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Re: [IPsec] Working Group Last Call: draft-ietf-ipsecme-esp-ah-reqts

"Valery Smyslov" <svanru@gmail.com> Mon, 03 March 2014 12:02 UTC

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From: Valery Smyslov <svanru@gmail.com>
To: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, ipsec <ipsec@ietf.org>
References: <530CE583.6030801@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 03 Mar 2014 16:02:57 +0400
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/wmlo7kKBKUkIUYgkMIEwxiy6CZU
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Working Group Last Call: draft-ietf-ipsecme-esp-ah-reqts
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Hi,

I have mostly no problem with the document.

However I have one small concern.

The draft lists the following trasforms based on AES cipher:

AES-GCM
AES-CCM
AES-CTR
AES-128-CBC
AES-GMAC
AES-XCBC-MAC-96

All these transforms, except for AES-XCBC-MAC-96,
allows to be used with different key lengths - 128, 192 and 256 bits.
It looks strange to me that, unlike the others, AES-128-CBC
has key length explicitely specified in the draft. Why it differs in
this respect from the others? What about AES-192-CBC and
AES-256-CBC - are they also "MUST" or "MAY"? Or even "MUST NOT"? :-)

I think the draft should either:
- remove explicit key length from AES-128-CBC and make it just AES-CBC
- add explicit key length to all other AES-based transforms (except for 
AES-XCBC-MAC-96)
- leave things as is, but explain why AES-CBC differs in this respect from 
the others

Regards,
Valery Smyslov.


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Yaron Sheffer" <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "ipsec" <ipsec@ietf.org>
Sent: Tuesday, February 25, 2014 10:48 PM
Subject: [IPsec] Working Group Last Call: draft-ietf-ipsecme-esp-ah-reqts


> Hi, this is to start a 2-week working group last call on the revised 
> Algorithm Implementation Requirements document, ending March 11. The draft 
> is at: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-esp-ah-reqts-01. We 
> should have last called the draft a while ago, and I apologize for the 
> delay.
>
> The changes from the existing requirements are listed in Sec. 2.5 of the 
> draft, but most of this (rather short) document is new and describes the 
> rationale for the choice of algorithms and requirement levels.
>
> Please read this draft and send any comments to the WG mailing list, even 
> if the comments are "I see no problems". Comments such as "I do not 
> understand this part" or "this part could be explained better in this way" 
> are particularly useful at this point.
>
> Thanks,
>     Yaron
>
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec

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