Re: [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key

Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@kolumbus.fi> Mon, 29 October 2007 22:04 UTC

Return-path: <mipshop-bounces@ietf.org>
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (helo=stiedprmman1.va.neustar.com) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Imcix-0004sG-Uy; Mon, 29 Oct 2007 18:04:43 -0400
Received: from mipshop by megatron.ietf.org with local (Exim 4.43) id 1Imciw-0004re-TJ for mipshop-confirm+ok@megatron.ietf.org; Mon, 29 Oct 2007 18:04:42 -0400
Received: from [10.90.34.44] (helo=chiedprmail1.ietf.org) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Imciw-0004rR-IJ for mipshop@ietf.org; Mon, 29 Oct 2007 18:04:42 -0400
Received: from p130.piuha.net ([193.234.218.130]) by chiedprmail1.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Imciv-0002yX-Sx for mipshop@ietf.org; Mon, 29 Oct 2007 18:04:42 -0400
Received: from p130.piuha.net (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by p130.piuha.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id B73B7198683; Tue, 30 Oct 2007 00:04:40 +0200 (EET)
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (p130.piuha.net [193.234.218.130]) by p130.piuha.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1BD32198676; Tue, 30 Oct 2007 00:04:40 +0200 (EET)
Message-ID: <472658F8.70207@kolumbus.fi>
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2007 00:04:40 +0200
From: Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@kolumbus.fi>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 1.5.0.14pre (X11/20071022)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: James Kempf <kempf@docomolabs-usa.com>
Subject: Re: [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key
References: <47260A0A.8030005@piuha.net> <01e801c81a4a$29352530$576115ac@dcml.docomolabsusa.com> <47260EF1.8000605@piuha.net> <026201c81a69$19887280$576115ac@dcml.docomolabsusa.com> <47264733.5030708@piuha.net> <02a901c81a6e$01425bf0$576115ac@dcml.docomolabsusa.com>
In-Reply-To: <02a901c81a6e$01425bf0$576115ac@dcml.docomolabsusa.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP
X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/)
X-Scan-Signature: f66b12316365a3fe519e75911daf28a8
Cc: Mipshop <mipshop@ietf.org>, Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>, draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key@tools.ietf.org
X-BeenThere: mipshop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5
Precedence: list
List-Id: mipshop.ietf.org
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mipshop>, <mailto:mipshop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Post: <mailto:mipshop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:mipshop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mipshop>, <mailto:mipshop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Errors-To: mipshop-bounces@ietf.org

Internet drafts editor. And yes, bump the version number.
You should use the submission tool at

   https://datatracker.ietf.org/idst/upload.cgi

Friday sounds good.

Jari

James Kempf kirjoitti:
> Yes, that's fine.
>
> I'll have the revisions completed by Fri. Do you want me to resubmit
> through the RFC Editor in the usual way, and bump the version number up?
>
>            jak
>
> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jari Arkko" <jari.arkko@piuha.net>
> To: "James Kempf" <kempf@docomolabs-usa.com>
> Cc: <draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key@tools.ietf.org>; "Mipshop"
> <mipshop@ietf.org>
> Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 1:48 PM
> Subject: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key
>
>
> James,
>
>> jak>> If this is not clear from the current text, then perhaps you can
>> suggest a place where some additional text could be added to clarify?
>
> Ok, I was merely confused about this. Let me go read the text again,
> moment...
>
> OLD:
>     The mechanism utilizes SEND [SEND] and a public/private
>     key pair, generated on the MN using the same public key algorithm
>     as SEND, to encrypt/decrypt a shared handover key sent from the AR
>     to the MN.
> NEW:
>     The mechanism utilizes SEND [SEND] and an additional public/private
>     key pair, generated on the MN using the same public key algorithm
>     as SEND, to encrypt/decrypt a shared handover key sent from the AR
>     to the MN.
>
> OLD:
>    The message exchange between the MN and AR
>     to provision the handover key is required to be protected by SEND;
>     that is, the source address for the key provisioning messages must
>     be a CGA and the messages must be signed with the CGA private key.
>     This allows the AR to establish the MN's authorization to operate
>     on the CGA. The AR uses the CGA to name the handover key.
> NEW:
>    The message exchange between the MN and AR
>     to provision the handover key is required to be protected by SEND;
>     that is, the source address for the key provisioning messages must
>     be a CGA and the messages must be signed with the CGA private key.
>     This allows the AR to establish the MN's authorization to operate
>     on the CGA. The AR uses the CGA to name the handover key.
>     The SEND key pair is, however, independent from the handover
>     encryption/decryption key pair and the actual handover key.
>
> OLD:
>  The MN
>  generates a public/private key pair for encrypting/decrypting the
>  shared handover key, using the same public key algorithm as SEND.
> NEW:
>  First, the MN generates the necessary key pair and associated CGA
>  addresses so that the MN can employ SEND. Then the MN
>  generates a public/private key pair for encrypting/decrypting the
>  shared handover key, using the same public key algorithm as was
>  used for SEND.
>
> Finally, I noticed that the acronym CGA needs expansion in the
> the abstract.
>
> Is this enough for you to work for a new draft revision? How soon
> can you get it submitted?
>
> Jari
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Mipshop mailing list
> Mipshop@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mipshop
>



_______________________________________________
Mipshop mailing list
Mipshop@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mipshop