Re: [manet] Message integrity and message mutability (was RE: draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)

[Justin Dean <[e-mail]>]

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 11:29 AM, Jiazi YI <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> Maybe I missed a bit here:
>
> If only the desired receiver of the multicast RREP (carrying a destination
> address) can reply to the multicast RREP, why not using unicast directly?
>
> Because the link isn't yet known to be bi-directional and a unicast route
can't be installed yet.

Justin


> best
>
> Jiazi
>
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 4:59 PM, Victoria Mercieca <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi Chris,
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 3:51 PM, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>> I has to go back to Victoria’s summary here. It says:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2) C creates the RREP. Since it doesnt know if the link to B is
>>> bidirectional, it includes the AckReq (an address to indicate that it
>>> expects to receive a RREP_Ack from B).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That doesn’t actually indicate if that’s C’s address or B’s address
>>> being included. I’d assumed it was C’s address. Your comment makes sense if
>>> it’s B’s address. Reading again, I think you’re probably right. But only
>>> probably. Can we confirm that.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> C creates the RREP. The included AckReq address is B's address. The RREP
>> then gets multicast.
>> B receives it, sees that it own address is marked as the AckReq address,
>> and sends an ack unicast back to C.
>> Anyone else who receives the multicast RREP from C does not send the Ack,
>> since the AckReq address does not match any of their interface addresses.
>>
>>
>>> I assume you meant that the RREP (not RREP_Ack) is multicast. There’s a
>>> bit of a chicken and egg problem here. We do know how we want to unicast.
>>>
>>
>> The RREP is multicast (when we dont know if the link is bidirectional),
>> the RREP_Ack is always unicast.
>>
>> Kind regards,
>> Vicky.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> *-- *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>> *
>>> *T*:  [phone]  |  *E: *[e-mail]
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>
>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Justin Dean [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>> *Sent:* 25 April 2016 15:26
>>> *To:* Thomas Heide Clausen
>>> *Cc:* Dearlove, Christopher (UK); Christopher Dearlove; Mobile Ad Hoc
>>> Networks mailing list; Victoria Mercieca
>>> *Subject:* Re: [manet] Message integrity and message mutability (was
>>> RE: draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>
>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from an
>>> external partner or the internet.*
>>>
>>> * Consider carefully whether you should click on any links, open any
>>> attachments or reply. For information regarding **Red Flags** that you
>>> can look out for in emails you receive, click here
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>>>
>>> The address in the RREP_Ack may be required due to the RREP_Ack being
>>> multicast as there is not yet a verified unicast route installed yet.
>>> Going to double check if I'm remembering correctly.
>>>
>>> Justin
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 10:18 AM, <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I must admit that while I have reviewed the protocol several times, I’ve
>>> not been digging that deep into the protocol functioning to catch this
>>> issue of how invasive the protocol operations are when forwarding a
>>> message: there were other “major” issues to address (and which obscured the
>>> details), so as a first order: thank you Victoria, for having called
>>> attention to this.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> To the substance of these emails.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I am afraid that I do not understand the use of inserting validity TLVs
>>> while in-flight, into a message. Actually, I am dubious for both the
>>> originator inserting this (how can the originator of a message know how
>>> “latter parts of the path” will be have”) except if we are talking
>>> duty-cycling of devices and inserting “the remaining time that I am going
>>> to be up before I suspend”. Intuitively, that would also assume fairly long
>>> duty cycles “I am up for tens of seconds”, which I am not sure are actually
>>> realistic. And, as Chris says in another email, this is trading off “the
>>> ability to do security” for an unknown/untested feature — which I think is
>>> the wrong trade-off.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On he topic of “needing to put an address in” for RREP-ACK, I must admit
>>> that this seems roundabout. I can see three issues here:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> o I am not sure that adding an address vs. a flag may not have to do
>>> with the “multiple interfaces/
>>>
>>> multiple addresses” discrimination mechanics of the protocol? I haven’t
>>> worked it through, though,
>>>
>>> but that would be a guess.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> o The end-to-end topology diffusion mechanism should not need to be
>>> concerned with the
>>>
>>> “bidirectionally check” of a local link (in part, as it encumbers
>>> security, but not only).  In short, a
>>>
>>> flag or an address, both are (equally) bad.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> o A cleaner mechanism would be a “hello mechanism”, not necessarily as
>>> NHDP, but a “when
>>>
>>> forwarding a RREQ/RREP, trigger a 3-way hello exchange, if the link is
>>> estimated to be of a
>>>
>>> type which potentially can be unidirectional”. There is another benefit
>>> to doing that, see the end
>>>
>>> of this email.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Either way, I do not like the notion of fusing
>>> metrics-and-link-bidirectionality-detection any more than I like fusing
>>> global-topology-diffusion-and-link-bidirectionality-detection.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The solution all this is, to me, threefold
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 1) Factor out the bidirectionally check in a (triggered) neighbour
>>> detection mechanism
>>>
>>> (triggered HELLO message)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2) Remove the “validity time TLVs”, since they add complexity for no
>>> perceivable benefits
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 3) Use the security model that we’ve discussed previously, where (only)
>>> the metrics change per hop.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Since we’re discussing bi-directionality of links here, and the
>>> necessity of a mechanism for handling these, I want to call attention to a
>>> related issue, as I hinted previously.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The abstract states that the protocol:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>    ...is intended for use by mobile routers in wireless, multihop
>>>
>>>    networks.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Section 5 paragraph 4  of the document, however, reads:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>    Assuming link metrics are symmetric, the cost of the routes installed
>>>
>>>    in the Local Route Set at each router will be correct.  While this
>>>
>>>    assumption is not always correct, calculating incoming/outgoing
>>>
>>>    metric data is outside of scope of this document.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I do not know of *any* wireless systems, where the assumption that
>>> “link metrics are symmetric” actually holds. Consequently, the conclusion
>>> in the quoted paragraph:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>    calculating incoming/outgoing
>>>
>>>    metric data is outside of scope of this document.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Is not an acceptable design choice.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> While this protocol may not want to “calculate if for this link the
>>> metrics is 4 or 5”, the protocol must be able to convey and distinguish
>>> that “the metric from A to B is 4, and the metric from B to A is 19”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This is a “related issue” since the solution may (as with the
>>> bi-directionality check) be in the triggered neighbour detection mechanism:
>>> that exchange could, if designed carefully, be used to probe for and convey
>>> metrics information, also.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hope this helps,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thomas
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 25 Apr 2016, at 15:27, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Assuming for the moment that everyone will need an RREP-Ack or won’t
>>> (let’s come back to that) why do C and B need to put an address in as an
>>> RREQ-Ack request? Why not a flag, because the address will be included as
>>> the IP sending address - and we know 5444 is required to pass that on.
>>> (It’s used by NHDP as well.) Then we don’t need to change the RREP, it will
>>> have a flag set or not, and won’t change (in this regard).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Now let’s consider do we know whether we can set a fixed flag. First I’d
>>> say there are two cases - you’ve got a firm control on what’s going on in
>>> your network, or it’s one of unknown parties and behaviour (consistent with
>>> specification). In the former case you only want one setting, for example
>>> no-Ack if running NHDP or your MAC layer tells you about bidirectionality,
>>> Ack otherwise. In the latter case, I think you just always want an Ack. So
>>> both cases get you to the same place.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Should that not be an acceptable argument (though I think it’s good for
>>> where we are - in fact always Ack is close) then at flag is a step better,
>>> it’s a fixed location to change. However it would be better in that case if
>>> the two things to change (metric and ack flag) were together. But that has
>>> its own issues, so I won’t go there.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *--*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>> *
>>> *T*:  [phone]  |  *E: *[e-mail]
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>
>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Victoria Mercieca [mailto:[e-mail]
>>> <[e-mail]>]
>>> *Sent:* 25 April 2016 14:15
>>> *To:* Jiazi YI
>>> *Cc:* Dearlove, Christopher (UK); Christopher Dearlove; Mobile Ad Hoc
>>> Networks mailing list
>>> *Subject:* Re: [manet] Message integrity and message mutability (was
>>> RE: draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>
>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from an
>>> external partner or the internet.*
>>>
>>> * Consider carefully whether you should click on any links, open any
>>> attachments or reply. For information regarding **Red Flags** that you
>>> can look out for in emails you receive, click here
>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Red%20Flags.pdf>.*
>>> * If you feel the email is suspicious, please follow this process
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>>>
>>> Hi Jiazi,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 1:04 PM, Jiazi YI <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>> With regard to your validity time point, we here have a tradeoff. If you
>>> allow that feature, it significantly impacts on the approach that was
>>> coming together on as best you can end to end encryption.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So the question is, is this a feature that’s really wanted?
