Re: [IPsec] Candidate charter text is now in wiki

Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> Tue, 06 February 2018 18:30 UTC

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Date: Tue, 06 Feb 2018 20:29:54 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Candidate charter text is now in wiki
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David Schinazi writes:
> Here is proposed charter text for the "Mitigating privacy concerns"
> section:

As there has not been any support for this item in the mailing list I
do not think we will be adding it in the charter this time. 

> IKEv2 is currently vulnerable to the two following privacy concerns:
> 
> 1) It's not possible to run a server that obfuscates IKEv2/IPsec
>     using TLS. Today thanks to RFC 8229 it is possible to run an
>     IKEv2/IPsec server on TCP port 443 with TLS. However if a
>     government agent tries to send an SA_INIT over that it will
>     discover that this server runs IKEv2/IPsec, and may blacklist
>     it. We should add a mechanism to IKEv2 that allows the server to
>     only respond to SA_INIT from known entities (e.g. that possess a
>     shared secret).
> 
> 2) The privacy of the initiator's identity in the presence of a man
>     in the middle attacker is not protected Today an attacker with
>     full control of the network can receive the IDi/IDr sent by the
>     initiator in the first AUTH packet. We should add a mechanism to
>     IKEv2 that allows the initiator to only send IDi/IDr to known
>     entities (e.g. that possess a shared secret).
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi