Re: [karp] Last Call: <draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-07.txt> (Operations Model for Router Keying) to Informational RFC

Danny McPherson <danny@tcb.net> Mon, 29 July 2013 17:02 UTC

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From: Danny McPherson <danny@tcb.net>
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To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [karp] Last Call: <draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-07.txt> (Operations Model for Router Keying) to Informational RFC
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On Jul 29, 2013, at 5:35 AM, Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> I like your text below except that signing is the wrong word.
> How about generation of integrity-protected messages?

Yeah, that's what I meant..  New text WFM, thanks [again] Sam for addressing these concerns!

-danny



> These messages are almost never digitally signed.

> Proposed text:
> 
>> Routers need to
>>     have tight enough time synchronization that receivers permit a key
>>     to be utilized for validation prior to the first use of that key for signing or
>>     availability will be impacted.
>