>>> Unfortunately I think we know that the answer to that is, we don’t know
>>> because we don’t have any experience. My view would be that in the tradeoff
>>> of an untested feature (unless I’m wrong about that) and the security
>>> complication, security wins and drop the feature. If there is some real
>>> requirement, then there’s a discussion. (Questions like how often the
>>> intermediate routers actually have any knowledge - typically links break
>>> for unexpected rather than expected reasons. Andan intermediate router
>>> could possibly use a validity time to influence its behaviour.) Note that
>>> dropping the ability of intermediate routers to modify/set still allows
>>> validity times per route to be set at endpoints.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree with Chris' concern.
>>>
>>> The ValidityTime is optional, which makes the integrity protection hard.
>>> Furthermore, it gives a potential attack vector: as all the routers in a
>>> path will take the shortest validityTime, a compromised router can set the
>>> the validityTime to a very short value, which will make the route installed
>>> along the path became invalid (very soon).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On the other hand, I'm not sure this option will give us much help.
>>> Chris mentioned much knowledge intermediate router would have to decide
>>> this value (and how much sense the value would make).
>>>
>>> Another issue is, a route to a destination might be updated by different
>>> sources. For example, in the network below:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A----B-----C
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A first establish a route to B with long validity time. Then A initiates
>>> a route discovery to C. C tends to set a short validity time, which will
>>> make the route between B and A expire earlier than expected.
>>>
>>> Is this a problem? Maybe yes, maybe no -- I'm not sure it's considered
>>> or not.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Not sure I follow here.
>>>
>>> Currently, the validity time of the route between A and B would not
>>> affected by a short validity time of a route between A and C. Validity
>>> times are per-route, and the route A-B and the route A-C are separate.
>>>
>>> If we switched to a validity time per neighbor (so that we can keep
>>> validity time separate from route advertisements) as I mentioned in the
>>> email below, then the validity of a route between A and C would be affected
>>> if there was a short validity time between A and B. But, if B will only
>>> route for a certain amount of time, then the route between A and C will of
>>> course be affected. Is it best to know in advance that there's a time
>>> limit, or just deal with RERRs when they happen?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> With regard to the acknowledgements, the problem (with regard to
>>> security) comes from trying to do two jobs with the same message - end to
>>> end route advertisement and hop by hop acknowledgement. I understand the
>>> reasons - saving bytes and message types. (I would have to study the
>>> protocol really hard to identify if any message types can be folded
>>> together and recognised by content rather than type efficiently. This I do
>>> not expect to do.) Again a tradeoff. This one is in discussion space,
>>> though that needs people who understand both sides of the issue, including
>>> the details of the bidirectionality mechanism. Of course, as has been said,
>>> we need one of those.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I haven't finished my review of the latest draft, and I don't get the
>>> necessity of AckReq and the corresponding multicast RREP yet.
>>>
>>> If possible, this "optional" field should be avoided.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> To give an overview of AckReq and RREP:
>>>
>>> Since AODVv2 requires bidirectional links, this is the way to determine
>>> if a link is bidirectional.
>>>
>>> A----B----C
>>>
>>>
>>> 1) A sends RREQ, B forwards it, C receives the RREQ. B and C both
>>> install a route to OrigAddr but they dont yet know if it's valid because
>>> they dont know if the link to their next hop is available in the reverse
>>> direction.
>>>
>>> 2) C creates the RREP. Since it doesnt know if the link to B is
>>> bidirectional, it includes the AckReq (an address to indicate that it
>>> expects to receive a RREP_Ack from B).
>>>
>>> 3) B receives the RREP, installs a route to TargAddr and marks it as
>>> valid, since it knows the link to C is bidirectional, because the RREQ went
>>> in one direction and the RREP came in the other. B also sends the RREP_Ack
>>> to C and forwards the RREP to A (and might change the message to indicate
>>> its own AckReq - ie that it requires an ack from A).
>>>
>>> 4) C receives the RREP_Ack from B, and therefore knows that B received
>>> the RREP, therefore the link is bidirectional. C can then mark its route to
>>> OrigAddr as valid.
>>>
>>> 5) Similarly, A receives the RREP, installs the route to TargAddr and
>>> sends an RREP_Ack to B.
>>>
>>> 6) B receives the RREP_Ack and marks its route to OrigAddr as valid.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Alternatively, in step 2, if C knows the link to B is bidirectional
>>> (perhaps from some earlier route discovery), it doesnt need to put the
>>> AckReq in the RREP. Then in step 3, since B doesnt know if the link to A is
>>> bidirectional, it changes the message to add the AckReq address, in order
>>> to get an RREP_Ack from A.
