[IPsec] Please review draft-ietf-ipsecme-aes-ctr-ikev2-05.txt

[Tero Kivinen <[e-mail]>]

Paul Hoffman writes:
> Based on Pasi's AD review, the authors significantly shortened the
> document. It seems prudent to have the WG review the new, shorter
> version. In particular, it would be good for developers to look at
> the new short document and see if it is complete enough to implement
> from. 
> 
> This review cycle will end in a week, but please do the review early
> in case problems are found. 

The draft looks good, but I would clarify the security considerations
section a bit. Now it says:

   Security considerations explained in section 7 of [RFC3686] are
   entirely relevant for this draft also.  The security considerations
   on fresh keys and integrity protection in section 7 of [RFC3686] are
   totally applicable on using AES-CTR in IKEv2; see [RFC3686] for
   details.  Due to this reasons, static keys are never used for the IKE
   SA and the IKE_SA always uses integrity protection.

The last paragraph is bit misleading, as there is no way static keys
can be used in IKE SA at all, and this is not because of the issues of
AES-CTR. Also integrity protection is already mandatory for IKEv2 IKE
SA regardless whether AES-CTR is used or not. It would be better to
replace the last sentence with:

   As static keys are never used in IKEv2 for IKE_SA and integrity
   protection is mandatory for IKE_SA, these issues are not applicable
   for AES-CTR in IKEv2 when protecting IKE_SA.
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