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Re: [OAUTH-WG] Draft -12 feedback deadline

Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com> Fri, 18 February 2011 17:40 UTC

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From: Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Feb 2011 09:40:21 -0800
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To: Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>, oauth-bounces@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Draft -12 feedback deadline
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On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 3:49 AM, Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com> wrote:
> Marius
>
> Isn't the risk of the refresh token leaking the same as the risk of the
> access token leaking, i.e. why not provide both?

Sure, but refresh tokens never die.


> IMO, the refresh token
> just provides a server side mechanism for revoking access, where resource
> servers are distributed, through having short lived access tokens
>
> Of course, the refresh access token flow currently requires a secret so
> would need to be changed or alternative flow introduced. Will wait for
> details of how auth code flow can be used

The flow is not changing. For native apps the client secret can either
be declared optional, or a "well known secret" can be issued for
native apps.

The authorization server can also insist that each native app has a
unique secret and it must guard it, that may or may not make sense.

Marius

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