>>>
>>> If we want to avoid changing the message, we'll need to look at
>>> forwarding the RREP as-is, and creating a second message to solicit an
>>> RREP_Ack, in order to verify that the link is bidirectional before marking
>>> the route to OrigAddr as valid.
>>>
>>> Kind regards,
>>>
>>> Victoria.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> regards
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Jiazi
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *--*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>> *
>>> *T*:  [phone] <%2B44%20%280%291245%20242194>  |  *E: *
>>> [e-mail]
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>
>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Victoria Mercieca [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>> *Sent:* 23 April 2016 10:55
>>> *To:* Christopher Dearlove
>>> *Cc:* [e-mail]; Dearlove, Christopher (UK); Mobile Ad Hoc
>>> Networks mailing list
>>>
>>>
>>> *Subject:* Re: [manet] Message integrity and message mutability (was
>>> RE: draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from an
>>> external partner or the internet. Consider carefully whether you should
>>> click on any links, open any attachments or reply. For information
>>> regarding **Red Flags*
>>> * that you can look out for in emails you receive, click here
>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Red%20Flags.pdf>.
>>> If you feel the email is suspicious, please follow this process
>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Dealing%20With%20Suspicious%20Emails.pdf>.*
>>>
>>> Hi Chris,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> These have both been in the draft in some form since before I got
>>> involved... but I'll do my best to explain.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - For Validity Time, its a way to advertise that you would only support
>>> the route contained in the message for a certain period of time. The
>>> originator might use this, but the draft was written to allow any
>>> intermediate node to be able to add it or update it too. The route created
>>> in the Local Route Set has an expiration time associated with it, based on
>>> the received validity time.
>>>
>>> - For the AckReq address, its so that you can add into a RREP a request
>>> for an acknowledgement, so that you don't have to have a different message
>>> type altogether for working out whether links to neighbors are
>>> bidirectional, and also, since you only care about bidirectionality on
>>> routes that are being set up, you dont need to constantly monitor all
>>> neighbors.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In order to avoid the potential AckReq-related changes to each message,
>>> maybe we do need to introduce a different message specifically for this. We
>>> could maybe use RREP_Ack to both request and acknowledge? It means an extra
>>> message of control traffic that needs to be sent, maybe one extra message
>>> per hop on the path of a RREP, but it could still be limited to neighbors
>>> which have participated in the route discovery rather than monitoring all
>>> neighbors at all times.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This message could maybe also include "I'm happy to route anywhere for a
>>> certain amount of time", sort of like willingness in OLSR/OLSRv2. So
>>> instead of having a validity time per route, its a validity time per
>>> neighbor. Then, for RREQ and RREP, only the metric value would change in
>>> transit, as discussed. However, that leads to some issues with deciding
>>> what a route's expiration time is. You might know how long the next hop
>>> router is valid for, but what if a router beyond that, which was also part
>>> of the route, had a lower validity time? You couldn't determine the real
>>> validity time. Do we remove the route expiration time altogether to avoid
>>> this issue? In which case, we would have to rely on RERR messages being
>>> sent for routes which become invalid when the neighbor's validity time has
>>> expired? So neighbor validity time expiration is treated the same as a link
>>> break.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What do you think?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Kind regards,
>>>
>>> Victoria.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 1:09 AM, Christopher Dearlove <
>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Pretty much all of the discussion has been assuming only a metric value
>>> change. With multiple things changing many of the ideas go out of the
>>> window. That reinforces the point about not making specifications now that
>>> might turn out to be wrong for ICVs.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Ignoring how this misunderstanding happened, I'll start by asking why.
>>> Metric changing I understand. Why the other two? (there's a partial
>>> explanation of one). What alternatives have people implemented in
>>> comparable protocols?
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> Christopher Dearlove
>>>
>>> [e-mail] (iPhone)
>>>
>>> [e-mail] (home)
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 Apr 2016, at 00:26, Victoria Mercieca <[e-mail]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Continued in this thread because the other one seems to be more about
>>> TLV types and metric type numbers, whereas this is about
>>> regeneration/forwarding.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> To recap, in the current draft, there are 3 things that might change at
>>> each hop:
>>> - the metric value (happens in RREQ and RREP),
>>> - adding/changing Validity Time using the Validity Time TLV (can happen
>>> in RREQ and RREP),
>>> - adding an address (and corresponding value in the AddressType TLV to
>>> indicate how to interpret the address) to indicate the address from which
>>> an RREP_Ack is expected, to accomplish the bidirectionality check (can
>>> happen in RREP).
