Re: [Ntp] Antwort: Re: The trick to timestamp with authentication

Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com> Mon, 07 December 2020 13:50 UTC

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Date: Mon, 07 Dec 2020 14:50:01 +0100
From: Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com>
To: kristof.teichel@ptb.de
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Subject: Re: [Ntp] Antwort: Re: The trick to timestamp with authentication
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On Mon, Dec 07, 2020 at 02:25:11PM +0100, kristof.teichel@ptb.de wrote:
>    But having unauthenticated corrections just makes it easier for the
>    attacker, because writing a false correction might be less effort than an
>    actual delay attack.

I'd say it is the opposite. Delaying a packet is not that difficult.
For example, you can generate traffic in order to increase queueing
delays in switches/routers.

In a MITM attack you need to prevent the original packet sent by the
client or server reaching the other host. If you can do that, is it
easier to sent a modified packet than just waiting a bit before
sending the captured packet unmodified? I don't think there is a big
difference.

-- 
Miroslav Lichvar