thus expected a length of 10 as per RFC 8250 but finds a different >length. Also I wonder how one decides if a client should use PDM, unencrypted PDMv2 or encrypted PDMv2. There should be specific text that says that the server MUST respond with the same mechanism. > Are all mechanisms mandatory to implement? Basically we need more text...
Added text below:
4.2.  Implementation Guidelines
   How should a network administrator decide whether a client should use PDM, unencrypted PDMv2, or encrypted PDMv2?  This decision is a network policy issue.  The administrator must be aware that PDM or unencrypted PDMv2 might expose too much information to malicious parties.
   That said, if the network administrator decides that taking such a risk within their network is acceptable, then they should make the decision that is appropriate for their network.
   Alternatively, the network administrator might choose to create a policy that prohibits the use of PDM or unencrypted PDMv2 on their network.  The implementation SHOULD provide a way for the network administrator to enforce such a policy.
   The server and client implementations SHOULD support PDM, unencrypted PDMv2, and encrypted PDMv2.  If a client chooses a certain mechanism (e.g., PDM), the server MAY respond with the same mechanism, unless the network administrator has selected a policy that only allows certain mechanisms on their network.
4.2.1.  Use Case 1: Server does not understand PDM or PDMv2
   If a client sends a packet with PDM or PDMv2 and the server does not have code which understands the header, the packet is processed according to the Option Type which is defined in RFC8250 and is in accordance with RFC8200.
   The Option Type identifiers is coded to skip over this option and continue processing the header.
4.2.2.  Use Case 2: Server does not allow PDM or PDMv2
   If a client sends a packet with PDM and the network policy is to only allow encrypted or unencrypted PDMv2, then the PDM / PDMv2 header MUST be ignored and processing continue normally.
   The server SHOULD log such occurrences but MUST apply rate limiting to any such logs.  The implementor should be aware that logging or returning of error messages can be used in a Denial of Service reflector attack.  An attacker might send many packets with PDM / PDMv2 and cause the receiver to experience resource exhaustion.
   The routers involved may have implemented filtering as per [RFC9288] on filtering of IPv6 extension headers which may impact the receipt of PDM / PDMv2.  The organization which manages the network within which PDM / PDMv2 is sent should take care that the filtering of extension headers is done correctly so that the desired effect is obtained.



## Minor
> *  Section 1, Consider changing Man-In-The-Middle to Machine-In-The-Middle as per https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/on-inclusive-language/
Done.
>- Section 1, it would be good to introduce what PDMv2 is before stating "PDMv2 adds...".
Done.
>- Section 3, mentions terms pkX and skX but never use it, is there a reason they are defined?
Added references.  
>- Section 9, you are reusing the option type 0x0F defined in RFC 8250, you don't need to ask IANA to assign one!
Changed.  
>- Section A.1, is there a reference to the primary-secondary architecture mentioned? 

Removed.

## Nits
>* Section 1, s/current PDM/PDM [RFC8250]/
>* Section 4.1, expand HPKE, KEM, KDF (you do that later on in section 5.4, but it should be done here). Also PSN. 
>* Don't capitalize "CAN" as it is not a BCP14 keyword. Maybe use MAY?
>* Section 6.3, the formatting for field descriptions is hard to follow. 
>* s/Reserved Bits/Reserved/ - add it MUST be set to zero on transmission and ignored on receipt. 
>* s/RFC3552/[RFC3552]/
>* Remove appendix B and C as they are empty

Done.  With the exception of Appendix B and C, as I believe the RFC editor does this.
Thanks! Dhruv
On Tue, Jan 9, 2024 at 10:56 PM Tommy Pauly <tpauly=[e-mail]> wrote:

Hello IPPM, This email starts a Working Group Last Call for "IPv6 Performance and Diagnostic Metrics Version 2 (PDMv2) Destination Option”, draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-05. IPv6 Performance and Diagnostic Metrics Version 2 (PDMv2) Destination Option

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IPv6 Performance and Diagnostic Metrics Version 2 (PDMv2) Destination Op...

RFC8250 describes an optional Destination Option (DO) header embedded in each packet to provide sequence numbers...
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https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-05 Please review the document and send your comments in response to this email, along with whether you think the document is ready to progress.
This last call will be three weeks long, and end on Tuesday, January 30. In parallel, we have requested another SECDIR review. Best,Tommy & Marcus_______________________________________________
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