>>>
>>> If we define a certain portion of the message as immutable and include
>>> the ICV to verify that part, end to end:
>>> - The metric value would be excluded from the ICV since it needs
>>> changing at each hop.
>>> - Would adding a Validity Time TLV at an intermediate hop be acceptable?
>>> The whole TLV could be removed in order to calculate the ICV?
>>>
>>> - Would adding an address cause issues for the ICV, because it's in the
>>> address block? Could the rule be "if it contains an AckReq address, remove
>>> it (and the corresponding value in the AddressType TLV), before checking
>>> the ICV", is that OK? Or would we need to avoid touching the ICV'ed part of
>>> the message altogether, maybe put the AckReq address in a separate Address
>>> Block, with an extra AddressType TLV following that address block? Is there
>>> a way to accomplish this?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Also, to be thorough, do we need to consider RERR messages while we
>>> discuss regeneration vs forwarding?
>>>
>>> - RERR (sent when a link breaks) is a way of saying "I've lost my route
>>> so I'm telling others" and "you were my next hop, so now I've also lost my
>>> route, I'll tell others", etc. It's going to be tailored at each step to
>>> include the relevant routes that got deleted, it's not one message being
>>> sent end-to-end like RREQ and RREP are.
>>>
>>> - However, RERR (sent when a source of traffic is sending data on a
>>> route which comes through you, and you want to tell the Packet Source's
>>> router to delete the route) could be seen as an end-to-end message which
>>> all intermediate routers learn from, similar to RREQ and RREP. It reports
>>> one route, and doesn't need changing at intermediate hops, so could be
>>> protected with ICV.
>>>
>>> - Would it be OK to only require a message ICV if a PktSource address
>>> was included, i.e. when the message needs to go via a number of
>>> intermediate hops to PktSource's router? All other RERRs are intended to be
>>> one-hop messages, which may in turn prompt other one-hop messages, etc...,
>>> and a packet ICV might be more appropriate?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Kind regards,
>>>
>>> Victoria.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 5:26 PM, <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 17 Mar 2016, at 18:17, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, I meant AODVv2, thanks for the catch.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So is your (Thomas) proposed base specification a hop count only metric?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No, the would be silly as base specification, given that hop count
>>> mostly is useless.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> As base specification I would simply say “Include a Metric Type Message
>>> TLV with a value field, and a 7182 Message TLV & Timestamp” as we do in
>>> OLSRv2 (with the appropriate verbiage as to generation and processing).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> With the message generated by the originator of the RREQ/RREP and *not*
>>> deconstructed/reconstructed/reordered (as is the risk with “regeneration)
>>> allows knowing that it would be *only* that metric field being modified
>>> (other than hop count/limit) for when eventually writing up the extension.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> (Actually doesn’t the current specification only define hop count, or
>>> has that changed in latest draft?)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No. That is one of the issues I raise in my original. For some reason,
>>> it cites RFC6551, which is a ROLL document and which has in its abstract
>>> that:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>    Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs) have unique characteristics
>>>
>>>    compared with traditional wired and ad hoc networks that require the
>>>
>>>    specification of new routing metrics and constraints.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I.e. this document cites a metric document which clearly claims to be
>>> inapplicable in ad hoc networks. I note that this is another thing I’ve
>>> raised for years without seeing it attempted resolved.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thomas
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *--*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>> *
>>> *T*:  [phone] <%2B44%20%280%291245%20242194>  |  *E: *
>>> [e-mail]
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>
>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]
>>> <[e-mail]>]
>>> *Sent:* 17 March 2016 17:10
>>> *To:* Dearlove, Christopher (UK)
>>> *Cc:* Lotte Steenbrink; Mobile Ad Hoc Networks mailing list
>>> *Subject:* Re: [manet] Message integrity and message mutability (was
>>> RE: draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from an
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>>> click on any links, open any attachments or reply. For information
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 17 Mar 2016, at 18:04, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> OK, so we have a message that mutates by:
>>>
>>> - Modifying hop count/limit.
>>>
>>> - Modifying a metric value.
