Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead
Merike Kaeo <merike@doubleshotsecurity.com> Thu, 12 November 2009 03:49 UTC
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From: Merike Kaeo <merike@doubleshotsecurity.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2009 19:49:29 -0800
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Cc: "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "Bhatia, Manav (Manav)" <manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com>, Jack Kohn <kohn.jack@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead
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All of the standards I've seen that explicitly define how IPsec is to be used for authentication (including RFC 4552 - Authentication/ Confidentiality for OSPFv3) say that for authentication ESP-Null MUST be used and AH MAY. Which RFCs specify AH specifically as a MUST for authentication/ integrity? Now on the flip side, in practical implementations, most vendors I know of started off with AH being used for OSPFv3 and I doubt in practice people are using ESP-Null. Would love to be wrong here :) - merike On Nov 11, 2009, at 7:28 PM, Stephen Kent wrote: > At 7:44 AM +0530 11/12/09, Bhatia, Manav (Manav) wrote: >> Steve, >> >>> I would have no problem deprecating AH in the context of the IPsec >>> architecture document, if others agree. It is less efficient than >>> ESP-NULL. However, other WGs have cited AH as the IPsec protocol of >>> choice for integrity/authentication in their environments, so there >>> will be a need to coordinate with them, and it may be >>> unacceptable to >>> kill AH as a standalone protocol for them. >> >> I agree that it is a trifle too early to start deprecating AH, >> though I wouldn't mind doing so. OTOH, don't most WGs already >> suggest AH as a MAY, and ESP-NULL as a MUST? > > Not always. For example, I believe that OSPF security makes use of > AH, outside the IPsec context. > >> In any case what should be the stand for the newer work that comes >> out of these WGs. Should they spell out support for AH, or should >> they just be talking about ESP (or ESP-NULL or WESP)? > > I'd recommend ESP-NULL, unless the context on which the operate > might require inspection by an intermediate system. > >> If we want to deprecate AH, or at least discourage its use in the >> context of the IPSec architecture in the near future then >> shouldn't we be working on this? > > Part of the problem is that some WGs want to make use of IPsec > protocols outside of the IPsec architecture. > >> > I am not comfortable with the notion of ESP with WESP. WESP adds >> > more per-packet overhead than ESP, and some users are very >> sensitive >>> to this aspect of IPsec use. Also, other WG rely on ESP and we >>> would >>> need to convince them that the packet inspection features of WESP >>> merit making changes to their standards, which might be a tough >>> sell. >> >> I agree. However, we should start socializing WESP in other WGs so >> that folks are at least aware of it. > > Agree. > > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > IPsec@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec >
- [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Jack Kohn
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Scott C Moonen
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Merike Kaeo
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Jack Kohn
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Daniel Migault
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Jack Kohn
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Steven Bellovin
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Richard Graveman
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Venkatesh Sriram
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Steven Bellovin
- [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Dan McDonald
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Gregory Lebovitz
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Gregory Lebovitz
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Jack Kohn
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Jack Kohn
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Jack Kohn
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Jack Kohn
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Daniel Migault
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Jack Kohn
- Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead Stephen Kent