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Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again

Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net> Wed, 23 March 2011 15:24 UTC

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From: Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net>
To: keyassure <keyassure@ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LFD.1.10.1103230625150.18330@newtla.xelerance.com>
References: <92D68A5E-5CB7-4C80-8D7B-0B8D55D93608@kumari.net> <alpine.LFD.1.10.1103201932370.20162@newtla.xelerance.com> <9D285351-8D73-4C15-BE2C-5DF731C08DCE@vpnc.org> <alpine.LFD.1.10.1103202028110.20162@newtla.xelerance.com> <1300669586.2117.12.camel@localhost> <alpine.LFD.1.10.1103202211390.20162@newtla.xelerance.com> <1300739370.2117.40.camel@localhost> <alpine.LFD.1.10.1103211631260.20162@newtla.xelerance.com> <AANLkTimyOXv66UeG2q2dmt1-e_Ek6WPPH-coueFc7fDS@mail.gmail.com> <AANLkTin1QjUbVFN8FqjL2SPRLSRRw4Ahs4zbhy4ZdZuX@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LFD.1.10.1103211727150.28224@newtla.xelerance.com> <alpine.LFD.1.10.1103230625150.18330@newtla.xelerance.com>
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Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2011 11:26:28 -0400
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Subject: Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again
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On Wed, 2011-03-23 at 06:30 -0400, Paul Wouters wrote:
> Especially considering the latest CA compromise where a CA issued a rogue
> certificate for addons.mozilla.org. And this is not some el cheapo CA,
> but one that is respected and has people very active within the IETF, the
> good guys....
> 
> http://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion
> 
> This is another clear signal that DANE is needed,

Indeed.

> and the need for the X509 storage format is unneccessary.

Non sequitur.  What does the compromise of a CA have to do with the use
(or not) of X.509 as a container in DANE?

-- 
Matt

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