>>>
>>> Anything else?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> As mutating (other than hop count/limit) messages aren’t covered by 5444
>>> or any derivative document (but only recommended against, not banned) that
>>> you may need to make the message otherwise immutable (no deconstruction and
>>> rebuilding, other than guaranteed unchanging) that would have to be
>>> specified by AODVv2. (Easy to say, but needs saying.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> With you so far.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Then that information is not in a guaranteed fixed location given by a
>>> simple offset. So any signature algorithm that finds it and ignores it or
>>> aggregates on it is specific to OLSRv2.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Surely you mean AODVv2
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So standard 7182 ICVs don’t do the job, you would need an AODVv2
>>> specialised variant. Which is the sort of thing that the message specific
>>> TLV space is there for, I’d be strongly against a “but ignore the value of
>>> this specific TLV should it occur” being in the general space. However it
>>> can easily be defined by reference to 7182 (“this TLV is like that TLV,
>>> except if an X TLV is present, set its value field to zero”).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Messy, but could work.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Not that messy, actually, although clearly not as nice as “fixed offset”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That said, I am arguing for the base spec being:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             “make the message otherwise immutable (no deconstruction and
>>> rebuilding, other
>>>
>>>              than guaranteed unchanging)” which is afforded by forwarding
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                                     +
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             RFC7182 Timestamps and ICVs.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                                     +
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             RFC7183 style text bringing it all together.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The “aggregated signatures around mutable field” would very be an
>>> experimental extension.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What I object to is, if the base spec specifically renders such
>>> extensions impossible
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *--*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>> *
>>> *T*:  [phone] <%2B44%20%280%291245%20242194>  |  *E: *
>>> [e-mail]
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>
>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Lotte Steenbrink [mailto:[e-mail]
>>> <[e-mail]>]
>>> *Sent:* 17 March 2016 16:48
>>> *To:* Dearlove, Christopher (UK)
>>> *Cc:* [e-mail]; Mobile Ad Hoc Networks mailing list
>>> *Subject:* Re: [manet] Message integrity and message mutability (was
>>> RE: draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from an
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>>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Am 17.03.2016 um 17:44 schrieb Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>> [e-mail]>:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Good point about whether you just pass on one cost or a set of costs. As
>>> I said, not looked at details - I will, when time permits. One cost is much
>>> easier, and yes, it reduces the fixed size aggregated signatures problem to
>>> “just” one of computational load.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> For the record, Thomas’ understanding is correct; the cost is one
>>> aggregated value.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>>
>>> Lotte Steenrbink
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *--*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>> *
>>> *T*:  [phone] <%2B44%20%280%291245%20242194>  |  *E: *
>>> [e-mail]
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>
>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]
>>> <[e-mail]>]
>>> *Sent:* 17 March 2016 16:38
>>> *To:* Dearlove, Christopher (UK)
>>> *Cc:* Mobile Ad Hoc Networks mailing list
>>> *Subject:* Re: Message integrity and message mutability (was RE:
>>> [manet] draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from an
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>>> click on any links, open any attachments or reply. For information
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 17 Mar 2016, at 17:30, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I appreciate Thomas’s comments about the limitations of message
>>> regeneration, but I would be a bit less absolute.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The issues over end to end authentication and more advanced signatures
>>> are valid. I need to read the given reference on aggregate signatures to
>>> increase my knowledge (thanks for it), but my understanding of the
>>> possibilities in this field may offer a solution to the problem, but with
>>> some other issues (possibly including a new type of TLV).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But the hop count/limit point I don’t fully agree with, you can
>>> regenerate with an incremented/decremented count/limit, which leaves the
>>> ability to prevent messages propagating indefinitely, including expanding
>>> ring searches, and retains the ability to use RFC 5497 interval and
>>> validity times that might be useful with an expanding ring search (or might
>>> not).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But the key issue is that AODVv2 wants to accumulate metrics. I still
>>> haven’t got to the bottom of many details here, but let’s for the moment
>>> just consider that conceptually.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It’s hard to handle end to end. Charlie’s draft attempts to do an end to
>>> end of some information, not this information. I’m not sure if that’s
>>> useful (and the specialised format is better avoided if possible). Other
>>> approaches are hop by hop (might as well use packet signatures) and shared
>>> key (might as well go hop by hop). Pairwise signatures for each pair of
>>> routers I’m discounting as scaling terribly. In the interests of
>>> completeness let’s mention not accumulating metrics, which puts us back to
>>> hop count and that’s not ideal either.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I don’t think there is an ideal solution. (I like ideas I’ve seen about
>>> aggregating, but that has some issues of its own, even apart from
>>> computational load.) I’d love to be proved wrong - someone with the perfect
>>> solution to come along.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Which means that either we make an arbitrary choice - which will be
>>> disagreed with, but needs discussing first - or create something flexible.
