Re: [mif] I-D Action: draft-mglt-mif-security-requirements-00.txt

[Brian E Carpenter <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

I don't understand the scope or the threat model for this draft.

The scope seems to be less than the whole of MIF. It seems to be
limited to a subset of MIF cases where a provider is in some way
in control of the acquisition and use of additional interfaces.
In the general case, nobody is in control - the user device simply
discovers and uses whatever connectivity appears. If this is a
correct understanding, could the title, Abstract and Introduction
make it very clear what the scope is?

I don't understand the threat model because it isn't described
at all. So I can't evaluate any of the assertions about security
requirements. I do know that a conclusion that IPsec must be used
for everything is very unpalatable. There are risks in any public
WLAN of course, but they exist whatever crypto is used.

One detail:

> Alternate IP addresses are provided for a given
> communication, a Primary IP addresses is replaced by an
> Alternate IP address, and Primary and Alternate are not used
> simultaneously for the same communication.

This is not true if the device uses recent techniques such as
MPTCP, which automatically shares the available paths. Such end
to end techniques are outside the control of the provider.

   Brian