Re: [Ntp] The trick to timestamp with authentication

Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com> Mon, 07 December 2020 10:54 UTC

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Date: Mon, 07 Dec 2020 11:54:06 +0100
From: Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [Ntp] The trick to timestamp with authentication
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On Fri, Dec 04, 2020 at 01:03:16AM +0000, Doug Arnold wrote:
> The ntp working group could decide ntpv5 can support on path corrections or security, but not both.  However, I suspect a lot of people would be disappointed. 

Please don't forget that MITM attackers can delay packets and cause
larger errors in NTP measurements than unauthenticated corrections.
Not allowing switches to make unauthenticated corrections in
authenticated packets will not improve security.

-- 
Miroslav Lichvar