>>> Unfortunately flexible in that regard constrains in others, e.g. some
>>> (many? most?) aggregating signatures need fixed data sizes (which we can do
>>> by defining a TLV that “fills up” with hop count, but that has a cost too).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have been told by people much more well versed in this than I in
>>> cryptology, that the correct answer is “some”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That said, "AODVv2 wants to accumulate metrics” — does that mean that
>>> the message grows as it is being forwarded, and that the recipient of a
>>> RREQ/RREP will know the individual costs of each path segment? My
>>> understanding is, that the recipient will get “the sum the costs of each
>>> path segment” which should be fitting within a fixed size?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thomas
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Sorry, no answers, just comments. And I’m not addressing Thomas’s later
>>> points here.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *--*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>> *
>>> *T*:  [phone] <%2B44%20%280%291245%20242194>  |  *E: *
>>> [e-mail]
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>
>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>
>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* manet [mailto:[e-mail] <[e-mail]>] *On
>>> Behalf Of *[e-mail]
>>> *Sent:* 17 March 2016 16:00
>>> *To:* Mobile Ad Hoc Networks mailing list
>>> *Subject:* [manet] draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big
>>> ticket Items
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from an
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>>> click on any links, open any attachments or reply. For information
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>>> EXTERNAL EMAIL -- This message originates from outside our organization.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Dear all,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Apologies for not having gotten this done sooner - day-job leaving few
>>> spare cycles.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I’ve previously offered reviews and comments, and some of those have
>>> been addressed in the latest I-D — others have not, but should be. I recall
>>> that there was some mail attempting to rebut parts of the review, and I
>>> will dig it out and reply to that.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> With that being said, I have reviewed the latest version of the
>>> document, and full details will be forthcoming. There’re a couple of
>>> big-ticket/architectural items that I want to address up front, as I
>>> believe that before we have those hammered out, it will be useless to go
>>> into details. Note, I do not claim that this is an exhaustive list of “big
>>> ticket items”, but that’s as far as I have gotten in thinking this through.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I also bring these up as they are items that have been brought up
>>> repeatedly over the past years, but not resolved nor discussed.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Loops*
>>>
>>> Just to bring this out: I share Chris’ worry about conflicting and
>>> concurrent statements from the authors on “There are no loops possible” and
>>> “We need to fix two situations where loops can occur” and “we are still
>>> investigating some loop conditions”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I particularly worry that this is not a discussion had in public, but
>>> apparently in some other forum…
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Intermediate Route Replies, and all of section 10*
>>>
>>> Section 10 contains a set of “vaguely specified extensions”, which is
>>> incoherent with the intended status indicated for this document.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Specifically, and this is not unrelated to the point about loops above,
>>> intermediate RREPs (section 10.3) are a potential source for loops.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Expanding Ring Multicast (section 10.1) is not documented in a way that
>>> can be implemented (and also, see “Forwarding-vs-regeneration” below, it is
>>> in the present form of this protocol impossible), etc.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Forwarding-vs-regeneration*
>>>
>>> Recent exchanges on the list made me understand that protocol control
>>> messages are *not* forwarded, but are consumed at each hop, then a new
>>> message with (almost-but-not-quite) the same content is generated and
>>> transmitted.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have thought some more on this (& read some of the exchanges on the
>>> list on this topic by Chris, Ulrich, and others), and I am convinced that
>>> this is not the right way to go, *at least* for the following reasons:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             o          *It renders the hop-limit/hop-count fields in
>>> the RFC5444 message header useless.*
>>>
>>>                         This would not be bad if the functionality
>>> offered by those fields was not useful
>>>
>>>                         — sadly, it is. For example, for scope limited
>>> flooding (expanding ring search, and
>>>
>>>                         such) which may be of interest, and which
>>> require hop-limit.
>>>
>>>                         A hop-count field may also provide a “cheap” (in
>>> terms of overhead) additional piece
>>>
>>>                         of information to use conjunctively with a
>>> “real” metric.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                         The only practical solution would be to
>>> re-introduce these functions by way of inserting a
>>>
>>>                         MessageTLV — which (i) is not specified in this
>>> document, and (ii) which would just
>>>
>>>                         serve to render messages bigger than strictly
>>> needed.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                         Scope limited flooding  does seem to be a
>>> necessary requirement, if for no
>>>
>>>                         other reason than to prevent information from
>>> “circulating forever in the network”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             o          *It makes end-to-end authentication
>>> unnecessarily hard.*
>>>
>>>                         I think Chris called this out already, but it
>>> bears repeating: S generates a message
>>>
>>>                         (say, a RREQ), and includes an ICV calculated
>>> over the content of the message.
