Re: [IPsec] Candidate charter text is now in wiki

David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com> Wed, 29 November 2017 03:47 UTC

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From: David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com>
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Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 19:47:47 -0800
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To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Candidate charter text is now in wiki
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Hi Tero,

Here is proposed charter text for the "Mitigating privacy concerns" section:

IKEv2 is currently vulnerable to the two following privacy concerns:

1) It's not possible to run a server that obfuscates IKEv2/IPsec using TLS.
    Today thanks to RFC 8229 it is possible to run an IKEv2/IPsec server on TCP port 443 with TLS.
    However if a government agent tries to send an SA_INIT over that it will discover that this server runs IKEv2/IPsec, and may blacklist it.
    We should add a mechanism to IKEv2 that allows the server to only respond to SA_INIT from known entities (e.g. that possess a shared secret).

2) The privacy of the initiator's identity in the presence of a man in the middle attacker is not protected
    Today an attacker with full control of the network can receive the IDi/IDr sent by the initiator in the first AUTH packet.
    We should add a mechanism to IKEv2 that allows the initiator to only send IDi/IDr to known entities (e.g. that possess a shared secret).

Thanks,
David Schinazi


> On Nov 16, 2017, at 22:35, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
> 
> Dear Tero,
> 
> It seems that you missed this text for the address failure codes (Nov 13): 
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec/current/msg11724.html   
> 
> I'm resending it fwiw:
> 
>   RFC7296 defines a generic notification code that is related to a
>   failure to handle an internal address failure.  That code does not
>   explicitly allow an initiator to determine why a given address family
>   is not assigned, nor whether it should try using another address
>   family.  The Working Group will specify a set of more specific
>   notification codes that will provide sufficient information to the
>   IKEv2 initiator about the encountered failure.
> 
> Cheers,
> Med
> 
>> -----Message d'origine-----
>> De : IPsec [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] De la part de Tero Kivinen
>> Envoyé : vendredi 17 novembre 2017 06:21
>> À : ipsec@ietf.org
>> Objet : [IPsec] Candidate charter text is now in wiki
>> 
>> I put the candidate charter text to the wiki. This includes the
>> changes in the first two paragraphs, removes items already done, and
>> list of new items. I have not yet added the items that came too late
>> to have charter text bashed in the meeting to the wiki.
>> 
>> For those items which do not have text yet, it would be good idea if
>> those people could send new proposed text to the list so we could bash
>> those at the same time as we go and check the other pieces.
>> 
>> So read that candidate charter text and comment it on the list.
>> 
>> Wiki address is https://trac.ietf.org/trac/ipsecme/wiki/recharter2017
>> --
>> kivinen@iki.fi
>> 
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