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Re: Giving up security & privacy when manually configuring addresses - rfc4291bis text (Re: draft-bourbaki-6man-classless-ipv6-00)

Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org> Thu, 08 June 2017 10:27 UTC

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Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2017 11:27:04 +0100
From: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>
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To: Mark Smith <markzzzsmith@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: Giving up security & privacy when manually configuring addresses - rfc4291bis text (Re: draft-bourbaki-6man-classless-ipv6-00)
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Mark Smith wrote:
> Large addresses can be of value in infrastructure addressing too. If a
> network operator wants to significantly mitigate if not prevent an
> attack such as a BGP listener TCP SYN attack from the Internet, they
> can hide the router's interface address somewhere inside a /64 so that
> the attacker can't find it via unsolicited inbound probing.

this is a non argument and obscure addresses are of no value to network
operators:

1. most routers will answer traceroute probes, so it's trivial to find
out the address of a bgp-enabled router.

2. if you are serious about protecting infrastructure, you install
infrastructure ACLs which actually fix the problem.

Nick

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