Re: [ippm] WGLC for draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-05

Rob,
Thanks so much for your support, review and comments.
> What happens when one partner discovers the traffic has been corrupted or intercepted, or otherwise appears suspect? Can the PDM conversation be > reinitiated safely at that point? Or should there be some kind of banditry notification and/or session termination?
One thing, we no longer do real-time decryption of the packets.  The packets are decrypted offline by another process.  We have left that process out of scope.
But, we can certainly add that if a problem is found in decryption, this may be due to "banditry" or another violation.   Enterprises care a great deal about fraud, logging, and notifications of this sort so we will certainly add that.
Thanks,

Nalini Elkins
CEO and Founder
Inside Products, Inc.
https://www.insidethestack.com
PresidentIndustry Network Technology Councilhttps://www.industrynetcouncil.org 

    On Thursday, January 25, 2024 at 08:02:01 AM PST, Hamilton, Robert <rhamilton=40cas.org@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:  

I support the adoption of this draft, with just a few comments.

I noted in section 7.1.4:

Encrypted PDMv2 provides inherent protection against active attacks like Message Modification by providing integrity.  If either of the sequence number or encrypted PDMv2 contents are modified then decryption will fail.

I suspect that the decryption function will actually work, but it will result in a garbled message instead of the original open text. If the PDM(v2) conversation stream is corrupted like this, I’m not sure there’s a way to reestablish it without reinitializing the secret, which I think is what you had in mind with:

 When the Epoch rolls over, the SharedSecret SHOULD be re-negotiated. 

in Section 4.1; potentially that could signal to the legitimate partner that there is an issue, but it would signal to the MITM that the real partners know he’s there, and could permit the MITM to observe the SharedSecret setup. It may be necessary simply to disable the PDM conversation instead.

What happens when one partner discovers the traffic has been corrupted or intercepted, or otherwise appears suspect? Can the PDM conversation be reinitiated safely at that point? Or should there be some kind of banditry notification and/or session termination?

Thanks,

R;

Rob Hamilton

Infrastructure Engineer

Chemical Abstracts Service 

From: ippm <ippm-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Tommy Pauly
Sent: Tuesday, January 9, 2024 12:26 PM
To: IETF IPPM WG <ippm@ietf.org>
Subject: [EXT] [ippm] WGLC for draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-05

[Actual Sender is forwardingalgorithm@ietf.org]

Hello IPPM,

This email starts a Working Group Last Call for "IPv6 Performance and Diagnostic Metrics Version 2 (PDMv2) Destination Option”, draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-05.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2/

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-05

Please review the document and send your comments in response to this email, along with whether you think the document is ready to progress.

This last call will be three weeks long, and end on Tuesday, January 30. In parallel, we have requested another SECDIR review.

Best,

Tommy & Marcus 
 Confidentiality Notice: This electronic message transmission, including any attachment(s), may contain confidential, proprietary, or privileged information from CAS, a division of the American Chemical Society ("ACS"). If you have received this transmission in error, be advised that any disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. Please destroy all copies of the message and contact the sender immediately by either replying to this message or calling 614-447-3600.
_______________________________________________
ippm mailing list
ippm@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ippm