[Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key
"James Kempf" <kempf@docomolabs-usa.com> Mon, 29 October 2007 20:55 UTC
Return-path: <mipshop-bounces@ietf.org>
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (helo=stiedprmman1.va.neustar.com) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Imbdo-0007O0-TA; Mon, 29 Oct 2007 16:55:20 -0400
Received: from mipshop by megatron.ietf.org with local (Exim 4.43) id 1Imbdm-0007Nt-Pn for mipshop-confirm+ok@megatron.ietf.org; Mon, 29 Oct 2007 16:55:18 -0400
Received: from [10.90.34.44] (helo=chiedprmail1.ietf.org) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Imbdl-0007Nk-T5 for mipshop@ietf.org; Mon, 29 Oct 2007 16:55:17 -0400
Received: from key1.docomolabs-usa.com ([216.98.102.225] helo=fridge.docomolabs-usa.com) by chiedprmail1.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Imbdl-0006gW-AX for mipshop@ietf.org; Mon, 29 Oct 2007 16:55:17 -0400
Message-ID: <02a901c81a6e$01425bf0$576115ac@dcml.docomolabsusa.com>
From: James Kempf <kempf@docomolabs-usa.com>
To: Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>
References: <47260A0A.8030005@piuha.net> <01e801c81a4a$29352530$576115ac@dcml.docomolabsusa.com> <47260EF1.8000605@piuha.net> <026201c81a69$19887280$576115ac@dcml.docomolabsusa.com> <47264733.5030708@piuha.net>
Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2007 13:55:14 -0700
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format="flowed"; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type="original"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Spam-Score: -97.2 (---------------------------------------------------)
X-Scan-Signature: fb6060cb60c0cea16e3f7219e40a0a81
Cc: Mipshop <mipshop@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key@tools.ietf.org
Subject: [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key
X-BeenThere: mipshop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5
Precedence: list
List-Id: mipshop.ietf.org
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mipshop>, <mailto:mipshop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Post: <mailto:mipshop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:mipshop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mipshop>, <mailto:mipshop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Errors-To: mipshop-bounces@ietf.org
Yes, that's fine. I'll have the revisions completed by Fri. Do you want me to resubmit through the RFC Editor in the usual way, and bump the version number up? jak ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jari Arkko" <jari.arkko@piuha.net> To: "James Kempf" <kempf@docomolabs-usa.com> Cc: <draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key@tools.ietf.org>; "Mipshop" <mipshop@ietf.org> Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 1:48 PM Subject: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key James, > jak>> If this is not clear from the current text, then perhaps you can > suggest a place where some additional text could be added to clarify? Ok, I was merely confused about this. Let me go read the text again, moment... OLD: The mechanism utilizes SEND [SEND] and a public/private key pair, generated on the MN using the same public key algorithm as SEND, to encrypt/decrypt a shared handover key sent from the AR to the MN. NEW: The mechanism utilizes SEND [SEND] and an additional public/private key pair, generated on the MN using the same public key algorithm as SEND, to encrypt/decrypt a shared handover key sent from the AR to the MN. OLD: The message exchange between the MN and AR to provision the handover key is required to be protected by SEND; that is, the source address for the key provisioning messages must be a CGA and the messages must be signed with the CGA private key. This allows the AR to establish the MN's authorization to operate on the CGA. The AR uses the CGA to name the handover key. NEW: The message exchange between the MN and AR to provision the handover key is required to be protected by SEND; that is, the source address for the key provisioning messages must be a CGA and the messages must be signed with the CGA private key. This allows the AR to establish the MN's authorization to operate on the CGA. The AR uses the CGA to name the handover key. The SEND key pair is, however, independent from the handover encryption/decryption key pair and the actual handover key. OLD: The MN generates a public/private key pair for encrypting/decrypting the shared handover key, using the same public key algorithm as SEND. NEW: First, the MN generates the necessary key pair and associated CGA addresses so that the MN can employ SEND. Then the MN generates a public/private key pair for encrypting/decrypting the shared handover key, using the same public key algorithm as was used for SEND. Finally, I noticed that the acronym CGA needs expansion in the the abstract. Is this enough for you to work for a new draft revision? How soon can you get it submitted? Jari _______________________________________________ Mipshop mailing list Mipshop@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mipshop
- [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-han… James Kempf
- [Mipshop] AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-handove… Jari Arkko
- [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-han… James Kempf
- [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-han… Jari Arkko
- [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-han… James Kempf
- [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-han… Jari Arkko
- [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-han… James Kempf
- Re: [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop… Vijay Devarapalli
- Re: [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop… James Kempf
- Re: [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop… Jari Arkko
- [Mipshop] Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-han… Jari Arkko