>>>
>>>                         For any recipient to be able to validate the
>>> ICV, the message has to be exactly
>>>
>>>                         the same — not just in content, but in structure
>>> — as what was generated.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                         “Regenerating” rather than “forwarding” messages
>>> means, that the intermediate
>>>
>>>                         router “regenerating” the RREQ may chose a
>>> different structure (e.g., include TLVs
>>>
>>>                         in a different order).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                         The proposal from
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-perkins-manet-aodv-e2esec-00
>>>
>>>                         is to add constraints on (i) the set of elements
>>> to include in a signature and (ii) the
>>>
>>>                         order of these elements.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                         One problem with that approach is (i): if an
>>> extension adds a message TLV, or an
>>>
>>>                         Address TLV, to a message, then that will not be
>>> “covered” by the proposed e2esec TLV.
>>>
>>>                         Rather for *each* extension developed, an
>>> “updates e2esec” clause needs to be done.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                         I’d say that this approach would be prone to
>>> errors — and add entropy to the process
>>>
>>>                         of designing protocol extensions. The
>>> alternative, a message being generated by the
>>>
>>>                         source and *forwarded* (as we do in OLSRv2, for
>>> example) would allow ICV TLVs
>>>
>>>                         (even, allow reuse of those specified for
>>> OLSRv2) for covering a message and
>>>
>>>                         extensions.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                         “But what about the metrics value which will
>>> change on each hop”, you may say?
>>>
>>>                         Fortunately, that is relatively easy to handle:
>>> simply zero out the value of that TLV when
>>>
>>>                         generating or verifying the ICV MessageTLV. And
>>> use Packet-TLVs for hop-by-hop
>>>
>>>                         authentication, if needed (but, see below).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             o          *It prevents the use of more clever/advanced
>>> signature schemes/ICVs*
>>>
>>>                         Aggregate signature algorithms (
>>> https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/aggsurvey.pdf)
>>>
>>>                         exist, and an interesting use-case can be found
>>> in also reactive protocols, allowing verifying
>>>
>>>                         not “just” the end points, but also the
>>> intermediaries (again, with the appropriate “zero out”
>>>
>>>                         discussed above, or something smarter).
>>>
>>>                         Regeneration of messages, rather than
>>> forwarding, renders that impossible (or, if used,
>>>
>>>                         updating to
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-perkins-manet-aodv-e2esec-00)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> There are other reasons, but the above are those that jump at me as
>>> immediate show-stoppers.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I do honestly not see what possible benefit there is from “regeneration”
>>> — but I see very clear inconveniences, and security is not the least of
>>> these. Insisting on “regeneration” requires development of “non-general
>>> workarounds” as pointed out above.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Security Considerations*
>>>
>>> This is an always thorny subject. When OLSRv2 was going through the
>>> process we got a thorough education in how little we knew about security
>>> from the SEC-ADs, and had to spend about a year or so developing RFC7183.
>>> The bottom line is, that this protocol needs its “RFC7183  equivalent”,
>>> either as part of the main document, or as an independent document.
>>> currently, that is not the case.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A minima, looking at BCP72 and BCP107 — taking inspiration from RFC7183
>>> might be aw good idea, as that was the most recent that went through the
>>> SEC AD. Regardless of how, however, a “mandatory to implement” security
>>> mechanism most be specified (I think the right term was “MUST implement,
>>> SHOULD use”), in sufficient detail to ensure interoperable implementations.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> As an example, both [RFC6130] and [RFC7181] set out that that:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>       On receiving a ... message, a router MUST first check if the
>>>
>>>       message is invalid for processing by this router
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> and then proceed to give a number of conditions that, each, will lead to
>>> a rejection of the message as "badly formed and therefore invalid for
>>> processing” — a list which RFC7183 then amended. That gave a “hook” for
>>> RFC7183 for inserting “rejection”. Idem for message generation.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If I was to do RFC7181/RFC6130 today, I would include that directly into
>>> the protocol specifications. It turned out to be more overhead (and slow
>>> down publication anyways) to do it as separate documents.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Secondly, we need to be a lot more rigid in terms of what ICVs,
>>> Timestamps, etc. are added/removed, and what that brings.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> For example (with the assumption that messages are *forwarded* and *not*
>>> regenerated), this could be one option:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                         o          When a RREQ, RREP message is
>>> generated, add an ICV Message TLV, which is calculated <this way>
>>>
>>>                                      …(take inspiration from RFC7183
>>> here)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ...
>>>
>>> [Message clipped]
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>>>
>>>
>>>
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