Re: [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key

Vijay Devarapalli <vijay.devarapalli@azairenet.com> Mon, 29 October 2007 21:35 UTC

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Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2007 14:34:20 -0700
From: Vijay Devarapalli <vijay.devarapalli@azairenet.com>
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To: James Kempf <kempf@docomolabs-usa.com>
Subject: Re: [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key
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Cc: Mipshop <mipshop@ietf.org>, Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>, draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key@tools.ietf.org
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James Kempf wrote:
> Yes, that's fine.
> 
> I'll have the revisions completed by Fri. Do you want me to resubmit 
> through the RFC Editor in the usual way, 

You mean the IETF secretariat. :)

> and bump the version number up?

Yes.

Vijay

> 
>            jak
> 
> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jari Arkko" <jari.arkko@piuha.net>
> To: "James Kempf" <kempf@docomolabs-usa.com>
> Cc: <draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key@tools.ietf.org>; "Mipshop" 
> <mipshop@ietf.org>
> Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 1:48 PM
> Subject: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key
> 
> 
> James,
> 
>> jak>> If this is not clear from the current text, then perhaps you can
>> suggest a place where some additional text could be added to clarify?
> 
> Ok, I was merely confused about this. Let me go read the text again,
> moment...
> 
> OLD:
>     The mechanism utilizes SEND [SEND] and a public/private
>     key pair, generated on the MN using the same public key algorithm
>     as SEND, to encrypt/decrypt a shared handover key sent from the AR
>     to the MN.
> NEW:
>     The mechanism utilizes SEND [SEND] and an additional public/private
>     key pair, generated on the MN using the same public key algorithm
>     as SEND, to encrypt/decrypt a shared handover key sent from the AR
>     to the MN.
> 
> OLD:
>    The message exchange between the MN and AR
>     to provision the handover key is required to be protected by SEND;
>     that is, the source address for the key provisioning messages must
>     be a CGA and the messages must be signed with the CGA private key.
>     This allows the AR to establish the MN's authorization to operate
>     on the CGA. The AR uses the CGA to name the handover key.
> NEW:
>    The message exchange between the MN and AR
>     to provision the handover key is required to be protected by SEND;
>     that is, the source address for the key provisioning messages must
>     be a CGA and the messages must be signed with the CGA private key.
>     This allows the AR to establish the MN's authorization to operate
>     on the CGA. The AR uses the CGA to name the handover key.
>     The SEND key pair is, however, independent from the handover
>     encryption/decryption key pair and the actual handover key.
> 
> OLD:
>  The MN
>  generates a public/private key pair for encrypting/decrypting the
>  shared handover key, using the same public key algorithm as SEND.
> NEW:
>  First, the MN generates the necessary key pair and associated CGA
>  addresses so that the MN can employ SEND. Then the MN
>  generates a public/private key pair for encrypting/decrypting the
>  shared handover key, using the same public key algorithm as was
>  used for SEND.
> 
> Finally, I noticed that the acronym CGA needs expansion in the
> the abstract.
> 
> Is this enough for you to work for a new draft revision? How soon
> can you get it submitted?
> 
> Jari
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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