[Ntp] Antw: Re: Antw: [EXT] Re: Splitting the Roughtime draft?

>>> Warner Losh <imp@bsdimp.com> schrieb am 01.02.2021 um 22:40 in Nachricht
<CANCZdfrCnkyw88wdznGD-3PgF1taMx1ZMNdvV8OP_ATsK413bg@mail.gmail.com>:
> On Mon, Feb 1, 2021 at 12:29 AM Ulrich Windl <
> Ulrich.Windl@rz.uni-regensburg.de> wrote:
> 
>> >>> Hal Murray <hmurray@megapathdsl.net> schrieb am 31.01.2021 um 10:06 in
>> Nachricht <20210131090607.ED116406061@ip-64-139-1-69.sjc.megapath.net>:
>>
>> > marcus@dansarie.se said:
>> >> I think we need to be very clear about the fact that all trust in
>> Roughtime
>> >> is rooted in the long‑term keys and that they are expected to be valid
>> for
>> a
>> >> very long time indeed.
>> >
>> > How long is "very long"?
>>
>> The "industry standard" seems to be 10 years for that, while "long"
>> nowadays
>> is probably only two years...
>>
> 
> Consumer grade stuff is like 1-2 years. But deployed, embedded gear still
> needs 5-10 years depending on the segment it is in. You don't want to climb
> a lot of telephone poles to redeploy every couple of years, for example...

If you have to climb up telephone poles to replace keys, you have a different
problem ;-)

> 
> Warner
> 
> 
>> >
>> > I've been trying to figure out how to use Roughtime to get NTS off the
>> > ground
>> > when the time isn't known/trusted yet.  If it needs long term keys, is
>> there
>>
>> >
>> > any advantage to long‑term Roughtime keys as compared to trusted
>> certificates
>> >
>> > with a long lifetime?
>> >
>> > ‑‑
>> > These are my opinions.  I hate spam.
>> >
>> >
>> >
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