Re: [IPsec] [Cfrg] Beginning discussion on secure password-only authentication for IKEv2

Explaining a joke spoils all the fun, but here goes:

It's not like PKI is working out better for user authentication.
And password-in-https-form is also vulnerable to online dictionary attacks.
Now if they were using TLS-EAP....
But that, of course, suffers from excessive layering.

________________________________________
From: ipsec-bounces@ietf.org [ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Yaron Sheffer [yaronf@checkpoint.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 04, 2010 22:05
To: Blumenthal, Uri - 0662 - MITLL; 'pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz'
Cc: 'ipsec@ietf.org'; 'cfrg@irtf.org'
Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Cfrg] Beginning discussion on secure password-only authentication for IKEv2

Can someone please explain the joke to me? Nelson was asked about TLS-PSK (RFC 4279) and he replied that it can easily be abused. TLS-PSK (similarly to IKE-PSK) is vulnerable to dictionary attacks if used with a short secret (a.k.a. "password"), at least in the presence of an active attacker. So I think his response was entirely appropriate. What am I missing?

Thanks,
        Yaron

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ipsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Blumenthal, Uri - 0662 - MITLL
> Sent: Thursday, March 04, 2010 19:09
> To: 'pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz'
> Cc: 'ipsec@ietf.org'; 'cfrg@irtf.org'
> Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Cfrg] Beginning discussion on secure password-
> only authentication for IKEv2
>
> Well, during my long and fruitful career I've come across many asinine
> statements - but this pearl from your collection outshines mine! Indeed
> "straight from the horse's" (or in the context - "mule's"?) mouth (no
> offense meant to those wonderful equestrians).
>
> I'm struck speechless (which is unusual, as anybody who knows me would
> confirm :-).
>
> Regards,
> Uri
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: pgut001 <pgut001@wintermute02.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
> To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>; Blumenthal,
> Uri - 0662 - MITLL
> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>; ipsec@ietf.org <ipsec@ietf.org>
> Sent: Wed Mar 03 18:20:53 2010
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [IPsec] Beginning discussion on secure password-
> only authentication for IKEv2
>
> "Blumenthal, Uri - 0662 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> writes:
>
> >On the vendor side - perhaps EKE patent concern was the cause (you
> >implement/sell free SRP and get slapped with EKE licensing)? And the
> users
> >found alternative solutions in the meanwhile?
>
> Nope.  It's been supported in OpenSSL since 0.9.9, but not in any
> browser.
> The reason for not supporting it in Firefox is so astonishingly
> boneheaded
> that I'll quote the original message to make sure that it's straight
> from the
> horse's mouth ("PSK cipher suites" = non-patent-encumbered EKE in TLS-
> talk):
>
> -- Snip --
>
> Subject: Re: NSS implementation of TLS-PSK/ RFC 4279
> Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2008 14:01:10 -0700
> From: Nelson B Bolyard <nelson@bolyard.me>
> Reply-To: mozilla's crypto code discussion list
> <dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org>
>
> jengler@berkeley.edu wrote, On 2008-10-14 13:52 PDT:
> > I was wondering if implementation of TLS-PSK (RFC 4279) is currently
> in
> > development. I do not see it in the current NSS source or roadmap.
> Thank
> > you for any help.
> >
> > -John Engler
>
> No.  There are no plans to include any PSK cipher suites in NSS.
> Because of the enormous potential for PSK cipher suites to be
> misused by application developers, there is strong resistance to
> incorporating them into NSS.
>
> -- Snip --
>
> As for Microsoft, Opera, etc who knows?  (If you work on, or have
> worked on,
> any of these browsers, I'd like to hear more about why it hasn't been
> considered).  I think it'll be a combination of two factors:
>
> 1. Everyone knows that passwords are insecure so it's not worth trying
> to do
>    anything with them.
>
> 2. If you add failsafe mutual authentication via EKE to browsers, CAs
> become
>    entirely redundant.
>
> So the browser vendors' approach is to ignore EKE and keep on waiting
> for PKI
> to start working, forever if necessary.  "PKI meurt, elle ne se rend
> pas!" [0].
>
> Peter.
>
> [0] Hat tip to Luther Martin for the quote :-).
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