Re: [OAUTH-WG] Multi-AS State Re-Use

Guido Schmitz <g.schmitz@gtrs.de> Mon, 09 May 2016 18:14 UTC

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From: Guido Schmitz <g.schmitz@gtrs.de>
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Date: Mon, 09 May 2016 20:14:02 +0200
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Multi-AS State Re-Use
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Hi all,

can anybody confirm that this is a new / undocumented attack?

Cheers,

Guido, Daniel, and Ralf

On 22.04.2016 16:23, Daniel Fett wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> Besides the state leakage attack we found that another important fact
> regarding state is underspecified: Each state value should only be
> used for one run of the protocol, in particular, each AS should see a
> different state in multi-AS settings. Clients might be tempted to
> generate state once and then re-use each time a user wants to
> authorize.
> 
> If state is re-used, given a setup where one Client allows users to
> authorize using two AS, a potentially malicious AS learns the state
> value that is valid for authorization at an honest AS. I.e., each AS
> can mount a CSRF attack on the user using the other AS.
> 
> Just as the attack in the other mail, this is not a big deal in
> practice, but should be discussed somewhere.
> 
> Cheers,
> Daniel, Guido, and Ralf
>